From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
To: "Martin Schwidefsky" <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
"Heiko Carstens" <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@google.com>,
"René Nyffenegger" <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Brian Gerst" <brgerst@gmail.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
"Russell King" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"Will Deacon" <will.deacon@arm.com>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"James Morse" <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2017 10:47:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170404174727.35478-1-thgarnie@google.com> (raw)
This patch ensures a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel
address limit. If that happened, a process can corrupt kernel-mode
memory and elevate privileges.
For example, it would mitigation this bug:
- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also
added so each architecture can optimize this change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Based on next-20170404
---
arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
init/Kconfig | 7 +++++++
kernel/sys.c | 7 +++++++
4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index ca2fe764be2d..4ec7563f2746 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ config S390
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE
+ select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
select ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS if HIBERNATION
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 980c3c9b06f8..f9ff80fa92ff 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -191,6 +191,27 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__) \
__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+/*
+ * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
+ * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
+ */
+static inline void verify_pre_usermode_state(void) {
+ BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+#define __CHECK_USER_CALLER() \
+ bool user_caller = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)
+#define __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE() \
+ if (user_caller) verify_pre_usermode_state()
+#else
+#define __CHECK_USER_CALLER()
+#define __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE()
+asmlinkage void asm_verify_pre_usermode_state(void);
+#endif
+
+
#define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
#define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...) \
asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)) \
@@ -199,7 +220,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)); \
asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)) \
{ \
- long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__)); \
+ long ret; \
+ __CHECK_USER_CALLER(); \
+ ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__)); \
+ __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE(); \
__MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__); \
__PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__)); \
return ret; \
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 7f7027817bce..2c6b73de9a26 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1958,6 +1958,13 @@ config PROFILING
config TRACEPOINTS
bool
+#
+# Set by each architecture that want to optimize how verify_pre_usermode_state
+# is called.
+#
+config ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+ bool
+
source "arch/Kconfig"
endmenu # General setup
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 196c7134bee6..4ae278fcc290 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2459,3 +2459,10 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+asmlinkage void asm_verify_pre_usermode_state(void)
+{
+ verify_pre_usermode_state();
+}
+#endif
--
2.12.2.715.g7642488e1d-goog
next reply other threads:[~2017-04-04 17:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-04 17:47 Thomas Garnier [this message]
2017-04-04 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Thomas Garnier
2017-04-04 18:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2017-04-04 18:27 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-04-04 18:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-04 19:21 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-04 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-04-04 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 4/4] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-04-05 14:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2017-04-05 14:36 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-05 17:49 ` Catalin Marinas
2017-04-05 18:14 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-04-07 16:11 ` Catalin Marinas
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