From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Harald Freudenberger" <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
"Alexander Gordeev" <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
"Heiko Carstens" <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
"Vasily Gorbik" <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 1/5] s390/zcrypt: Fix CPRB memory allocation in zcrypt misc code
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 16:02:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260729160224.422111F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260729154458.195135-2-freude@linux.ibm.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Uninitialized kernel heap memory padding is leaked to the crypto hardware via the AP bus message buffer.
--
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v9 1/5] s390/zcrypt: Fix CPRB memory allocation in zcrypt misc code ---
commit bbdecb3add414a50e3e90e0021b88d5f9c7bf242
Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
s390/zcrypt: Fix CPRB memory allocation in zcrypt misc code
Both CPRB alloc functions in zcrypt_ccamisc.c and zcrypt_ep11misc.c
did not round up the memory allocation to a multiple of 4 bytes as it
is needed by the zcrypt layer to process the CPRBs.
Now the alloc_and_prep_cprbmem() and alloc_cprbmem() functions
guarantee that the base CPRB struct and a possible parameter block are
aligned to a 4-byte boundary and the backing memory allocation is
rounded up to the next multiple of 4 byte. Also the free_cprbmem() is
updated and scrubs the rounded up amount of memory.
> diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c
> index 84936a795b956..6819acd67c49b 100644
> --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c
> +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c
[ ... ]
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but while reviewing how CPRB
requests are padded and aligned, I noticed a pre-existing issue in
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c.
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c:xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx() {
...
/* prepare CPRB */
if (z_copy_from_user(userspace, msg->userdata,
xcrb->request_control_blk_addr,
xcrb->request_control_blk_length))
return -EFAULT;
...
}
Does this code leak uninitialized kernel heap memory padding to the crypto
hardware via the AP bus message buffer?
When a userspace application calls the zcrypt ioctl (e.g., ICARSAMODEXPO)
with an unaligned request_control_blk_length, the ap_msg->msg buffer is
allocated via kmalloc without __GFP_ZERO by ap_init_apmsg().
Since only the unaligned length is copied into the buffer, while the total
message length sent to the AP card uses the 4-byte aligned CEIL4() length,
could the unwritten padding bytes (up to 3 bytes) retain their previous
kernel heap contents and be transmitted to the hardware?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but the same behavior appears in
xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx():
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c:xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx() {
...
/* Import CPRB data from the ioctl input parameter */
if (z_copy_from_user(userspace, msg->userdata,
(char __force __user *)xcrb->req, xcrb->req_len)) {
return -EFAULT;
}
...
}
Can the unaligned request length copied here also leave padding bytes
uninitialized before being sent to the hardware?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260729154458.195135-1-freude@linux.ibm.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-29 16:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-29 15:44 [PATCH v9 0/5] Improve code in zcrypt msg type 6 handling Harald Freudenberger
2026-07-29 15:44 ` [PATCH v9 1/5] s390/zcrypt: Fix CPRB memory allocation in zcrypt misc code Harald Freudenberger
2026-07-29 16:02 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-29 15:44 ` [PATCH v9 2/5] s390/zcrypt: Improve CCA CPRB length and overflow checks Harald Freudenberger
2026-07-29 16:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-29 15:44 ` [PATCH v9 3/5] s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 " Harald Freudenberger
2026-07-29 16:35 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-29 15:44 ` [PATCH v9 4/5] s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 CPRB domain handling with ASN.1 parsing Harald Freudenberger
2026-07-29 16:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-29 15:44 ` [PATCH v9 5/5] s390/zcrypt: Pad trailing CCA or EP11 message with zeros Harald Freudenberger
2026-07-29 17:07 ` sashiko-bot
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