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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] s390/entry: add support for syscall stack randomization
Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 11:31:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202105031131.864506CE31@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <yt9dk0ogi3j6.fsf@linux.ibm.com>

On Mon, May 03, 2021 at 11:13:01AM +0200, Sven Schnelle wrote:
> Hi Kees,
> 
> Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> writes:
> 
> > Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes:
> >
> >> On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 11:14:51AM +0200, Sven Schnelle wrote:
> >>> enough and has much less performance penalty compared to using
> >>> get_random_int(). The patch also adds randomization in pgm_check_handler()
> >>> as the sigreturn/rt_sigreturn system calls might be called from there.
> >>
> >> Ah, interesting. Is this path to syscalls unique to s390? (As in, should
> >> x86 and arm64 gain coverage over a path that got missed?)
> >
> > Yes, it's unique to s390. So there should be no need to do anything
> > similar on other architectures.
> 
> I was a bit short with my reponse, so let me explain this a bit
> further. On s390, when a signal handler needs to be called, we put a
> 'svc (system call) instruction on the Stack and set the address in the
> register holding the return address (r14) to that address. That worked
> fine until non-executable stacks where introduced. With non-executable
> stacks, we get a program check instead when trying to execute the svc.
> The kernel than checks whether the instruction that caused the fault
> is the svc instruction, and if yes, it will redirect to the systemm call
> code to execute the {rt_}sigreturn syscall. So we need to do the stack
> offset randomization also in the program check handler to cover that path.

Ah-ha; thanks for the details! I appreciate it. :)

> >>> +static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
> >>> +						  unsigned long ti_work)
> >>> +{
> >>> +	choose_random_kstack_offset(get_tod_clock_fast() & 0xff);
> >>
> >> What's the stack alignment on s390? Or, better question, what's the
> >> expected number of entropy bits?
> >
> >
> > The stack alignement on s390 is 8 bytes, so this should give us 5 bits
> > of entropy.

Sounds good!

-- 
Kees Cook

      reply	other threads:[~2021-05-03 18:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-29  9:14 [PATCH] s390/entry: add support for syscall stack randomization Sven Schnelle
2021-04-30 15:42 ` Heiko Carstens
2021-04-30 17:10 ` Kees Cook
2021-05-03  6:36   ` Sven Schnelle
2021-05-03  9:13     ` Sven Schnelle
2021-05-03 18:31       ` Kees Cook [this message]

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