From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: alistair23@gmail.com
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org, ojeda@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/21] PCI/TSM: Rename pf0 to host
Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 05:12:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260623051220.66C921F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260623045406.2589547-11-alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Use-After-Free and freed mutex unlock in `__pci_tsm_disconnect()` for hosts on PF > 0.
- [High] Disconnecting any TSM host blindly destroys independent TSM contexts of sibling functions in the same PCI slot.
--
commit 8bf82a17d0ecf2259067413b6fb0b2c2e2bef4d9
Author: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
PCI/TSM: Rename pf0 to host
Rename pci_tsm_pf0 to pci_tsm_host (and rename variables and function
names from pf0 to host) as part of converting pci_tsm_host
to be any device that knows how to speak any of CMA, IDE, or
TDISP.
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/tsm.c b/drivers/pci/tsm.c
> --- a/drivers/pci/tsm.c
> +++ b/drivers/pci/tsm.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -441,19 +441,19 @@ static void __pci_tsm_disconnect(struct pci_dev *pdev)
> /*
> * disconnect() is uninterruptible as it may be called for device
> * teardown
> */
> - guard(mutex)(&tsm_pf0->lock);
> + guard(mutex)(&tsm_host->lock);
> pci_tsm_walk_fns_reverse(pdev, remove_fn, NULL);
[Severity: High]
Can this lead to a use-after-free and memory corruption when a TSM host
is on a Physical Function > 0?
When disconnecting a host on PF > 0 (such as a CMA host on PF 1),
pci_tsm_walk_fns_reverse() iterates over the slot. The walker skips
the callback only for i == 0. When i > 0, it applies the teardown to the
function itself:
drivers/pci/tsm.c:pci_tsm_walk_fns_reverse() {
...
/* on exit, caller will run @cb on function 0 */
if (i > 0)
cb(pf, data);
}
This causes remove_fn() to be called on PF 1 itself, which frees the
tsm_host object via pci_tsm_host_destructor() and kfree(). When
__pci_tsm_disconnect() returns, the guard attempts to unlock the destroyed
and freed mutex.
[Severity: High]
Does this unintentionally destroy the TSM contexts of independent
sibling functions?
The call to pci_tsm_walk_fns_reverse() unconditionally applies remove_fn()
to all functions in the slot. If multiple independent TSM hosts exist
within the same PCI slot (for example, PF 0 as a TDISP host and PF 1 as a
CMA host), disconnecting one host will cause the walker to execute
remove_fn() on the other siblings.
drivers/pci/tsm.c:remove_fn() {
tsm_remove(pdev->tsm);
link_sysfs_disable(pdev);
return 0;
}
Since remove_fn() does not verify if the function's TSM context actually
belongs to the specific host being disconnected (the data argument is NULL),
could disconnecting PF 1 silently wipe out the entirely separate host
context of PF 0?
> ops->disconnect(pdev);
> }
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260623045406.2589547-1-alistair.francis@wdc.com?part=10
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-23 5:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-23 4:53 [PATCH v2 00/21] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM alistair23
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 01/21] rust: transmute: add `cast_slice[_mut]` functions alistair23
2026-06-23 5:05 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 02/21] rust: create basic untrusted data API alistair23
2026-06-23 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 03/21] rust: validate: add `Validate` trait alistair23
2026-06-23 5:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 04/21] X.509: Make certificate parser public alistair23
2026-06-23 5:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 05/21] X.509: Parse Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-06-23 5:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 06/21] X.509: Move certificate length retrieval into new helper alistair23
2026-06-23 5:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 07/21] rust: add bindings for hash.h alistair23
2026-06-23 7:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 08/21] rust: error: impl From<FromBytesWithNulError> for Kernel Error alistair23
2026-06-23 5:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 09/21] lib: rspdm: Initial commit of Rust SPDM alistair23
2026-06-23 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 10/21] PCI/TSM: Rename pf0 to host alistair23
2026-06-23 5:12 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 11/21] PCI/TSM: Support connecting to PCIe CMA devices alistair23
2026-06-23 5:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 12/21] PCI/CMA: Add a PCI TSM CMA driver using SPDM alistair23
2026-06-23 5:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 13/21] PCI/CMA: Validate Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-06-23 5:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:53 ` [PATCH v2 14/21] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_version alistair23
2026-06-23 5:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:54 ` [PATCH v2 15/21] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_capabilities alistair23
2026-06-23 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:54 ` [PATCH v2 16/21] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM negotiate_algorithms alistair23
2026-06-23 5:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:54 ` [PATCH v2 17/21] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_digests alistair23
2026-06-23 5:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:54 ` [PATCH v2 18/21] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_certificate alistair23
2026-06-23 5:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:54 ` [PATCH v2 19/21] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM certificate validation alistair23
2026-06-23 5:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:54 ` [PATCH v2 20/21] rust: allow extracting the buffer from a CString alistair23
2026-06-23 5:13 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 4:54 ` [PATCH v2 21/21] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM challenge alistair23
2026-06-23 5:21 ` sashiko-bot
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