From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Wei Huang" <wei.huang2@amd.com>
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/3] PCI: Add per-device debugfs directories
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2026 16:10:00 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261001161002.1379B1F000FF@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261001155551.4182899-3-wei.huang2@amd.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] PCI: system-wide stall during hotplug due to global pci_debugfs_lock held over debugfs removal
- [Medium] PCI: speculative resource leak due to unpoisoned debugfs pointer on teardown
--
commit 64859f6a500632327edcd41b730592212c9d3478
Author: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
PCI: Add per-device debugfs directories
This commit adds per-device debugfs directories owned by the PCI core,
using pci_dev_debugfs_dir() to create them on demand and pci_destroy_dev()
to recursively remove them.
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/debugfs.c b/drivers/pci/debugfs.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..682fb614d7cfb
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/pci/debugfs.c
[ ... ]
> +void pci_dev_debugfs_remove(struct pci_dev *dev)
> +{
> + guard(mutex)(&pci_debugfs_lock);
> +
> + debugfs_remove_recursive(dev->debugfs);
[Severity: High]
Does holding the global pci_debugfs_lock during debugfs_remove_recursive()
risk a system-wide stall?
If a userspace process is actively reading a debugfs file, the removal will
block for SRCU synchronization. Because the global lock is held via
guard(mutex) for the entire function scope, any concurrent
pci_dev_debugfs_dir() or pci_dev_debugfs_remove() calls on unrelated PCI
devices will then block indefinitely during hotplug and removal operations.
Could the dentry be extracted under the lock and removed outside of it?
> + dev->debugfs = NULL;
[Severity: Medium]
Can a concurrent runtime sysfs operation mistakenly recreate this debugfs
directory after removal?
This sets the pointer to NULL while the device is still exposed to the
system. As seen in pci_destroy_dev(), pci_dev_debugfs_remove() is called
prior to device_del(). If a concurrent operation calls pci_dev_debugfs_dir()
and sees NULL, it might recreate the directory and permanently leak it after
the device is finally deleted.
Should the pointer be explicitly poisoned with ERR_PTR(-ENODEV) instead
of set to NULL to prevent recreation?
> +}
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/remove.c b/drivers/pci/remove.c
> index e711ac1d4e38a..e10139117d578 100644
> --- a/drivers/pci/remove.c
> +++ b/drivers/pci/remove.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ static void pci_destroy_dev(struct pci_dev *dev)
> platform_pci_remove_wake(dev);
> pci_doe_sysfs_teardown(dev);
> pci_npem_remove(dev);
> + pci_dev_debugfs_remove(dev);
>
> /*
> * While device is in D0 drop the device from TSM link operations
> * including unbind and disconnect (IDE + SPDM teardown).
> */
> pci_tsm_destroy(dev);
>
> device_del(&dev->dev);
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261001155551.4182899-1-wei.huang2@amd.com?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-01 16:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-01 15:55 [PATCH RFC 0/3] PCI/TPH: Expose CPU-to-Steering Tag mappings via debugfs Wei Huang
2026-10-01 15:55 ` [PATCH RFC 1/3] PCI/TPH: Factor out the ST _DSM evaluation Wei Huang
2026-10-01 16:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-01 15:55 ` [PATCH RFC 2/3] PCI: Add per-device debugfs directories Wei Huang
2026-10-01 16:10 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-01 15:55 ` [PATCH RFC 3/3] Expose the CPU/Steering Tag mapping via debugfs Wei Huang
2026-10-01 16:04 ` sashiko-bot
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