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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Dapeng Mi" <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] perf/x86/intel: Clear cpuc->pmu on hybrid PMU init failure
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2026 07:26:18 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260710072619.5E3011F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260710065128.1799838-4-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:

New issues:
- [High] Lockless double-read of `cpuc->pmu` in `x86_get_pmu()` leads to a TOCTOU race when racing with `cpuc->pmu = NULL`, causing a NULL pointer dereference.

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The patch leaves a critical memory corruption vulnerability unhandled if a CPU hotplug rollback occurs before the hybrid PMU initialization runs.
- [High] An unhandled #GP fault occurs in `intel_pmu_handle_irq` if a spurious NMI/PMI is received on a CPU where PMU initialization failed.
--

--- Patch [3]: [PATCH 3/7] perf/x86/intel: Clear cpuc->pmu on hybrid PMU init failure ---
commit 0c199c356195e47c5b429eac88846944835a4589
Author: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>

perf/x86/intel: Clear cpuc->pmu on hybrid PMU init failure

When init_hybrid_pmu() fails at check_hw_exists(), cpuc->pmu may still
point to the default static PMU. The CPU hotplug rollback then runs
intel_pmu_cpu_dead(). On hybrid systems, that path may call
hybrid_pmu(cpuc->pmu), which is not valid for the static PMU pointer and
can result in incorrect hybrid state access.

Fix this by resetting cpuc->pmu to NULL on hybrid PMU init failure.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> index b39c6ce0efb5c..9d4774278b508 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
> @@ -6329,8 +6329,10 @@ static bool init_hybrid_pmu(int cpu)
>  
>  	intel_pmu_check_hybrid_pmus(pmu);
>  
> -	if (!check_hw_exists(&pmu->pmu, pmu->cntr_mask, pmu->fixed_cntr_mask))
> +	if (!check_hw_exists(&pmu->pmu, pmu->cntr_mask, pmu->fixed_cntr_mask)) {
> +		cpuc->pmu = NULL;

[Severity: High]
Can this assignment race with concurrent readers?  Looking at x86_get_pmu()
in arch/x86/events/core.c, there is a lockless double-read of cpuc->pmu:

x86_get_pmu(int cpu)
{
    ...
    if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpuc->pmu))
        return &pmu;

    return cpuc->pmu;
}

If sys_perf_event_open() executes concurrently and calls x86_get_pmu()
via reserve_lbr_buffers(), could the compiler emit two independent loads?

If cpuc->pmu is non-NULL during the first load but is set to NULL by this
patch before the second load, x86_get_pmu() would return NULL.  Does this
lead to a NULL pointer dereference in reserve_lbr_buffers()?

> +		return false;
> +	}

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does this fully resolve the
rollback vulnerability?

If a CPU hotplug operation fails between the CPUHP_PERF_X86_PREPARE and
CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_STARTING states, the hotplug core rolls back and invokes
intel_pmu_cpu_dead().

Because init_hybrid_pmu() is bypassed entirely, cpuc->pmu remains pointing
to the static default pmu struct.

intel_pmu_cpu_dead() then executes:

    if (is_hybrid() && cpuc->pmu)
        cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &hybrid_pmu(cpuc->pmu)->supported_cpus);

Since cpuc->pmu is non-NULL, hybrid_pmu() calculates a negative offset from
the static pmu struct, and cpumask_clear_cpu() performs an out-of-bounds
memory write. Is there a way to safely handle rollbacks that bypass
initialization entirely?

[Severity: High]
This is also a pre-existing issue, but what happens if a spurious NMI is
received on a CPU where check_hw_exists() failed?

If init_hybrid_pmu() returns false here, x86_pmu_starting_cpu() ignores this
failure and returns 0, allowing the CPU to come online with a disabled PMU.
If another CPU has active perf events, active_events is greater than 0.

When an NMI broadcast hits this broken CPU, perf_event_nmi_handler() sees
active_events > 0 and calls intel_pmu_handle_irq(), which executes:

    __intel_pmu_disable_all(true);

This unconditionally executes wrmsrq(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0).
Since the PMU MSRs are unsupported on this CPU, will this unchecked wrmsrq
trigger a fatal general protection fault?

>  	pr_info("%s PMU driver: ", pmu->name);
>

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260710065128.1799838-1-dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com?part=3

  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-10  7:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-10  6:51 [PATCH 0/7] perf/x86: Miscellaneous PMU bug fixes and optimizations Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10  6:51 ` [PATCH 1/7] perf/x86: Unregister PMI handler on PMU init failure Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10  6:51 ` [PATCH 2/7] perf/x86: Free hybrid state " Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10  6:51 ` [PATCH 3/7] perf/x86/intel: Clear cpuc->pmu on hybrid " Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10  7:26   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-10  8:01     ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-07-10  8:20   ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-07-10  6:51 ` [PATCH 4/7] perf/x86/intel: Unwind cpuc state if PEBS buffer setup fails Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10  6:51 ` [PATCH 5/7] perf/x86: Remove stale fixed counter helper and fix hybrid PMU access Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10  6:51 ` [PATCH 6/7] perf/x86/intel: Fix intel_cap handling on hybrid PMUs Dapeng Mi
2026-07-10  6:51 ` [PATCH 7/7] perf/x86: Optimize ACR handling in match_prev_assignment() Dapeng Mi

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