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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Bryam Vargas" <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, "Heiko Carstens" <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Vasily Gorbik" <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Alexander Gordeev" <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v2] net/smc: order the CDC receive path against buffer publication
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 04:34:44 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260716043445.17CF61F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260714-b4-disp-835288a6-v2-1-581555ef2145@proton.me>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Premature publication of buffer descriptors (`rmb_desc` and `sndbuf_desc`) via `smp_store_release()` before the completion of their associated connection state initialization leaves a race window where concurrent state updates from CDC handlers can be silently overwritten.
- [High] The patch attempts to fix a NULL pointer dereference of `conn->sndbuf_desc` in `smc_cdc_msg_recv_action()` for the SMC-D DMB-nocopy path but misses a secondary dereference path in the same function, leaving an exploitable kernel panic.
--

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH net v2] net/smc: order the CDC receive path against buffer publication ---
commit 9b6f28a01319410a969a198788b79eb249671b6c
Author: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Subject: net/smc: order the CDC receive path against buffer publication

This commit introduces acquire/release pairs for publishing rmb_desc and
sndbuf_desc to prevent NULL dereferences and stale reads. By ensuring
CDC handlers only see fully initialized buffers, it prevents crashes 
during the connection setup window.

Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260711-b4-disp-c36a9798-v1-1-340b0c6053fb@proton.me?part=1

> diff --git a/net/smc/smc_cdc.c b/net/smc/smc_cdc.c
> index 32d6d03df3214..2cd0ee7b51c22 100644
> --- a/net/smc/smc_cdc.c
> +++ b/net/smc/smc_cdc.c
> @@ -353,12 +354,20 @@ static void smc_cdc_msg_recv_action(struct smc_sock *smc,
>  		 * peer RMB, then update tx_curs_fin and sndbuf_space
>  		 * here since peer has already consumed the data.
>  		 */
> +		/* Pair with smp_store_release() in smcd_buf_attach(): the ghost
> +		 * sndbuf_desc is attached after the connection is reachable to
> +		 * the ISM device, so acquire it and skip the update while it is
> +		 * unset -- avoids a NULL deref and a load of an uninitialised
> +		 * buffer.
> +		 */
> +		sndbuf_desc = smp_load_acquire(&conn->sndbuf_desc);
>  		if (conn->lgr->is_smcd &&
> -		    smc_ism_support_dmb_nocopy(conn->lgr->smcd)) {
> +		    smc_ism_support_dmb_nocopy(conn->lgr->smcd) &&
> +		    sndbuf_desc) {
>  			/* Calculate consumed data and
>  			 * increment free send buffer space.
>  			 */
> -			diff_tx = smc_curs_diff(conn->sndbuf_desc->len,
> +			diff_tx = smc_curs_diff(sndbuf_desc->len,
>  						&conn->tx_curs_fin,
>  						&conn->local_rx_ctrl.cons);

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does this function have a
secondary NULL pointer dereference path?

While this patch adds a guard for sndbuf_desc here, further down in this
same function (smc_cdc_msg_recv_action), if an early CDC message arrives
with an advanced cons cursor, diff_cons will be > 0.

This triggers the following code block:

    if ((diff_cons && smc_tx_prepared_sends(conn)) || ...

Looking at smc_tx_prepared_sends() in net/smc/smc_tx.h, it unconditionally
dereferences sndbuf_desc:

static inline int smc_tx_prepared_sends(struct smc_connection *conn)
{
    ...
    return smc_curs_diff(conn->sndbuf_desc->len, &sent, &prep);
}

Could this cause a panic if conn->sndbuf_desc is still NULL during the race
window?

[ ... ]

> diff --git a/net/smc/smc_core.c b/net/smc/smc_core.c
> index cf6b620fef05f..d94b728c0d68c 100644
> --- a/net/smc/smc_core.c
> +++ b/net/smc/smc_core.c
> @@ -2499,7 +2499,13 @@ static int __smc_buf_create(struct smc_sock *smc, bool is_smcd, bool is_rmb)
>  	}
>  
>  	if (is_rmb) {
> -		conn->rmb_desc = buf_desc;
> +		/* Publish with release semantics: the connection is already in
> +		 * the link group's token tree, so a concurrent CDC receive
> +		 * handler must observe a fully initialised buffer once it sees
> +		 * a non-NULL rmb_desc.  Pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in
> +		 * the CDC receive path.
> +		 */
> +		smp_store_release(&conn->rmb_desc, buf_desc);
>  		conn->rmbe_size_comp = bufsize_comp;
>  		smc->sk.sk_rcvbuf = bufsize * 2;
>  		atomic_set(&conn->bytes_to_rcv, 0);

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but could this ordering cause concurrent
handler updates to be silently clobbered?

By publishing rmb_desc via smp_store_release() before bytes_to_rcv is
initialized, could a CDC receive handler observe the non-NULL descriptor,
process a message, and update bytes_to_rcv via atomic_add(), only for this
thread to immediately overwrite it with atomic_set(&conn->bytes_to_rcv, 0)?

[ ... ]

> @@ -2599,7 +2605,13 @@ int smcd_buf_attach(struct smc_sock *smc)
>  	buf_desc->cpu_addr =
>  		(u8 *)buf_desc->cpu_addr + sizeof(struct smcd_cdc_msg);
>  	buf_desc->len -= sizeof(struct smcd_cdc_msg);
> -	conn->sndbuf_desc = buf_desc;
> +	/* Publish with release semantics: the connection is already reachable
> +	 * to the ISM device (smc_ism_set_conn() ran in __smc_buf_create()), so
> +	 * the CDC receive tasklet must observe a fully initialised ghost buffer
> +	 * once it sees a non-NULL sndbuf_desc.  Pairs with smp_load_acquire()
> +	 * in smc_cdc_msg_recv_action().
> +	 */
> +	smp_store_release(&conn->sndbuf_desc, buf_desc);
>  	conn->sndbuf_desc->used = 1;
>  	atomic_set(&conn->sndbuf_space, conn->sndbuf_desc->len);
>  	return 0;

[Severity: High]
This is also a pre-existing issue, but does this have the same clobbering
risk as the rmb_desc publication above?

If a CDC handler observes the published sndbuf_desc and updates sndbuf_space
via atomic_add(), wouldn't the atomic_set(&conn->sndbuf_space, ...) here
unconditionally overwrite the handler's update, leading to corrupted space
accounting?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260714-b4-disp-835288a6-v2-1-581555ef2145@proton.me?part=1

      reply	other threads:[~2026-07-16  4:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-15  4:34 [PATCH net v2] net/smc: order the CDC receive path against buffer publication Bryam Vargas via B4 Relay
2026-07-16  4:34 ` sashiko-bot [this message]

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