* [PATCH rdma-rc v2] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand
@ 2017-11-27 11:25 Leon Romanovsky
2017-11-27 22:03 ` Don Dutile
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2017-11-27 11:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe
Cc: linux-rdma-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Daniel Jurgens, Paul Moore,
Don Dutile, stable-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Leon Romanovsky
From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj-VPRAkNaXOzVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is
specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types.
This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because
querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul-r2n+y4ga6xFZroRs9YW3xA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: stable-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat-ut6Up61K2wZBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>
Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj-VPRAkNaXOzVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav-VPRAkNaXOzVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat-ut6Up61K2wZBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
---
Changelog:
v1->v2: Fixed build errors
v0->v1: Added proper SElinux patch
---
drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
index 23278ed5be45..06c608c07b65 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -417,8 +417,17 @@ void ib_close_shared_qp_security(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev)
{
+ u8 i = rdma_start_port(dev);
+ bool is_ib = false;
int ret;
+ while (i <= rdma_end_port(dev) && !is_ib)
+ is_ib = rdma_protocol_ib(dev, i++);
+
+ /* If this isn't an IB device don't create the security context */
+ if (!is_ib)
+ return 0;
+
qp->qp_sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*qp->qp_sec), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!qp->qp_sec)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -441,6 +450,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_create_qp_security);
void ib_destroy_qp_security_begin(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
{
+ /* Return if not IB */
+ if (!sec)
+ return;
+
mutex_lock(&sec->mutex);
/* Remove the QP from the lists so it won't get added to
@@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_abort(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
int ret;
int i;
+ /* Return if not IB */
+ if (!sec)
+ return;
+
/* If a concurrent cache update is in progress this
* QP security could be marked for an error state
* transition. Wait for this to complete.
@@ -505,6 +522,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_end(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
{
int i;
+ /* Return if not IB */
+ if (!sec)
+ return;
+
/* If a concurrent cache update is occurring we must
* wait until this QP security structure is processed
* in the QP to error flow before destroying it because
@@ -565,13 +586,19 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
bool pps_change = ((qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) ||
(qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH));
+ WARN_ONCE((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT &&
+ rdma_protocol_ib(real_qp->device, qp_attr->port_num) &&
+ !real_qp->qp_sec),
+ "%s: QP security is not initialized for IB QP: %d\n",
+ __func__, real_qp->qp_num);
+
/* The port/pkey settings are maintained only for the real QP. Open
* handles on the real QP will be in the shared_qp_list. When
* enforcing security on the real QP all the shared QPs will be
* checked as well.
*/
- if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
+ if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp,
qp_attr,
@@ -600,7 +627,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
qp_attr_mask,
udata);
- if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
+ if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
/* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
* ports_pkeys structure.
*/
@@ -631,6 +658,9 @@ int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev,
u16 pkey;
int ret;
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(dev, port_num))
+ return 0;
+
ret = ib_get_cached_pkey(dev, port_num, pkey_index, &pkey);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -665,6 +695,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
{
int ret;
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
+ return 0;
+
ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -690,6 +723,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
{
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
+ return;
+
security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
@@ -697,6 +733,9 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
{
+ if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))
+ return 0;
+
if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
return -EACCES;
--
2.15.0
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH rdma-rc v2] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand
2017-11-27 11:25 [PATCH rdma-rc v2] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand Leon Romanovsky
@ 2017-11-27 22:03 ` Don Dutile
2017-11-27 22:58 ` Daniel Jurgens
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Don Dutile @ 2017-11-27 22:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Leon Romanovsky, Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe
Cc: linux-rdma, Daniel Jurgens, Paul Moore, stable
On 11/27/2017 06:25 AM, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
>
> For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is
> specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types.
> This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because
> querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL.
>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
> Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
> Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
> ---
> Changelog:
> v1->v2: Fixed build errors
> v0->v1: Added proper SElinux patch
> ---
> drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> index 23278ed5be45..06c608c07b65 100644
> --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> @@ -417,8 +417,17 @@ void ib_close_shared_qp_security(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
>
> int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev)
> {
> + u8 i = rdma_start_port(dev);
> + bool is_ib = false;
> int ret;
>
> + while (i <= rdma_end_port(dev) && !is_ib)
> + is_ib = rdma_protocol_ib(dev, i++);
> +
> + /* If this isn't an IB device don't create the security context */
> + if (!is_ib)
> + return 0;
> +
> qp->qp_sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*qp->qp_sec), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!qp->qp_sec)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -441,6 +450,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_create_qp_security);
>
> void ib_destroy_qp_security_begin(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
> {
> + /* Return if not IB */
> + if (!sec)
> + return;
> +
> mutex_lock(&sec->mutex);
>
> /* Remove the QP from the lists so it won't get added to
> @@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_abort(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
> int ret;
> int i;
>
> + /* Return if not IB */
> + if (!sec)
> + return;
> +
> /* If a concurrent cache update is in progress this
> * QP security could be marked for an error state
> * transition. Wait for this to complete.
> @@ -505,6 +522,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_end(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
> {
> int i;
>
> + /* Return if not IB */
> + if (!sec)
> + return;
> +
> /* If a concurrent cache update is occurring we must
> * wait until this QP security structure is processed
> * in the QP to error flow before destroying it because
> @@ -565,13 +586,19 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
> bool pps_change = ((qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) ||
> (qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH));
>
> + WARN_ONCE((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT &&
> + rdma_protocol_ib(real_qp->device, qp_attr->port_num) &&
> + !real_qp->qp_sec),
> + "%s: QP security is not initialized for IB QP: %d\n",
> + __func__, real_qp->qp_num);
> +
> /* The port/pkey settings are maintained only for the real QP. Open
> * handles on the real QP will be in the shared_qp_list. When
> * enforcing security on the real QP all the shared QPs will be
> * checked as well.
> */
>
> - if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
> + if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
> mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
> new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp,
> qp_attr,
> @@ -600,7 +627,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
> qp_attr_mask,
> udata);
>
> - if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
> + if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
> /* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
> * ports_pkeys structure.
> */
> @@ -631,6 +658,9 @@ int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev,
> u16 pkey;
> int ret;
>
> + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(dev, port_num))
> + return 0;
> +
> ret = ib_get_cached_pkey(dev, port_num, pkey_index, &pkey);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> @@ -665,6 +695,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
> {
> int ret;
>
> + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
> + return 0;
> +
> ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> @@ -690,6 +723,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
>
> void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
> {
> + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
> + return;
> +
> security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
> if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
> unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
> @@ -697,6 +733,9 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
>
> int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
> {
> + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))
> + return 0;
> +
> if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
> return -EACCES;
>
> --
> 2.15.0
>
This patch breaks the kernel build on RHEL b/c it generates
a warning in the second if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {}
that new_pps may not be assigned. ... build warnings in RHEL kernel == build failure (on x86).
That's b/c the patch adds real_qp->qp_sec to if's conditions,
and the compiler cannot determine if real_qp->qp_sec cannot be modified
between the first check like it, above, which sets the value of new_pps,
and the second check that uses it, because real_qp is passed into the device->modify()
function call btwn those two if() check's.
The code needs to do something like this in the first if-check:
.....
bool new_pps_gotten = false;
....
if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp,
qp_attr,
qp_attr_mask);
new_pps_gotten = true;
....
}
....
and change the second if check to be:
if (new_pps_gotten) {
* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
.....
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH rdma-rc v2] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand
2017-11-27 22:03 ` Don Dutile
@ 2017-11-27 22:58 ` Daniel Jurgens
[not found] ` <47653af5-68af-0aa1-e811-0d6d42935648-VPRAkNaXOzVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Daniel Jurgens @ 2017-11-27 22:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Don Dutile, Leon Romanovsky, Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe
Cc: linux-rdma, Paul Moore, stable
On 11/27/2017 4:03 PM, Don Dutile wrote:
> On 11/27/2017 06:25 AM, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
>> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
>>
>>
>> - if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
>> + if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
>> mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
>> new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp,
>> qp_attr,
>> @@ -600,7 +627,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
>> qp_attr_mask,
>> udata);
>>
>> - if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
>> + if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
>> /* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
>> * ports_pkeys structure.
>> */
>>
> This patch breaks the kernel build on RHEL b/c it generates
> a warning in the second if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {}
> that new_pps may not be assigned. ... build warnings in RHEL kernel == build failure (on x86).
>
> That's b/c the patch adds real_qp->qp_sec to if's conditions,
> and the compiler cannot determine if real_qp->qp_sec cannot be modified
> between the first check like it, above, which sets the value of new_pps,
> and the second check that uses it, because real_qp is passed into the device->modify()
> function call btwn those two if() check's.
>
> The code needs to do something like this in the first if-check:
> .....
> bool new_pps_gotten = false;
> ....
>
> if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
> mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
> new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp,
> qp_attr,
> qp_attr_mask);
> new_pps_gotten = true;
> ....
> }
> ....
>
> and change the second if check to be:
>
> if (new_pps_gotten) {
> * Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
> .....
>
Thanks Don, I think it's better to initialize new_pps to NULL, vs introducing a new variable. Also, there needs to be a check of new_pps after getting it.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-11-29 5:11 UTC | newest]
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2017-11-27 11:25 [PATCH rdma-rc v2] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand Leon Romanovsky
2017-11-27 22:03 ` Don Dutile
2017-11-27 22:58 ` Daniel Jurgens
[not found] ` <47653af5-68af-0aa1-e811-0d6d42935648-VPRAkNaXOzVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-27 23:28 ` Don Dutile
[not found] ` <16d5d4c2-ea9e-765a-b0b7-a867c6a757d6-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-28 20:38 ` Don Dutile
2017-11-28 21:03 ` Daniel Jurgens
2017-11-29 5:11 ` Leon Romanovsky
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