* [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
@ 2019-07-30 19:12 Thomas Garnier
2019-07-30 19:12 ` [PATCH v9 07/11] x86/acpi: Adapt assembly for PIE support Thomas Garnier
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2019-07-30 19:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kernel-hardening
Cc: kristen, keescook, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, H. Peter Anvin, x86,
Andy Lutomirski, Juergen Gross, Thomas Hellstrom, VMware, Inc.,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra,
Nadav Amit, Thomas Garnier, Jann Horn, Feng Tang, Maran Wilson,
Enrico Weigelt, Allison Randal, Alexios Zavras, linux-crypto,
linux-kernel, virtualization, linux-pm
Minor changes based on feedback and rebase from v8.
Splitting the previous serie in two. This part contains assembly code
changes required for PIE but without any direct dependencies with the
rest of the patchset.
Changes:
- patch v9 (assembly):
- Moved to relative reference for sync_core based on feedback.
- x86/crypto had multiple algorithms deleted, removed PIE changes to them.
- fix typo on comment end line.
- patch v8 (assembly):
- Fix issues in crypto changes (thanks to Eric Biggers).
- Remove unnecessary jump table change.
- Change author and signoff to chromium email address.
- patch v7 (assembly):
- Split patchset and reorder changes.
- patch v6:
- Rebase on latest changes in jump tables and crypto.
- Fix wording on couple commits.
- Revisit checkpatch warnings.
- Moving to @chromium.org.
- patch v5:
- Adapt new crypto modules for PIE.
- Improve per-cpu commit message.
- Fix xen 32-bit build error with .quad.
- Remove extra code for ftrace.
- patch v4:
- Simplify early boot by removing global variables.
- Modify the mcount location script for __mcount_loc intead of the address
read in the ftrace implementation.
- Edit commit description to explain better where the kernel can be located.
- Streamlined the testing done on each patch proposal. Always testing
hibernation, suspend, ftrace and kprobe to ensure no regressions.
- patch v3:
- Update on message to describe longer term PIE goal.
- Minor change on ftrace if condition.
- Changed code using xchgq.
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce dynamic relocation space on
mapped memory. It also simplifies the relocation process.
- Move the start the module section next to the kernel. Remove the need for
-mcmodel=large on modules. Extends module space from 1 to 2G maximum.
- Support for XEN PVH as 32-bit relocations can be ignored with
--emit-relocs.
- Support for GOT relocations previously done automatically with -pie.
- Remove need for dynamic PLT in modules.
- Support dymamic GOT for modules.
- rfc v2:
- Add support for global stack cookie while compiler default to fs without
mcmodel=kernel
- Change patch 7 to correctly jump out of the identity mapping on kexec load
preserve.
These patches make some of the changes necessary to build the kernel as
Position Independent Executable (PIE) on x86_64. Another patchset will
add the PIE option and larger architecture changes.
The patches:
- 1, 3-11: Change in assembly code to be PIE compliant.
- 2: Add a new _ASM_MOVABS macro to fetch a symbol address generically.
diffstat:
crypto/aegis128-aesni-asm.S | 6 +-
crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 8 +--
crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S | 3 -
crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S | 42 +++++++--------
crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S | 44 ++++++++--------
crypto/camellia-x86_64-asm_64.S | 8 +--
crypto/cast5-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S | 50 ++++++++++--------
crypto/cast6-avx-x86_64-asm_64.S | 44 +++++++++-------
crypto/des3_ede-asm_64.S | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.S | 4 -
crypto/glue_helper-asm-avx.S | 4 -
crypto/glue_helper-asm-avx2.S | 6 +-
crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S | 18 ++++--
entry/entry_64.S | 16 ++++--
include/asm/alternative.h | 6 +-
include/asm/asm.h | 1
include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 25 +++++++--
include/asm/pm-trace.h | 2
include/asm/processor.h | 6 +-
kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 31 ++++++-----
kernel/head_64.S | 16 +++---
kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2
power/hibernate_asm_64.S | 4 -
23 files changed, 261 insertions(+), 181 deletions(-)
Patchset is based on next-20190729.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH v9 07/11] x86/acpi: Adapt assembly for PIE support 2019-07-30 19:12 [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization Thomas Garnier @ 2019-07-30 19:12 ` Thomas Garnier 2019-07-30 19:12 ` [PATCH v9 09/11] x86/power/64: " Thomas Garnier 2019-08-06 15:43 ` [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization Borislav Petkov 2 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Thomas Garnier @ 2019-07-30 19:12 UTC (permalink / raw) To: kernel-hardening Cc: kristen, keescook, Thomas Garnier, Pavel Machek, Rafael J . Wysocki, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, H. Peter Anvin, x86, linux-pm, linux-kernel Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the kernel to be PIE compatible. Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the KASLR randomization range below 0xffffffff80000000. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@chromium.org> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 31 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S index b0715c3ac18d..3ec6c1b74ad4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ * Hooray, we are in Long 64-bit mode (but still running in low memory) */ ENTRY(wakeup_long64) - movq saved_magic, %rax + movq saved_magic(%rip), %rax movq $0x123456789abcdef0, %rdx cmpq %rdx, %rax jne bogus_64_magic @@ -26,14 +26,14 @@ ENTRY(wakeup_long64) movw %ax, %es movw %ax, %fs movw %ax, %gs - movq saved_rsp, %rsp + movq saved_rsp(%rip), %rsp - movq saved_rbx, %rbx - movq saved_rdi, %rdi - movq saved_rsi, %rsi - movq saved_rbp, %rbp + movq saved_rbx(%rip), %rbx + movq saved_rdi(%rip), %rdi + movq saved_rsi(%rip), %rsi + movq saved_rbp(%rip), %rbp - movq saved_rip, %rax + movq saved_rip(%rip), %rax jmp *%rax ENDPROC(wakeup_long64) @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ ENTRY(do_suspend_lowlevel) xorl %eax, %eax call save_processor_state - movq $saved_context, %rax + leaq saved_context(%rip), %rax movq %rsp, pt_regs_sp(%rax) movq %rbp, pt_regs_bp(%rax) movq %rsi, pt_regs_si(%rax) @@ -65,13 +65,14 @@ ENTRY(do_suspend_lowlevel) pushfq popq pt_regs_flags(%rax) - movq $.Lresume_point, saved_rip(%rip) + leaq .Lresume_point(%rip), %rax + movq %rax, saved_rip(%rip) - movq %rsp, saved_rsp - movq %rbp, saved_rbp - movq %rbx, saved_rbx - movq %rdi, saved_rdi - movq %rsi, saved_rsi + movq %rsp, saved_rsp(%rip) + movq %rbp, saved_rbp(%rip) + movq %rbx, saved_rbx(%rip) + movq %rdi, saved_rdi(%rip) + movq %rsi, saved_rsi(%rip) addq $8, %rsp movl $3, %edi @@ -83,7 +84,7 @@ ENTRY(do_suspend_lowlevel) .align 4 .Lresume_point: /* We don't restore %rax, it must be 0 anyway */ - movq $saved_context, %rax + leaq saved_context(%rip), %rax movq saved_context_cr4(%rax), %rbx movq %rbx, %cr4 movq saved_context_cr3(%rax), %rbx -- 2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v9 09/11] x86/power/64: Adapt assembly for PIE support 2019-07-30 19:12 [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization Thomas Garnier 2019-07-30 19:12 ` [PATCH v9 07/11] x86/acpi: Adapt assembly for PIE support Thomas Garnier @ 2019-07-30 19:12 ` Thomas Garnier 2019-08-06 15:43 ` [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization Borislav Petkov 2 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Thomas Garnier @ 2019-07-30 19:12 UTC (permalink / raw) To: kernel-hardening Cc: kristen, keescook, Thomas Garnier, Pavel Machek, Rafael J . Wysocki, Rafael J. Wysocki, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, H. Peter Anvin, x86, linux-pm, linux-kernel Change the assembly code to use only relative references of symbols for the kernel to be PIE compatible. Position Independent Executable (PIE) support will allow to extend the KASLR randomization range below 0xffffffff80000000. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@chromium.org> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S index a4d5eb0a7ece..796cd19d575b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ #include <asm/frame.h> ENTRY(swsusp_arch_suspend) - movq $saved_context, %rax + leaq saved_context(%rip), %rax movq %rsp, pt_regs_sp(%rax) movq %rbp, pt_regs_bp(%rax) movq %rsi, pt_regs_si(%rax) @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ ENTRY(restore_registers) movq %rax, %cr4; # turn PGE back on /* We don't restore %rax, it must be 0 anyway */ - movq $saved_context, %rax + leaq saved_context(%rip), %rax movq pt_regs_sp(%rax), %rsp movq pt_regs_bp(%rax), %rbp movq pt_regs_si(%rax), %rsi -- 2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization 2019-07-30 19:12 [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization Thomas Garnier 2019-07-30 19:12 ` [PATCH v9 07/11] x86/acpi: Adapt assembly for PIE support Thomas Garnier 2019-07-30 19:12 ` [PATCH v9 09/11] x86/power/64: " Thomas Garnier @ 2019-08-06 15:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-08-06 15:50 ` Peter Zijlstra 2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Borislav Petkov @ 2019-08-06 15:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Thomas Garnier Cc: kernel-hardening, kristen, keescook, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, x86, Andy Lutomirski, Juergen Gross, Thomas Hellstrom, VMware, Inc., Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Nadav Amit, Jann Horn, Feng Tang, Maran Wilson, Enrico Weigelt, Allison Randal, Alexios Zavras, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, virtualization, linux-pm On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 12:12:44PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote: > These patches make some of the changes necessary to build the kernel as > Position Independent Executable (PIE) on x86_64. Another patchset will > add the PIE option and larger architecture changes. Yeah, about this: do we have a longer writeup about the actual benefits of all this and why we should take this all? After all, after looking at the first couple of asm patches, it is posing restrictions to how we deal with virtual addresses in asm (only RIP-relative addressing in 64-bit mode, MOVs with 64-bit immediates, etc, for example) and I'm willing to bet money that some future unrelated change will break PIE sooner or later. And I'd like to have a better justification why we should enforce those new "rules" unconditionally. Thx. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization 2019-08-06 15:43 ` [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization Borislav Petkov @ 2019-08-06 15:50 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-08-29 19:55 ` Thomas Garnier 0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2019-08-06 15:50 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Borislav Petkov Cc: Thomas Garnier, kernel-hardening, kristen, keescook, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, x86, Andy Lutomirski, Juergen Gross, Thomas Hellstrom, VMware, Inc., Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, Nadav Amit, Jann Horn, Feng Tang, Maran Wilson, Enrico Weigelt, Allison Randal, Alexios Zavras, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, virtualization, linux-pm On Tue, Aug 06, 2019 at 05:43:47PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 12:12:44PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote: > > These patches make some of the changes necessary to build the kernel as > > Position Independent Executable (PIE) on x86_64. Another patchset will > > add the PIE option and larger architecture changes. > > Yeah, about this: do we have a longer writeup about the actual benefits > of all this and why we should take this all? After all, after looking > at the first couple of asm patches, it is posing restrictions to how > we deal with virtual addresses in asm (only RIP-relative addressing in > 64-bit mode, MOVs with 64-bit immediates, etc, for example) and I'm > willing to bet money that some future unrelated change will break PIE > sooner or later. Possibly objtool can help here; it should be possible to teach it about these rules, and then it will yell when violated. That should avoid regressions. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization 2019-08-06 15:50 ` Peter Zijlstra @ 2019-08-29 19:55 ` Thomas Garnier 2019-09-06 23:22 ` Thomas Garnier 0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Thomas Garnier @ 2019-08-29 19:55 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Borislav Petkov, Kernel Hardening, Kristen Carlson Accardi, Kees Cook, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, the arch/x86 maintainers, Andy Lutomirski, Juergen Gross, Thomas Hellstrom, VMware, Inc., Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, Nadav Amit, Jann Horn, Feng Tang, Maran Wilson, Enrico Weigelt, Allison Randal, Alexios Zavras, Linux Crypto Mailing List, LKML, virtualization, Linux PM list On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 8:51 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 06, 2019 at 05:43:47PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 12:12:44PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote: > > > These patches make some of the changes necessary to build the kernel as > > > Position Independent Executable (PIE) on x86_64. Another patchset will > > > add the PIE option and larger architecture changes. > > > > Yeah, about this: do we have a longer writeup about the actual benefits > > of all this and why we should take this all? After all, after looking > > at the first couple of asm patches, it is posing restrictions to how > > we deal with virtual addresses in asm (only RIP-relative addressing in > > 64-bit mode, MOVs with 64-bit immediates, etc, for example) and I'm > > willing to bet money that some future unrelated change will break PIE > > sooner or later. The goal is being able to extend the range of addresses where the kernel can be placed with KASLR. I will look at clarifying that in the future. > > Possibly objtool can help here; it should be possible to teach it about > these rules, and then it will yell when violated. That should avoid > regressions. > I will look into that as well. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization 2019-08-29 19:55 ` Thomas Garnier @ 2019-09-06 23:22 ` Thomas Garnier 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Thomas Garnier @ 2019-09-06 23:22 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Borislav Petkov, Kernel Hardening, Kristen Carlson Accardi, Kees Cook, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, the arch/x86 maintainers, Andy Lutomirski, Juergen Gross, Thomas Hellstrom, VMware, Inc., Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, Nadav Amit, Jann Horn, Feng Tang, Maran Wilson, Enrico Weigelt, Allison Randal, Alexios Zavras, Linux Crypto Mailing List, LKML, virtualization, Linux PM list On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 12:55 PM Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@chromium.org> wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 8:51 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote: > > > > On Tue, Aug 06, 2019 at 05:43:47PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote: > > > On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 12:12:44PM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote: > > > > These patches make some of the changes necessary to build the kernel as > > > > Position Independent Executable (PIE) on x86_64. Another patchset will > > > > add the PIE option and larger architecture changes. > > > > > > Yeah, about this: do we have a longer writeup about the actual benefits > > > of all this and why we should take this all? After all, after looking > > > at the first couple of asm patches, it is posing restrictions to how > > > we deal with virtual addresses in asm (only RIP-relative addressing in > > > 64-bit mode, MOVs with 64-bit immediates, etc, for example) and I'm > > > willing to bet money that some future unrelated change will break PIE > > > sooner or later. > > The goal is being able to extend the range of addresses where the > kernel can be placed with KASLR. I will look at clarifying that in the > future. > > > > > Possibly objtool can help here; it should be possible to teach it about > > these rules, and then it will yell when violated. That should avoid > > regressions. > > > > I will look into that as well. Following a discussion with Kees. I will explore objtool in the follow-up patchset as we still have more elaborate pie changes in the second set. I like the idea overall and I think it would be great if it works. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-09-06 23:29 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2019-07-30 19:12 [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization Thomas Garnier 2019-07-30 19:12 ` [PATCH v9 07/11] x86/acpi: Adapt assembly for PIE support Thomas Garnier 2019-07-30 19:12 ` [PATCH v9 09/11] x86/power/64: " Thomas Garnier 2019-08-06 15:43 ` [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization Borislav Petkov 2019-08-06 15:50 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-08-29 19:55 ` Thomas Garnier 2019-09-06 23:22 ` Thomas Garnier
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