* [PATCH v2] rust: pci: Reject IRQ vector indices that do not fit in u32
@ 2026-08-31 6:08 Sophon Z via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 6:17 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Sophon Z via B4 Relay @ 2026-08-31 6:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Danilo Krummrich, Bjorn Helgaas, Krzysztof Wilczyński,
Miguel Ojeda, Boqun Feng, Gary Guo, Björn Roy Baron,
Benno Lossin, Andreas Hindborg, Alice Ryhl, Trevor Gross,
Daniel Almeida, Tamir Duberstein, Alexandre Courbot,
Onur Özkan
Cc: linux-pci, rust-for-linux, linux-kernel, Sophon Z
From: Sophon Z <aiqubits@hotmail.com>
IrqVectorRegistration::index() accepts a usize, but pci_irq_vector()
takes an unsigned int. On 64-bit architectures, casting an index
larger than u32::MAX wraps it before the PCI core can validate it.
In particular, u32::MAX + 1 becomes zero and can resolve to the first
allocated vector.
Use a checked conversion and return EINVAL when the index cannot be
represented by the C API.
Fixes: 2fb7755b0a7e ("rust: pci: resolve IRQ in index() and embed IrqRequest in IrqVector")
Signed-off-by: Sophon Z <aiqubits@hotmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- EDITME: describe what is new in this series revision.
- EDITME: use bulletpoints and terse descriptions.
- Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20260831-fix-pci-irq-vector-index-truncation-v1-1-d63217d99b67@hotmail.com
---
rust/kernel/pci/irq.rs | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/rust/kernel/pci/irq.rs b/rust/kernel/pci/irq.rs
index 6741046ec1c0..1bf91973cb1f 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/pci/irq.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/pci/irq.rs
@@ -151,8 +151,10 @@ pub fn irq_type(&self) -> IrqType {
/// [`Self::len()`].
#[inline]
pub fn index(&self, index: usize) -> Result<IrqVector<'_>> {
+ let index = u32::try_from(index).map_err(|_| EINVAL)?;
+
// SAFETY: `self.dev.as_raw()` is a valid pointer to a `struct pci_dev`.
- let irq = unsafe { bindings::pci_irq_vector(self.dev.as_raw(), index as u32) };
+ let irq = unsafe { bindings::pci_irq_vector(self.dev.as_raw(), index) };
if irq < 0 {
return Err(Error::from_errno(irq));
}
---
base-commit: cee9395acd8043be0644b25c34bfa86623f2b935
change-id: 20260831-fix-pci-irq-vector-index-truncation-6752f3751a0d
Best regards,
--
Sophon Z <aiqubits@hotmail.com>
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] rust: pci: Reject IRQ vector indices that do not fit in u32
2026-08-31 6:08 [PATCH v2] rust: pci: Reject IRQ vector indices that do not fit in u32 Sophon Z via B4 Relay
@ 2026-08-31 6:17 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-08-31 6:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sophon Z; +Cc: linux-pci, ojeda
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] `IrqVectorRegistration::index` delegates out-of-bounds validation entirely to the C API `pci_irq_vector`, which triggers a `WARN_ON_ONCE` for sufficiently large indices, potentially causing a kernel panic.
--
commit 1d05a4f88062a655f88b6ab70e939331e2445d7b
Author: Sophon Z <aiqubits@hotmail.com>
rust: pci: Reject IRQ vector indices that do not fit in u32
IrqVectorRegistration::index() accepts a usize, but pci_irq_vector() takes
an unsigned int. This commit adds a checked conversion to prevent wrapping
on 64-bit architectures, returning EINVAL if the index exceeds u32 limits.
> diff --git a/rust/kernel/pci/irq.rs b/rust/kernel/pci/irq.rs
> index 6741046ec1c09..1bf91973cb1f4 100644
> --- a/rust/kernel/pci/irq.rs
> +++ b/rust/kernel/pci/irq.rs
> @@ -151,8 +151,10 @@ pub fn irq_type(&self) -> IrqType {
> /// [`Self::len()`].
> #[inline]
> pub fn index(&self, index: usize) -> Result<IrqVector<'_>> {
> + let index = u32::try_from(index).map_err(|_| EINVAL)?;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this adequately prevent out-of-bounds
indices from reaching the C API?
Passing an index greater than 65535 (MSI_MAX_INDEX) causes the underlying
C API msi_domain_get_virq() to trigger a WARN_ON_ONCE(index > MSI_MAX_INDEX).
On systems configured with panic_on_warn=1, this leads to a kernel panic.
If a driver exposes IRQ vector selection to userspace without its own bounds
checking, relying on this abstraction to return EINVAL, this could result in
a Denial of Service.
Since self.len() is already known and guaranteed to be at most 2048 for
MSI-X, wouldn't explicitly checking if index >= self.len() be safer and
inherently prevent the warning from being triggered?
> +
> // SAFETY: `self.dev.as_raw()` is a valid pointer to a `struct pci_dev`.
> - let irq = unsafe { bindings::pci_irq_vector(self.dev.as_raw(), index as u32) };
> + let irq = unsafe { bindings::pci_irq_vector(self.dev.as_raw(), index) };
> if irq < 0 {
> return Err(Error::from_errno(irq));
> }
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260831-fix-pci-irq-vector-index-truncation-v2-1-4030ea7746a9@hotmail.com?part=1
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