From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Vasily Gorbik" <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
"Heiko Carstens" <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
"Alexander Gordeev" <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/8] KVM: s390: Fix memory leak in guest debug handling
Date: Wed, 05 Aug 2026 11:36:04 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260805113605.B82B51F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260805110455.7200-5-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Guest debug dynamically allocated data (hw_wp_info, hw_bp_info, and old_data buffers) are leaked when a VCPU is destroyed while guest debugging is active.
- [High] Accessing guest memory (memslots) via `read_guest_abs()` without holding the SRCU read lock.
- [High] Integer truncation of `bp_data->len` allows unprivileged host-userspace to trigger a page allocator WARN_ON_ONCE via kmalloc().
--
--- Patch [4]: [PATCH v3 4/8] KVM: s390: Fix memory leak in guest debug handling ---
commit 4fe6d9b7b9fc213b17879f6cacc90f0c1ed0f351
Author: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
KVM: s390: Fix memory leak in guest debug handling
bp_data is freed only for the error case by kfree(bp_data). Every successful
KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG will leak bp_data.
Fixes: 27291e2165b6 ("KVM: s390: hardware support for guest debugging")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/guestdbg.c b/arch/s390/kvm/guestdbg.c
> index 69835e1d4f207..4c02dbebb2eb3 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/guestdbg.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/guestdbg.c
> @@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ int kvm_s390_import_bp_data(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> vcpu->arch.guestdbg.hw_bp_info = bp_info;
> vcpu->arch.guestdbg.nr_hw_wp = nr_wp;
> vcpu->arch.guestdbg.hw_wp_info = wp_info;
> + kfree(bp_data);
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but it looks like the dynamically
allocated data (hw_wp_info, hw_bp_info, and old_data buffers) is leaked
when a VCPU is destroyed.
If a userspace process calls the KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG ioctl to enable hardware
breakpoints or watchpoints, it allocates memory for these buffers. If the
process then destroys the VCPU without disabling debugging, does
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() fail to call kvm_s390_clear_bp_data(vcpu) to free
these buffers?
arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c:kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() {
...
free_page((unsigned long)(vcpu->arch.sie_block));
kvm_s390_free_mmu_cache(vcpu->arch.mc);
}
Could this allow an unprivileged user with access to KVM to repeatedly create
and destroy VCPUs to trigger a host-side memory exhaustion?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this code access guest memory
without holding the SRCU read lock?
When __import_wp_info() is called earlier in this function:
arch/s390/kvm/guestdbg.c:__import_wp_info() {
...
/* try to backup the original value */
ret = read_guest_abs(vcpu, wp_info->phys_addr, wp_info->old_data,
wp_info->len);
...
}
The call chain goes through kvm_s390_import_bp_data() -> __import_wp_info() ->
read_guest_abs() -> kvm_read_guest() without holding srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu).
Could concurrent memslot modifications (e.g., via other VCPU threads or
memory hotplug) result in a use-after-free when KVM attempts to traverse the
unprotected memslot tree?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but is there a potential integer truncation
when handling bp_data->len?
In __import_wp_info(), the 64-bit bp_data->len from userspace is truncated
to a 32-bit signed integer wp_info->len:
arch/s390/kvm/guestdbg.c:__import_wp_info() {
...
wp_info->len = bp_data->len;
...
if (wp_info->len < 0 || wp_info->len > MAX_WP_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
wp_info->old_data = kmalloc(bp_data->len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
...
}
If bp_data->len is set to 0x100000001, it would truncate to wp_info->len = 1,
bypassing the MAX_WP_SIZE check. The original 64-bit bp_data->len is then
passed to kmalloc().
Since the allocation size is >4GB, it exceeds MAX_PAGE_ORDER. Because the
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT flag lacks __GFP_NOWARN, will the kernel's page allocator
emit a WARN_ON_ONCE that could be triggered by an unprivileged host-userspace
process?
> return 0;
> error:
> kfree(bp_data);
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260805110455.7200-1-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com?part=4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-05 11:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-05 11:04 [PATCH v3 0/8] KVM: s390: More fixes Christian Borntraeger
2026-08-05 11:04 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] KVM: s390: Remove user triggerable WARN_ON Christian Borntraeger
2026-08-05 11:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-05 11:04 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] KVM: s390: Zero initialize data structures for inject_pfault_token Christian Borntraeger
2026-08-05 11:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-05 11:04 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] KVM: s390: Zero initialize irq in reinject_machine_check Christian Borntraeger
2026-08-05 11:29 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-05 11:04 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] KVM: s390: Fix memory leak in guest debug handling Christian Borntraeger
2026-08-05 11:36 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-05 11:04 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] KVM: s390: Fix old_data leak in guest debug error path Christian Borntraeger
2026-08-05 11:30 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-05 11:04 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] KVM: s390: Take srcu when importing watchpoint data Christian Borntraeger
2026-08-05 11:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-05 11:04 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] KVM: s390: Free guest debug data on vcpu destroy Christian Borntraeger
2026-08-05 11:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-05 11:04 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] KVM: s390: Fix length check __import_wp_info() Christian Borntraeger
2026-08-05 11:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-05 11:55 ` [PATCH v3 0/8] KVM: s390: More fixes Claudio Imbrenda
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260805113605.B82B51F000E9@smtp.kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=agordeev@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=borntraeger@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=gor@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=hca@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-s390@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox