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From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
To: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	dengler@linux.ibm.com, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, ifranzki@linux.ibm.com, agk@redhat.com,
	snitzer@kernel.org, gmazyland@gmail.com,
	Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/7] dm-integrity: use internal variable for digestsize
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2025 15:16:43 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250908131735.767017373@debian4.vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20250908131642.385445532@debian4.vm

Instead of calling digestsize() each time the digestsize for
the internal hash is needed, store the digestsize in a new
field internal_hash_digestsize within struct dm_integrity_c
once and use this value when needed.

Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
---
 drivers/md/dm-integrity.c |   25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

Index: linux-2.6/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c	2025-08-15 17:31:52.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c	2025-08-15 17:33:14.000000000 +0200
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ struct dm_integrity_c {
 	int failed;
 
 	struct crypto_shash *internal_hash;
+	unsigned int internal_hash_digestsize;
 
 	struct dm_target *ti;
 
@@ -1676,7 +1677,7 @@ static void integrity_sector_checksum(st
 		goto failed;
 	}
 
-	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash);
+	digest_size = ic->internal_hash_digestsize;
 	if (unlikely(digest_size < ic->tag_size))
 		memset(result + digest_size, 0, ic->tag_size - digest_size);
 
@@ -1776,7 +1777,7 @@ static void integrity_metadata(struct wo
 	if (ic->internal_hash) {
 		struct bvec_iter iter;
 		struct bio_vec bv;
-		unsigned int digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash);
+		unsigned int digest_size = ic->internal_hash_digestsize;
 		struct bio *bio = dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(dio, sizeof(struct dm_integrity_io));
 		char *checksums;
 		unsigned int extra_space = unlikely(digest_size > ic->tag_size) ? digest_size - ic->tag_size : 0;
@@ -2124,7 +2125,7 @@ retry_kmap:
 				} while (++s < ic->sectors_per_block);
 
 				if (ic->internal_hash) {
-					unsigned int digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash);
+					unsigned int digest_size = ic->internal_hash_digestsize;
 
 					if (unlikely(digest_size > ic->tag_size)) {
 						char checksums_onstack[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
@@ -2428,7 +2429,7 @@ retry:
 	if (!dio->integrity_payload) {
 		unsigned digest_size, extra_size;
 		dio->payload_len = ic->tuple_size * (bio_sectors(bio) >> ic->sb->log2_sectors_per_block);
-		digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash);
+		digest_size = ic->internal_hash_digestsize;
 		extra_size = unlikely(digest_size > ic->tag_size) ? digest_size - ic->tag_size : 0;
 		dio->payload_len += extra_size;
 		dio->integrity_payload = kmalloc(dio->payload_len, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NOWARN);
@@ -2589,7 +2590,7 @@ static void dm_integrity_inline_recheck(
 		bio_put(outgoing_bio);
 
 		integrity_sector_checksum(ic, dio->bio_details.bi_iter.bi_sector, outgoing_data, digest);
-		if (unlikely(crypto_memneq(digest, dio->integrity_payload, min(crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash), ic->tag_size)))) {
+		if (unlikely(crypto_memneq(digest, dio->integrity_payload, min(ic->internal_hash_digestsize, ic->tag_size)))) {
 			DMERR_LIMIT("%pg: Checksum failed at sector 0x%llx",
 				ic->dev->bdev, dio->bio_details.bi_iter.bi_sector);
 			atomic64_inc(&ic->number_of_mismatches);
@@ -2629,7 +2630,7 @@ static int dm_integrity_end_io(struct dm
 				//memset(mem, 0xff, ic->sectors_per_block << SECTOR_SHIFT);
 				integrity_sector_checksum(ic, dio->bio_details.bi_iter.bi_sector, mem, digest);
 				if (unlikely(crypto_memneq(digest, dio->integrity_payload + pos,
-						min(crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash), ic->tag_size)))) {
+						min(ic->internal_hash_digestsize, ic->tag_size)))) {
 					kunmap_local(mem);
 					dm_integrity_free_payload(dio);
 					INIT_WORK(&dio->work, dm_integrity_inline_recheck);
@@ -3011,8 +3012,8 @@ oom:
 		goto free_ret;
 	}
 	recalc_tags_size = (recalc_sectors >> ic->sb->log2_sectors_per_block) * ic->tag_size;
-	if (crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash) > ic->tag_size)
-		recalc_tags_size += crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash) - ic->tag_size;
+	if (ic->internal_hash_digestsize > ic->tag_size)
+		recalc_tags_size += ic->internal_hash_digestsize - ic->tag_size;
 	recalc_tags = kvmalloc(recalc_tags_size, GFP_NOIO);
 	if (!recalc_tags) {
 		vfree(recalc_buffer);
@@ -3171,8 +3172,8 @@ oom:
 	}
 
 	recalc_tags_size = (recalc_sectors >> ic->sb->log2_sectors_per_block) * ic->tuple_size;
-	if (crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash) > ic->tuple_size)
-		recalc_tags_size += crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash) - ic->tuple_size;
+	if (ic->internal_hash_digestsize > ic->tuple_size)
+		recalc_tags_size += ic->internal_hash_digestsize - ic->tuple_size;
 	recalc_tags = kmalloc(recalc_tags_size, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
 	if (!recalc_tags) {
 		kfree(recalc_buffer);
@@ -4694,6 +4695,8 @@ static int dm_integrity_ctr(struct dm_ta
 		    "Invalid internal hash", "Error setting internal hash key");
 	if (r)
 		goto bad;
+	if (ic->internal_hash)
+		ic->internal_hash_digestsize = crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash);
 
 	r = get_mac(&ic->journal_mac, &ic->journal_mac_alg, &ti->error,
 		    "Invalid journal mac", "Error setting journal mac key");
@@ -4706,7 +4709,7 @@ static int dm_integrity_ctr(struct dm_ta
 			r = -EINVAL;
 			goto bad;
 		}
-		ic->tag_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash);
+		ic->tag_size = ic->internal_hash_digestsize;
 	}
 	if (ic->tag_size > MAX_TAG_SIZE) {
 		ti->error = "Too big tag size";


  reply	other threads:[~2025-09-08 13:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-08 13:16 [PATCH v2 0/7] dm-integrity: asynchronous hash support Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-08 13:16 ` Mikulas Patocka [this message]
2025-09-08 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] dm-integrity: replace bvec_kmap_local with kmap_local_page Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-08 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] dm-integrity: introduce integrity_kmap and integrity_kunmap Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-08 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] dm-integrity: allocate the recalculate buffer with kmalloc Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-08 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] dm-integrity: add the "offset" argument Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-08 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] dm-integrity: rename internal_hash Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-08 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] dm-integrity: enable asynchronous hash interface Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-09  9:04 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] dm-integrity: asynchronous hash support Ingo Franzki
2025-09-09  9:42   ` Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-09 11:18     ` Ingo Franzki
2025-09-09 11:47       ` Milan Broz
2025-09-09 11:50         ` Ingo Franzki
2025-09-09 12:15           ` Milan Broz
2025-09-09 12:23             ` Ingo Franzki
2025-09-09 12:40               ` Milan Broz
2025-09-09 13:51             ` Harald Freudenberger
2025-09-09 14:12               ` Milan Broz
2025-09-11 13:43       ` Ingo Franzki
2025-09-11 15:58         ` Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-12  8:08           ` Ingo Franzki
2025-09-15  9:26             ` Harald Freudenberger
2025-09-18 15:00           ` Harald Freudenberger
2025-09-19  6:53             ` Ingo Franzki
2025-09-22 19:08             ` [PATCH] crypto/authenc: don't return -EBUSY when enqueuing the hash request Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-23  3:47               ` Herbert Xu
2025-09-23 11:14                 ` Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-23 14:36                   ` Mikulas Patocka
2025-09-23 15:17                   ` Herbert Xu
2025-09-24 10:20                     ` [PATCH] crypto: authenc - Correctly pass EINPROGRESS back up to the caller Herbert Xu
2025-09-24 13:17                       ` Ingo Franzki
2025-11-25 14:02                     ` [PATCH] crypto/authenc: don't return -EBUSY when enqueuing the hash request Mikulas Patocka
2025-11-26  5:16                       ` Herbert Xu
2025-09-09 13:36 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] dm-integrity: asynchronous hash support Harald Freudenberger

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