From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>, Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>,
"Bjorn Helgaas" <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>, <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/11] PCI/TSM: Authenticate devices via platform TSM
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 12:42:26 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <67b8e5328fd41_2d2c294e5@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <efc5ba59-964d-4988-a412-47f5297fedd3@amd.com>
Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> On 6/12/24 09:23, Dan Williams wrote:
> > The PCIe 6.1 specification, section 11, introduces the Trusted Execution
> > Environment (TEE) Device Interface Security Protocol (TDISP). This
> > interface definition builds upon Component Measurement and
> > Authentication (CMA), and link Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE). It
> > adds support for assigning devices (PCI physical or virtual function) to
> > a confidential VM such that the assigned device is enabled to access
> > guest private memory protected by technologies like Intel TDX, AMD
> > SEV-SNP, RISCV COVE, or ARM CCA.
> >
> > The "TSM" (TEE Security Manager) is a concept in the TDISP specification
> > of an agent that mediates between a "DSM" (Device Security Manager) and
> > system software in both a VMM and a confidential VM. A VMM uses TSM ABIs
> > to setup link security and assign devices. A confidential VM uses TSM
> > ABIs to transition an assigned device into the TDISP "RUN" state and
> > validate its configuration. From a Linux perspective the TSM abstracts
> > many of the details of TDISP, IDE, and CMA. Some of those details leak
> > through at times, but for the most part TDISP is an internal
> > implementation detail of the TSM.
> >
> > CONFIG_PCI_TSM adds an "authenticated" attribute and "tsm/" subdirectory
> > to pci-sysfs. The work in progress CONFIG_PCI_CMA (software
> > kernel-native PCI authentication) that can depend on a local to the PCI
> > core implementation, CONFIG_PCI_TSM needs to be prepared for late
> > loading of the platform TSM driver. Consider that the TSM driver may
> > itself be a PCI driver. Userspace can watch /sys/class/tsm/tsm0/uevent
> > to know when the PCI core has TSM services enabled.
> >
> > The common verbs that the low-level TSM drivers implement are defined by
> > 'struct pci_tsm_ops'. For now only 'connect' and 'disconnect' are
> > defined for secure session and IDE establishment. The 'probe' and
> > 'remove' operations setup per-device context representing the device's
> > security manager (DSM). Note that there is only one DSM expected per
> > physical PCI function, and that coordinates a variable number of
> > assignable interfaces to CVMs.
> >
> > The locking allows for multiple devices to be executing commands
> > simultaneously, one outstanding command per-device and an rwsem flushes
> > all in-flight commands when a TSM low-level driver/device is removed.
> >
> > Thanks to Wu Hao for his work on an early draft of this support.
> >
> > Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> > Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>
> > Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
> > Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> > ---
> > Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci | 42 ++++
> > MAINTAINERS | 2
> > drivers/pci/Kconfig | 13 +
> > drivers/pci/Makefile | 1
> > drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 4
> > drivers/pci/pci.h | 10 +
> > drivers/pci/probe.c | 1
> > drivers/pci/remove.c | 3
> > drivers/pci/tsm.c | 293 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > drivers/virt/coco/host/tsm-core.c | 19 ++
>
> It is sooo small, make me wonder why we need it at all...
I expect it to grow as more common cross-vendor host TSM functionality
is added.
> > +static int pci_tsm_connect(struct pci_dev *pdev)
> > +{
> > + struct pci_tsm *pci_tsm = pdev->tsm;
> > + int rc;
> > +
> > + lockdep_assert_held(&pci_tsm_rwsem);
> > + if_not_guard(mutex_intr, &pci_tsm->lock)
> > + return -EINTR;
> > +
> > + if (pci_tsm->state >= PCI_TSM_CONNECT)
> > + return 0;
> > + if (pci_tsm->state < PCI_TSM_INIT)
> > + return -ENXIO;
> > +
> > + rc = tsm_ops->connect(pdev);
>
> I thought ages ago it was suggested that DOE/SPDM loop happens in a
> common place and not in the platform driver implementing
> tsm_ops->connect() (but I may have missed the point then).
That's still the plan, but I would expect that to be a common helper
that TSM drivers can use and does not need to be enforced as a midlayer
detail in pci/tsm.c. We can add that to pci/doe.c or somewhere more
appropriate for SPDM transport helpers.
[..]
> > diff --git a/include/linux/pci-tsm.h b/include/linux/pci-tsm.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..beb0d68129bc
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/include/linux/pci-tsm.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> > +#ifndef __PCI_TSM_H
> > +#define __PCI_TSM_H
> > +#include <linux/mutex.h>
> > +
> > +struct pci_dev;
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * struct pci_dsm - Device Security Manager context
> > + * @pdev: physical device back pointer
> > + */
> > +struct pci_dsm {
> > + struct pci_dev *pdev;
> > +};
> > +
> > +enum pci_tsm_state {
> > + PCI_TSM_ERR = -1,
> > + PCI_TSM_INIT,
> > + PCI_TSM_CONNECT,
> > +};
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * struct pci_tsm - Platform TSM transport context
> > + * @state: reflect device initialized, connected, or bound
> > + * @lock: protect @state vs pci_tsm_ops invocation
> > + * @doe_mb: PCIe Data Object Exchange mailbox
> > + * @dsm: TSM driver device context established by pci_tsm_ops.probe
> > + */
> > +struct pci_tsm {
> > + enum pci_tsm_state state;
> > + struct mutex lock;
> > + struct pci_doe_mb *doe_mb;
> > + struct pci_dsm *dsm;
> > +};
>
> doe_mb and state look are device's attribures so will look more
> appropriate in pci_dsm ("d" from "dsm" is "device"), and pci_tsm would
> be some intimate knowledge of the ccp.ko (==PSP) about PCI PFs ("t" ==
> "TEE" == TCB == PSP). Or I got it all wrong?
I typed up a long reply only to realize I think this can be made simpler
by only having one common context and drop this subtle 'struct pci_dsm'
distinction.
So, 'struct pci_tsm' is just the common core context / handle for
drivers/pci/tsm.c to communicate with low level TSM driver
implementation. It is allocated by pci_tsm_ops->probe() and freed by
pci_tsm_ops->remove().
A low-level TSM driver can optionally wrap that core context with its
own data, i.e. enforce a container_of() relationship between the core
context and the low level context.
[..]
> > diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h
> > index 50811b7655dd..a0900e7d2012 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/pci.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/pci.h
> > @@ -535,6 +535,9 @@ struct pci_dev {
> > u16 ide_cap; /* Link Integrity & Data Encryption */
> > u16 sel_ide_cap; /* - Selective Stream register block */
> > int nr_ide_mem; /* - Address range limits for streams */
> > +#endif
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_TSM
> > + struct pci_tsm *tsm; /* TSM operation state */
> > #endif
> > u16 acs_cap; /* ACS Capability offset */
> > u8 supported_speeds; /* Supported Link Speeds Vector */
> > diff --git a/include/linux/tsm.h b/include/linux/tsm.h
> > index 1a97459fc23e..46b9a0c6ea4e 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/tsm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/tsm.h
> > @@ -111,7 +111,9 @@ struct tsm_report_ops {
> > int tsm_report_register(const struct tsm_report_ops *ops, void *priv);
> > int tsm_report_unregister(const struct tsm_report_ops *ops);
> > struct tsm_subsys;
> > +struct pci_tsm_ops;
> > struct tsm_subsys *tsm_register(struct device *parent,
> > - const struct attribute_group **groups);
> > + const struct attribute_group **groups,
> > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops);
> > void tsm_unregister(struct tsm_subsys *subsys);
> > #endif /* __TSM_H */
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h b/include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h
> > index 9635b27d2485..19bba65a262c 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h
> > @@ -499,6 +499,7 @@
> > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_PWR_VAL 0x03fc0000 /* Slot Power Limit Value */
> > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_PWR_SCL 0x0c000000 /* Slot Power Limit Scale */
> > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_FLR 0x10000000 /* Function Level Reset */
> > +#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_TEE 0x40000000 /* TEE I/O (TDISP) Support */
> > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL 0x08 /* Device Control */
> > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_CERE 0x0001 /* Correctable Error Reporting En. */
> > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_NFERE 0x0002 /* Non-Fatal Error Reporting Enable */
> >
>
>
> I am trying to wrap my head around your tsm. here is what I got in my tree:
> https://github.com/aik/linux/blob/tsm/include/linux/tsm.h
>
> Shortly:
>
> drivers/virt/coco/tsm.ko does sysfs (including "connect" and "bind" to
> control and "certs"/"report" to attest) and implements tsm_dev/tsm_tdi,
> it does not know pci_dev;
>
> drivers/pci/tsm-pci.ko creates/destroys tsm_dev/tsm_dev using tsm.ko;
>
> drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp.ko (the PSP guy) registers:
> - tsm_subsys in tsm.ko (which does "connect" and "bind" and
> - tsm_bus_subsys in tsm-pci.ko (which does "spdm_forward")
> ccp.ko knows about pci_dev and whatever else comes in the future, and
> ccp.ko's "connect" implementation calls the IDE library (I am adopting
> yours now, with some tweaks).
>
> tsm-dev and tsm-tdi embed struct dev each and are added as children to
> PCI devices: no hide/show attrs, no additional TSM pointer in struct
> device or pci_dev, looks like:
The motivation for building awareness of device-security properties
natively into 'struct pci_dev' is the recognition that TSM-based
security is not the only model that Linux needs to contend. The TSM
flow is a superset of PCI-CMA and maybe PCI-IDE in the future (although
Intel seems to be the only architecture that has a concept of allowing
IDE establishment without a TSM).
I understand your motivations to make all of TSM functionality bolted
onto the side of the PCI core. It has some nice properties. However, I
think that is a SEV-TIO centric view of the world. PCI device security
attributes are PCI device attributes and have reason to exist with and
without a TSM. In other words, certificates and measurements should not
be placed behind a TSM ABI because certificates and measurements are
expected to have a native PCI-CMA ABI.
It would be a useful property if software written to retrieve
measurement and certificate chains did that relative to the PCI dev
independent of TSM presence.
> aik@sc ~> ls /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:e1:04.0/tsm-tdi/tdi:0000:e1:04.0/
> device power subsystem tsm_report tsm_report_user tsm_tdi_bind
> tsm_tdi_status tsm_tdi_status_user uevent
>
> aik@sc ~> ls /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:e1:04.0/tsm_dev/
> device power subsystem tsm_certs tsm_cert_slot tsm_certs_user
> tsm_dev_connect tsm_dev_status tsm_meas tsm_meas_user uevent
>
> aik@sc ~> ls /sys/class/tsm/tsm0/
> device power stream0:0000:e1:00.0 subsystem uevent
>
> aik@sc ~> ls /sys/class/tsm-dev/
> tdev:0000:c0:01.1 tdev:0000:e0:01.1 tdev:0000:e1:00.0
>
> aik@sc ~> ls /sys/class/tsm-tdi/
> tdi:0000:c0:01.1 tdi:0000:e0:01.1 tdi:0000:e1:00.0 tdi:0000:e1:04.0
> tdi:0000:e1:04.1 tdi:0000:e1:04.2 tdi:0000:e1:04.3
Right, so I remain unconvinced that Linux needs to contend with new "tsm"
class devs vs PCI device objects with security properties especially
when those security properties have a "TSM" and non-"TSM" flavor.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-21 20:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 125+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-05 22:23 [PATCH 00/11] PCI/TSM: Core infrastructure for PCI device security (TDISP) Dan Williams
2024-12-05 22:23 ` [PATCH 01/11] configfs-tsm: Namespace TSM report symbols Dan Williams
2024-12-10 6:08 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-12-11 13:55 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-12-05 22:23 ` [PATCH 02/11] coco/guest: Move shared guest CC infrastructure to drivers/virt/coco/guest/ Dan Williams
2024-12-10 6:09 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-12-05 22:23 ` [PATCH 03/11] coco/tsm: Introduce a class device for TEE Security Managers Dan Williams
2025-01-28 12:17 ` Jonathan Cameron
2025-02-25 21:08 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-05 22:23 ` [PATCH 04/11] PCI/IDE: Selective Stream IDE enumeration Dan Williams
2024-12-10 3:08 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2024-12-12 6:32 ` Xu Yilun
2025-02-22 0:42 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-20 3:17 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-10 6:18 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-20 3:59 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-10 7:05 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-12-12 6:06 ` Xu Yilun
2024-12-18 10:35 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-22 0:30 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-20 18:07 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-21 0:53 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-27 23:46 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-10 19:24 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2025-02-22 0:13 ` Dan Williams
2025-01-30 10:45 ` Jonathan Cameron
2025-02-26 0:21 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-05 22:23 ` [PATCH 05/11] PCI/TSM: Authenticate devices via platform TSM Dan Williams
2024-12-10 10:18 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-21 8:13 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-02-25 7:17 ` Xu Yilun
2025-02-26 12:10 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-02-26 12:13 ` [RFC PATCH 1/7] tsm: Select PCI_DOE which is required for PCI_TSM Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2025-02-26 12:13 ` [RFC PATCH 2/7] tsm: Move tsm core outside the host directory Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2025-02-26 12:13 ` [RFC PATCH 3/7] tsm: vfio: Add tsm bind/unbind support Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2025-02-26 12:13 ` [RFC PATCH 4/7] tsm: Allow tsm ops function to be called for multi-function devices Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2025-02-26 12:13 ` [RFC PATCH 5/7] tsm: Don't error out for doe mailbox failure Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2025-02-26 12:13 ` [RFC PATCH 6/7] tsm: Allow tsm connect ops to be used for multiple operations Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2025-02-26 12:13 ` [RFC PATCH 7/7] tsm: Add secure SPDM support Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2025-02-27 6:50 ` Xu Yilun
2025-02-27 6:35 ` [PATCH 05/11] PCI/TSM: Authenticate devices via platform TSM Xu Yilun
2025-02-27 13:57 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-02-28 1:26 ` Xu Yilun
2025-02-28 9:48 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-03-01 7:50 ` Xu Yilun
2025-03-07 3:07 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-27 19:53 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-28 10:06 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-02-21 20:42 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2025-02-25 4:45 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-28 3:09 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-10 18:52 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2025-02-21 22:32 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-12 9:50 ` Xu Yilun
2025-02-22 1:15 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-24 11:02 ` Xu Yilun
2025-02-28 0:15 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-28 9:39 ` Xu Yilun
2025-01-30 11:45 ` Jonathan Cameron
2025-02-26 0:50 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-05 22:23 ` [PATCH 06/11] samples/devsec: PCI device-security bus / endpoint sample Dan Williams
2024-12-06 4:23 ` kernel test robot
2024-12-09 3:40 ` kernel test robot
2025-01-30 13:21 ` Jonathan Cameron
2025-02-26 2:00 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-05 22:23 ` [PATCH 07/11] PCI: Add PCIe Device 3 Extended Capability enumeration Dan Williams
2024-12-09 13:17 ` Ilpo Järvinen
2025-02-20 3:05 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-20 3:09 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-10 19:21 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-12-11 13:22 ` Ilpo Järvinen
2025-02-22 0:15 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-24 15:09 ` Ilpo Järvinen
2025-02-28 0:29 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-21 23:34 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-25 2:25 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-12-05 22:24 ` [PATCH 08/11] PCI/IDE: Add IDE establishment helpers Dan Williams
2024-12-10 3:19 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2024-12-10 3:37 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-02-20 3:39 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-21 15:53 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-02-25 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2025-01-07 20:19 ` Xu Yilun
2025-01-10 13:25 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-02-24 22:31 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-25 2:29 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-20 3:28 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-10 7:07 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-20 21:44 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-10 18:47 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2025-02-21 22:02 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-12 10:50 ` Xu Yilun
2024-12-19 7:25 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-12-19 10:05 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-01-07 20:00 ` Xu Yilun
2025-01-09 2:35 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-01-09 21:28 ` Xu Yilun
2025-01-15 0:20 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-25 0:06 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-25 3:39 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-28 2:26 ` Dan Williams
2025-03-04 0:03 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-03-04 0:57 ` Dan Williams
2025-03-04 1:31 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-03-04 17:59 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-20 4:19 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-24 22:24 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-25 2:45 ` Xu Yilun
2025-02-24 20:28 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-26 1:54 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-24 20:24 ` Dan Williams
2025-02-25 5:01 ` Xu Yilun
2024-12-05 22:24 ` [PATCH 09/11] PCI/IDE: Report available IDE streams Dan Williams
2024-12-06 0:12 ` kernel test robot
2024-12-06 0:43 ` kernel test robot
2025-02-11 6:10 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-02-27 23:35 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-05 22:24 ` [PATCH 10/11] PCI/TSM: Report active " Dan Williams
2024-12-10 18:49 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2025-02-21 22:28 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-05 22:24 ` [PATCH 11/11] samples/devsec: Add sample IDE establishment Dan Williams
2025-01-30 13:39 ` Jonathan Cameron
2025-02-27 23:27 ` Dan Williams
2024-12-06 6:05 ` [PATCH 00/11] PCI/TSM: Core infrastructure for PCI device security (TDISP) Greg KH
2024-12-06 8:44 ` Dan Williams
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