From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Dapeng Mi" <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] perf/x86/intel: Clear cpuc->pmu on hybrid PMU init failure
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2026 07:26:18 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260710072619.5E3011F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260710065128.1799838-4-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [High] Lockless double-read of `cpuc->pmu` in `x86_get_pmu()` leads to a TOCTOU race when racing with `cpuc->pmu = NULL`, causing a NULL pointer dereference.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The patch leaves a critical memory corruption vulnerability unhandled if a CPU hotplug rollback occurs before the hybrid PMU initialization runs.
- [High] An unhandled #GP fault occurs in `intel_pmu_handle_irq` if a spurious NMI/PMI is received on a CPU where PMU initialization failed.
--
--- Patch [3]: [PATCH 3/7] perf/x86/intel: Clear cpuc->pmu on hybrid PMU init failure ---
commit 0c199c356195e47c5b429eac88846944835a4589
Author: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
perf/x86/intel: Clear cpuc->pmu on hybrid PMU init failure
When init_hybrid_pmu() fails at check_hw_exists(), cpuc->pmu may still
point to the default static PMU. The CPU hotplug rollback then runs
intel_pmu_cpu_dead(). On hybrid systems, that path may call
hybrid_pmu(cpuc->pmu), which is not valid for the static PMU pointer and
can result in incorrect hybrid state access.
Fix this by resetting cpuc->pmu to NULL on hybrid PMU init failure.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> index b39c6ce0efb5c..9d4774278b508 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> @@ -6329,8 +6329,10 @@ static bool init_hybrid_pmu(int cpu)
>
> intel_pmu_check_hybrid_pmus(pmu);
>
> - if (!check_hw_exists(&pmu->pmu, pmu->cntr_mask, pmu->fixed_cntr_mask))
> + if (!check_hw_exists(&pmu->pmu, pmu->cntr_mask, pmu->fixed_cntr_mask)) {
> + cpuc->pmu = NULL;
[Severity: High]
Can this assignment race with concurrent readers? Looking at x86_get_pmu()
in arch/x86/events/core.c, there is a lockless double-read of cpuc->pmu:
x86_get_pmu(int cpu)
{
...
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpuc->pmu))
return &pmu;
return cpuc->pmu;
}
If sys_perf_event_open() executes concurrently and calls x86_get_pmu()
via reserve_lbr_buffers(), could the compiler emit two independent loads?
If cpuc->pmu is non-NULL during the first load but is set to NULL by this
patch before the second load, x86_get_pmu() would return NULL. Does this
lead to a NULL pointer dereference in reserve_lbr_buffers()?
> + return false;
> + }
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does this fully resolve the
rollback vulnerability?
If a CPU hotplug operation fails between the CPUHP_PERF_X86_PREPARE and
CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_STARTING states, the hotplug core rolls back and invokes
intel_pmu_cpu_dead().
Because init_hybrid_pmu() is bypassed entirely, cpuc->pmu remains pointing
to the static default pmu struct.
intel_pmu_cpu_dead() then executes:
if (is_hybrid() && cpuc->pmu)
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &hybrid_pmu(cpuc->pmu)->supported_cpus);
Since cpuc->pmu is non-NULL, hybrid_pmu() calculates a negative offset from
the static pmu struct, and cpumask_clear_cpu() performs an out-of-bounds
memory write. Is there a way to safely handle rollbacks that bypass
initialization entirely?
[Severity: High]
This is also a pre-existing issue, but what happens if a spurious NMI is
received on a CPU where check_hw_exists() failed?
If init_hybrid_pmu() returns false here, x86_pmu_starting_cpu() ignores this
failure and returns 0, allowing the CPU to come online with a disabled PMU.
If another CPU has active perf events, active_events is greater than 0.
When an NMI broadcast hits this broken CPU, perf_event_nmi_handler() sees
active_events > 0 and calls intel_pmu_handle_irq(), which executes:
__intel_pmu_disable_all(true);
This unconditionally executes wrmsrq(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0).
Since the PMU MSRs are unsupported on this CPU, will this unchecked wrmsrq
trigger a fatal general protection fault?
> pr_info("%s PMU driver: ", pmu->name);
>
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260710065128.1799838-1-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com?part=3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-10 7:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-10 6:51 [PATCH 0/7] perf/x86: Miscellaneous PMU bug fixes and optimizations Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10 6:51 ` [PATCH 1/7] perf/x86: Unregister PMI handler on PMU init failure Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10 6:51 ` [PATCH 2/7] perf/x86: Free hybrid state " Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10 6:51 ` [PATCH 3/7] perf/x86/intel: Clear cpuc->pmu on hybrid " Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10 7:26 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-10 8:01 ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-07-10 8:20 ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-07-10 6:51 ` [PATCH 4/7] perf/x86/intel: Unwind cpuc state if PEBS buffer setup fails Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10 6:51 ` [PATCH 5/7] perf/x86: Remove stale fixed counter helper and fix hybrid PMU access Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10 6:51 ` [PATCH 6/7] perf/x86/intel: Fix intel_cap handling on hybrid PMUs Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10 6:51 ` [PATCH 7/7] perf/x86: Optimize ACR handling in match_prev_assignment() Dapeng Mi
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