Re: [PATCH 0/2] riscv: Add Spectre v1 mitigations - patchwork-bot+linux-riscv

From: patchwork-bot+linux-riscv@kernel.org
To: Lukas Gerlach <lukas.gerlach@cispa.de>
Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, palmer@dabbelt.com,
	pjw@kernel.org, aou@eecs.berkeley.edu, alex@ghiti.fr,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, daniel.weber@cispa.de,
	michael.schwarz@cispa.de, marton.bognar@kuleuven.be,
	jo.vanbulck@kuleuven.be
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] riscv: Add Spectre v1 mitigations
Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2025 03:31:36 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <176715189629.3416240.5165553541798344765.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251218191332.35849-1-lukas.gerlach@cispa.de>

Hello:

This series was applied to riscv/linux.git (fixes)
by Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>:

On Thu, 18 Dec 2025 20:13:30 +0100 you wrote:
> This series adds Spectre v1 to RISC-V in line with x86 and arm64.
> 
> Modern RISC-V CPUs with deep pipelines (e.g., XuanTie C910, SiFive P550)
> are susceptible to Spectre v1 attacks where an attacker can speculatively
> bypass bounds checks and leak kernel memory via cache side channels.
> 
> The first patch adds pointer masking to uaccess routines. Similar to
> arm64's uaccess_mask_ptr(), this clears the top bit of user pointers
> before access, ensuring that even under speculation, a user-controlled
> pointer cannot reach kernel memory.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [1/2] riscv: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
    (no matching commit)
  - [2/2] riscv: Sanitize syscall table indexing under speculation
    https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/25fd7ee7bf58

You are awesome, thank you!
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