From: "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, joro@8bytes.org,
bhelgaas@google.com, will@kernel.org, alex.williamson@redhat.com,
robin.murphy@arm.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] PCI, iommu: Factor 'untrusted' check for ATS enablement
Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 10:19:49 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200515171948.GC75440@otc-nc-03> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200515154351.GA6546@infradead.org>
Hi Christoph
On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 08:43:51AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> Can you please lift the untrusted flag into struct device? It really
> isn't a PCI specific concept, and we should not have code poking into
> pci_dev all over the iommu code.
Just for clarification: All IOMMU's today mostly pertain to only PCI devices
and for devices that aren't PCI like HPET for instance we give a PCI
identifier. Facilities like ATS for instance require the platform to have
an IOMMU.
what additional problems does moving this to struct device solve?
Cheers,
Ashok
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-15 17:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-15 10:43 [PATCH 0/4] PCI, iommu: Factor 'untrusted' check for ATS enablement Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-15 10:43 ` [PATCH 1/4] PCI/ATS: Only enable ATS for trusted devices Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-15 11:57 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-05-15 21:18 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-05-15 10:44 ` [PATCH 2/4] iommu/amd: Use pci_ats_supported() Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-15 12:01 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-05-15 12:11 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-15 12:21 ` Joerg Roedel
2020-05-15 10:44 ` [PATCH 3/4] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: " Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-18 15:37 ` Will Deacon
2020-05-15 10:44 ` [PATCH 4/4] iommu/vt-d: " Jean-Philippe Brucker
2020-05-15 15:43 ` [PATCH 0/4] PCI, iommu: Factor 'untrusted' check for ATS enablement Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-15 17:19 ` Raj, Ashok [this message]
2020-05-15 17:21 ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 15:47 ` David Woodhouse
2020-05-18 16:29 ` Raj, Ashok
2020-05-18 16:36 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
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