* [PATCH 1/5] perf dso: Guard against errno==0 when dso__get_filename() returns NULL
2026-08-13 15:11 [PATCHES v5 0/5] perf DSO hardening series Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
@ 2026-08-13 15:11 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-13 15:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 2/5] perf dso: Guard close() against invalid fd in dso__decompress_kmodule_path() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo @ 2026-08-13 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Namhyung Kim
Cc: Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, James Clark, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers,
Adrian Hunter, Clark Williams, linux-kernel, linux-perf-users,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, sashiko-bot
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
__open_dso() computes fd = -errno when dso__get_filename() returns NULL.
Some failure paths in dso__get_filename() (e.g. binary type mismatch)
return NULL without making a syscall, leaving errno at 0 from a prior
successful call. fd = -0 = 0, which is stdin — subsequent code treats
it as a valid file descriptor.
Fall back to ENOENT when errno is 0, ensuring fd is always negative on
failure.
The forced ENOENT stays in errno for the callers that check it after a
negative fd. It must not misdirect the try_to_open_dso() fallback
loop, though: dso__get_filename()'s chroot fallback used to accept a
stale ENOENT even when stat() succeeded on a non-regular file (e.g. a
directory). Re-stat() there and only take the chroot path when
stat() actually failed with ENOENT [sashiko-bot review of PATCH 1/5].
Fixes: eba5102d2f0b ("perf tools: Add global list of opened dso objects")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
tools/perf/util/dso.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/dso.c b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
index 2309196d8df3111c..b86969dc6e81e96e 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/dso.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
@@ -582,9 +582,18 @@ static char *dso__get_filename(struct dso *dso, const char *root_dir,
goto out;
if (!is_regular_file(name)) {
+ struct stat st;
char *new_name;
- if (errno != ENOENT || dso__nsinfo(dso) == NULL)
+ /*
+ * errno only reflects the failure reason when stat() itself
+ * failed: a successful stat() on a non-regular file (e.g. a
+ * directory) leaves a stale errno, which a previous failed
+ * iteration of the try_to_open_dso() fallback loop may have
+ * set to ENOENT.
+ */
+ if (stat(name, &st) == 0 || errno != ENOENT ||
+ dso__nsinfo(dso) == NULL)
goto out;
new_name = dso__filename_with_chroot(dso, name);
@@ -640,10 +649,13 @@ static int __open_dso(struct dso *dso, struct machine *machine)
mutex_lock(dso__lock(dso));
name = dso__get_filename(dso, machine ? machine->root_dir : "", &decomp);
- if (name)
+ if (name) {
fd = do_open(name);
- else
+ } else {
+ if (errno == 0)
+ errno = ENOENT;
fd = -errno;
+ }
if (decomp)
unlink(name);
--
2.55.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/5] perf dso: Guard against errno==0 when dso__get_filename() returns NULL
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 1/5] perf dso: Guard against errno==0 when dso__get_filename() returns NULL Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
@ 2026-08-13 15:24 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-08-13 15:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo; +Cc: linux-perf-users
> From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
>
> __open_dso() computes fd = -errno when dso__get_filename() returns NULL.
> Some failure paths in dso__get_filename() (e.g. binary type mismatch)
> return NULL without making a syscall, leaving errno at 0 from a prior
> successful call. fd = -0 = 0, which is stdin — subsequent code treats
> it as a valid file descriptor.
>
> Fall back to ENOENT when errno is 0, ensuring fd is always negative on
> failure.
>
> The forced ENOENT stays in errno for the callers that check it after a
> negative fd. It must not misdirect the try_to_open_dso() fallback
> loop, though: dso__get_filename()'s chroot fallback used to accept a
> stale ENOENT even when stat() succeeded on a non-regular file (e.g. a
> directory). Re-stat() there and only take the chroot path when
> stat() actually failed with ENOENT [sashiko-bot review of PATCH 1/5].
>
> Fixes: eba5102d2f0b ("perf tools: Add global list of opened dso objects")
> Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260813151148.23169-1-acme@kernel.org?part=1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/5] perf dso: Guard close() against invalid fd in dso__decompress_kmodule_path()
2026-08-13 15:11 [PATCHES v5 0/5] perf DSO hardening series Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 1/5] perf dso: Guard against errno==0 when dso__get_filename() returns NULL Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
@ 2026-08-13 15:11 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-13 15:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 3/5] perf dso: Use stored fd error instead of stale errno in file_read() and file_size() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo @ 2026-08-13 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Namhyung Kim
Cc: Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, James Clark, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers,
Adrian Hunter, Clark Williams, linux-kernel, linux-perf-users,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, sashiko-bot
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
dso__decompress_kmodule_path() unconditionally calls close(fd) on the
return value of decompress_kmodule(). When decompression fails or the
DSO is not compressed, decompress_kmodule() returns -1. close(-1)
fails with EBADF and clobbers errno, which callers up the chain
(dso__get_filename → __open_dso) depend on for error propagation.
Guard the close() call with fd >= 0 so only valid file descriptors are
closed.
Fixes: 42b3fa670825 ("perf tools: Introduce dso__decompress_kmodule_{fd,path}")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
tools/perf/util/dso.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/dso.c b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
index b86969dc6e81e96e..41bbc8f994e41a3d 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/dso.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
@@ -395,7 +395,9 @@ int dso__decompress_kmodule_path(struct dso *dso, const char *name,
{
int fd = decompress_kmodule(dso, name, pathname, len);
- close(fd);
+ /* decompress_kmodule() returns -1 on failure, don't close(-1) */
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
return fd >= 0 ? 0 : -1;
}
--
2.55.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 2/5] perf dso: Guard close() against invalid fd in dso__decompress_kmodule_path()
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 2/5] perf dso: Guard close() against invalid fd in dso__decompress_kmodule_path() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
@ 2026-08-13 15:16 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-08-13 15:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo; +Cc: linux-perf-users
> From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
>
> dso__decompress_kmodule_path() unconditionally calls close(fd) on the
> return value of decompress_kmodule(). When decompression fails or the
> DSO is not compressed, decompress_kmodule() returns -1. close(-1)
> fails with EBADF and clobbers errno, which callers up the chain
> (dso__get_filename → __open_dso) depend on for error propagation.
>
> Guard the close() call with fd >= 0 so only valid file descriptors are
> closed.
>
> Fixes: 42b3fa670825 ("perf tools: Introduce dso__decompress_kmodule_{fd,path}")
> Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260813151148.23169-1-acme@kernel.org?part=2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/5] perf dso: Use stored fd error instead of stale errno in file_read() and file_size()
2026-08-13 15:11 [PATCHES v5 0/5] perf DSO hardening series Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 1/5] perf dso: Guard against errno==0 when dso__get_filename() returns NULL Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 2/5] perf dso: Guard close() against invalid fd in dso__decompress_kmodule_path() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
@ 2026-08-13 15:11 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-13 15:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 4/5] perf dso: Guard against cache underflow on short reads in dso_cache__memcpy() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 5/5] perf dso: Replace assert with runtime check in dso__read_symbol() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
4 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo @ 2026-08-13 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Namhyung Kim
Cc: Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, James Clark, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers,
Adrian Hunter, Clark Williams, linux-kernel, linux-perf-users,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, sashiko-bot
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
file_read() and file_size() use ret = -errno when
dso__data(dso)->fd is negative after try_to_open_dso() fails. By this
point errno has been through mutex_lock(), nsinfo__mountns_enter(), and
multiple open() attempts inside try_to_open_dso() — it no longer
reflects the actual open failure. If errno happens to be 0, ret = 0
looks like EOF rather than an error, and file_size() callers like
dso__data_size() would then report a zero-sized file instead of
failing.
dso__data(dso)->fd is always negative on failure — -errno from
__open_dso() when no filename could be built (e.g. -EINVAL, -ENOENT),
or -1 when do_open() itself failed — and never 0, so use it directly
instead of reading the stale global errno.
No assert() or comment is needed after the assignment: the enclosing
if (dso__data(dso)->fd < 0) already guarantees ret < 0
[Namhyung Kim review].
Fixes: 33bdedcea2d7 ("perf tools: Protect dso cache fd with a mutex")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
tools/perf/util/dso.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/dso.c b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
index 41bbc8f994e41a3d..60aa77f7978514ec 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/dso.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ static ssize_t file_read(struct dso *dso, struct machine *machine,
if (dso__data(dso)->fd < 0) {
dso__data(dso)->status = DSO_DATA_STATUS_ERROR;
- ret = -errno;
+ ret = dso__data(dso)->fd;
goto out;
}
@@ -1160,8 +1160,8 @@ static int file_size(struct dso *dso, struct machine *machine)
try_to_open_dso(dso, machine);
if (dso__data(dso)->fd < 0) {
- ret = -errno;
dso__data(dso)->status = DSO_DATA_STATUS_ERROR;
+ ret = dso__data(dso)->fd;
goto out;
}
--
2.55.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 3/5] perf dso: Use stored fd error instead of stale errno in file_read() and file_size()
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 3/5] perf dso: Use stored fd error instead of stale errno in file_read() and file_size() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
@ 2026-08-13 15:17 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-08-13 15:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo; +Cc: linux-perf-users
> From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
>
> file_read() and file_size() use ret = -errno when
> dso__data(dso)->fd is negative after try_to_open_dso() fails. By this
> point errno has been through mutex_lock(), nsinfo__mountns_enter(), and
> multiple open() attempts inside try_to_open_dso() — it no longer
> reflects the actual open failure. If errno happens to be 0, ret = 0
> looks like EOF rather than an error, and file_size() callers like
> dso__data_size() would then report a zero-sized file instead of
> failing.
>
> dso__data(dso)->fd is always negative on failure — -errno from
> __open_dso() when no filename could be built (e.g. -EINVAL, -ENOENT),
> or -1 when do_open() itself failed — and never 0, so use it directly
> instead of reading the stale global errno.
>
> No assert() or comment is needed after the assignment: the enclosing
> if (dso__data(dso)->fd < 0) already guarantees ret < 0
> [Namhyung Kim review].
>
> Fixes: 33bdedcea2d7 ("perf tools: Protect dso cache fd with a mutex")
> Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260813151148.23169-1-acme@kernel.org?part=3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4/5] perf dso: Guard against cache underflow on short reads in dso_cache__memcpy()
2026-08-13 15:11 [PATCHES v5 0/5] perf DSO hardening series Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 3/5] perf dso: Use stored fd error instead of stale errno in file_read() and file_size() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
@ 2026-08-13 15:11 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-13 15:29 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 5/5] perf dso: Replace assert with runtime check in dso__read_symbol() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
4 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo @ 2026-08-13 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Namhyung Kim
Cc: Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, James Clark, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers,
Adrian Hunter, Clark Williams, linux-kernel, linux-perf-users,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, sashiko-bot
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
dso_cache__memcpy() computes cache_offset = offset - cache->offset,
then cache_size = min(cache->size - cache_offset, size). The RB tree
lookup in __dso_cache__find() matches using the full
DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE window, but cache->size reflects the actual pread
return value from dso_cache__populate().
A short pread (e.g. near end-of-file) makes cache->size smaller than
DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE. If a subsequent access targets an offset past
cache->offset + cache->size but within the DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE
window, the cache entry is found but cache_offset exceeds cache->size.
Since both are u64, the subtraction cache->size - cache_offset wraps
to a large value, min() selects the caller's size, and memcpy reads
out of bounds.
Return 0 for an offset past the valid cached data. For a regular
file a short pread only happens at end-of-file, so 0 is what a direct
pread() at that offset would return: cached_io() stops its read loop
as on EOF. Re-reading from the backing file would not help — a
second pread at the same offset returns the same short count.
Fixes: 366df72657e0 ("perf dso: Refactor dso_cache__read()")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
tools/perf/util/dso.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/dso.c b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
index 60aa77f7978514ec..4dd64069c4348c06 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/dso.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
@@ -1014,7 +1014,20 @@ static ssize_t dso_cache__memcpy(struct dso_cache *cache, u64 offset, u8 *data,
u64 size, bool out)
{
u64 cache_offset = offset - cache->offset;
- u64 cache_size = min(cache->size - cache_offset, size);
+ u64 cache_size;
+
+ /*
+ * The RB tree matches using DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE, but a short
+ * pread may leave cache->size smaller. For a regular file a
+ * short pread only happens at end-of-file, so an offset past
+ * the valid data is EOF: return 0, matching what a direct
+ * pread() at that offset would return, and cached_io() then
+ * stops its read loop.
+ */
+ if (cache_offset >= cache->size)
+ return 0;
+
+ cache_size = min(cache->size - cache_offset, size);
if (out)
memcpy(data, cache->data + cache_offset, cache_size);
--
2.55.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4/5] perf dso: Guard against cache underflow on short reads in dso_cache__memcpy()
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 4/5] perf dso: Guard against cache underflow on short reads in dso_cache__memcpy() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
@ 2026-08-13 15:29 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-08-13 15:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo; +Cc: linux-perf-users
> From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
>
> dso_cache__memcpy() computes cache_offset = offset - cache->offset,
> then cache_size = min(cache->size - cache_offset, size). The RB tree
> lookup in __dso_cache__find() matches using the full
> DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE window, but cache->size reflects the actual pread
> return value from dso_cache__populate().
>
> A short pread (e.g. near end-of-file) makes cache->size smaller than
> DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE. If a subsequent access targets an offset past
> cache->offset + cache->size but within the DSO__DATA_CACHE_SIZE
> window, the cache entry is found but cache_offset exceeds cache->size.
> Since both are u64, the subtraction cache->size - cache_offset wraps
> to a large value, min() selects the caller's size, and memcpy reads
> out of bounds.
>
> Return 0 for an offset past the valid cached data. For a regular
> file a short pread only happens at end-of-file, so 0 is what a direct
> pread() at that offset would return: cached_io() stops its read loop
> as on EOF. Re-reading from the backing file would not help — a
> second pread at the same offset returns the same short count.
>
> Fixes: 366df72657e0 ("perf dso: Refactor dso_cache__read()")
> Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260813151148.23169-1-acme@kernel.org?part=4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5/5] perf dso: Replace assert with runtime check in dso__read_symbol()
2026-08-13 15:11 [PATCHES v5 0/5] perf DSO hardening series Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 4/5] perf dso: Guard against cache underflow on short reads in dso_cache__memcpy() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
@ 2026-08-13 15:11 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-08-13 15:26 ` sashiko-bot
4 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo @ 2026-08-13 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Namhyung Kim
Cc: Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, James Clark, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers,
Adrian Hunter, Clark Williams, linux-kernel, linux-perf-users,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, sashiko-bot, Song Liu
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
dso__read_symbol() asserts that len <= jited_prog_len, where len comes
from sym->end - sym->start (parsed from PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL in
perf.data). Both values originate from untrusted file input.
With NDEBUG (production builds), the assert is compiled out, allowing
an out-of-bounds heap read when the BPF program buffer is accessed.
Without NDEBUG, a crafted perf.data crashes perf with an assertion
failure.
Replace the assert with a runtime bounds check that returns NULL with
an appropriate error code, matching the existing error handling
pattern in this function.
Fixes: aa04707f507e ("perf dso: Support BPF programs in dso__read_symbol()")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
tools/perf/util/dso.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/dso.c b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
index 4dd64069c4348c06..42bfe30a3b518e80 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/dso.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
@@ -2038,7 +2038,12 @@ const u8 *dso__read_symbol(struct dso *dso, const char *symfs_filename,
errno = SYMBOL_ANNOTATE_ERRNO__BPF_MISSING_BTF;
return NULL;
}
- assert(len <= info_linear->info.jited_prog_len);
+ if (len > info_linear->info.jited_prog_len) {
+ pr_debug("BPF symbol length %zu exceeds jited_prog_len %u\n",
+ len, info_linear->info.jited_prog_len);
+ errno = SYMBOL_ANNOTATE_ERRNO__BPF_MISSING_BTF;
+ return NULL;
+ }
*out_buf_len = len;
return (const u8 *)(uintptr_t)(info_linear->info.jited_prog_insns);
#else
--
2.55.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 5/5] perf dso: Replace assert with runtime check in dso__read_symbol()
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH 5/5] perf dso: Replace assert with runtime check in dso__read_symbol() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
@ 2026-08-13 15:26 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-08-13 15:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo; +Cc: linux-perf-users
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] Misleading error code used for bounds check failure.
--
--- Patch [5]: [PATCH 5/5] perf dso: Replace assert with runtime check in dso__read_symbol() ---
commit 99fef42823fa80b278999b8901d74d88e812bd2a
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
perf dso: Replace assert with runtime check in dso__read_symbol()
This commit replaces an assert in dso__read_symbol() with a runtime bounds
check to prevent out-of-bounds heap reads or assertion failures when processing
untrusted perf.data files.
> diff --git a/tools/perf/util/dso.c b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
> index 4dd64069c4348..42bfe30a3b518 100644
> --- a/tools/perf/util/dso.c
> +++ b/tools/perf/util/dso.c
> @@ -2038,7 +2038,12 @@ const u8 *dso__read_symbol(struct dso *dso, const char *symfs_filename,
> errno = SYMBOL_ANNOTATE_ERRNO__BPF_MISSING_BTF;
> return NULL;
> }
> - assert(len <= info_linear->info.jited_prog_len);
> + if (len > info_linear->info.jited_prog_len) {
> + pr_debug("BPF symbol length %zu exceeds jited_prog_len %u\n",
> + len, info_linear->info.jited_prog_len);
> + errno = SYMBOL_ANNOTATE_ERRNO__BPF_MISSING_BTF;
[Severity: Medium]
Since this is a bounds check failure in dso__read_symbol() triggered by a
corrupted perf.data file, reusing SYMBOL_ANNOTATE_ERRNO__BPF_MISSING_BTF might
cause tools to incorrectly report that the BPF file is missing its BTF section
instead of indicating a length mismatch.
Could this regression result in a confusing message for the user?
> + return NULL;
> + }
> *out_buf_len = len;
> return (const u8 *)(uintptr_t)(info_linear->info.jited_prog_insns);
> #else
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260813151148.23169-1-acme@kernel.org?part=5
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