From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo" <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/12] perf jitdump: Validate unwinding sizes against record payload
Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2026 13:06:32 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260806130632.E7B0A1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260806123604.271277-13-acme@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Out-of-bounds heap read and information leak in `jit_repipe_code_move()` due to undersized event allocation.
- [High] Memory/state leak and mapping corruption when `eh_frame_hdr_size` is 0.
--
--- Patch [12]: [PATCH 12/12] perf jitdump: Validate unwinding sizes against record payload ---
commit e53fcebef8f0cf9ec357ae7d5ca199498a47b1da
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
perf jitdump: Validate unwinding sizes against record payload
Validate that unwinding_size fits within the record payload and that
eh_frame_hdr_size does not exceed unwinding_size before allocating or
storing the values, so a bogus record cannot force a large allocation
that is then discarded. mapped_size is likewise taken from the record
and was narrowed into an int. Use uint64_t for usize so the value
cannot truncate.
> diff --git a/tools/perf/util/jitdump.c b/tools/perf/util/jitdump.c
> index 5898a7d8eb962..d25a9fe9b020c 100644
> --- a/tools/perf/util/jitdump.c
> +++ b/tools/perf/util/jitdump.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static int jit_repipe_code_load(struct jit_buf_desc *jd, union jr_entry *jr)
>
> event->mmap2.pgoff = GEN_ELF_TEXT_OFFSET;
> event->mmap2.start = addr;
> - event->mmap2.len = usize ? ALIGN_8(csize) + usize : csize;
> + event->mmap2.len = usize ? ALIGN_8((uint64_t)csize) + usize : (uint64_t)csize;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but is it possible for the unwinding state
to be leaked and corrupt subsequent event lengths?
Looking at jit_repipe_code_load() just above this assignment, we only
clean up the unwinding state if eh_frame_hdr_size is non-zero:
if (jd->unwinding_data && jd->eh_frame_hdr_size) {
zfree(&jd->unwinding_data);
jd->eh_frame_hdr_size = 0;
jd->unwinding_mapped_size = 0;
jd->unwinding_size = 0;
}
If a JIT runtime emits a record with eh_frame_hdr_size == 0, this check
fails. As a result, unwinding_mapped_size is not reset.
When processing the next JIT code load record, the stale unwinding_mapped_size
is pulled into the usize variable and added to event->mmap2.len here.
Could this inflate the mapping size and cause collisions in the perf mapping
tree, corrupting the stack trace unwinding process?
> event->mmap2.pid = pid;
> event->mmap2.tid = tid;
> event->mmap2.ino = st.st_ino;
[ ... ]
> @@ -612,7 +613,7 @@ static int jit_repipe_code_move(struct jit_buf_desc *jd, union jr_entry *jr)
> char *filename;
> size_t size;
> struct stat st;
> - int usize;
> + uint64_t usize;
> u16 idr_size;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does the event allocation in
jit_repipe_code_move() leave room for a buffer over-read?
The event buffer is allocated with a hardcoded +16 padding:
event = calloc(1, sizeof(*event) + 16);
However, later in the same function, the header size incorporates idr_size:
event->mmap2.header.size = (sizeof(event->mmap2) -
(sizeof(event->mmap2.filename) - size) + idr_size);
If idr_size (derived from the PERF_SAMPLE_* format) is greater than 16 bytes,
header.size could exceed the allocated chunk size.
If perf_data__write() later reads header.size bytes, could this cause an
out-of-bounds heap read and leak uninitialized heap memory into the output
perf.data file?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260806123604.271277-1-acme@kernel.org?part=12
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-06 13:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-06 12:35 [PATCHES v3 0/12] perf jitdump: Input validation hardening Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 12:35 ` [PATCH 01/12] perf jitdump: Fix extended header read that always fails Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 13:04 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-06 12:35 ` [PATCH 02/12] perf jitdump: Fix debug_data and unwinding_data leaks Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 12:52 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-06 12:35 ` [PATCH 03/12] perf jitdump: Validate code_size against total_size in code load Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 12:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-06 12:35 ` [PATCH 04/12] perf jitdump: Prevent integer underflow in debug info size calculation Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 12:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-06 12:35 ` [PATCH 05/12] perf jitdump: Bounds-check debug entry byte-swap loop Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 12:51 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-06 15:21 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 12:35 ` [PATCH 06/12] perf jitdump: Check snprintf return before computing header size Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 12:52 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-06 12:35 ` [PATCH 07/12] perf jitdump: Fix funlockfile on unlocked stream in jit_open() error path Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 12:51 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-06 12:35 ` [PATCH 08/12] perf jitdump: Free event in jit_repipe_code_move() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 12:49 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-06 12:36 ` [PATCH 09/12] perf jitdump: Use dirname() return value in jit_open() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 12:36 ` [PATCH 10/12] perf jitdump: Validate debug entries on native (non-swap) path Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 13:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-06 12:36 ` [PATCH 11/12] perf jitdump: Validate sym string NUL-termination in code load Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 13:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-06 12:36 ` [PATCH 12/12] perf jitdump: Validate unwinding sizes against record payload Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-06 13:06 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-08-05 21:26 [PATCHES v2 0/12] perf jitdump: Input validation hardening Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-05 21:27 ` [PATCH 12/12] perf jitdump: Validate unwinding sizes against record payload Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-05 21:53 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-05 13:29 [PATCHES v1 0/12] perf jitdump: Input validation hardening Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-05 13:30 ` [PATCH 12/12] perf jitdump: Validate unwinding sizes against record payload Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-05 19:20 ` Ian Rogers
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