From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Harald Freudenberger" <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Alexander Gordeev" <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, "Vasily Gorbik" <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
"Heiko Carstens" <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 6/8] s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PHMAC when req is pushed to crypto engine
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 14:35:22 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260820143522.7C3221F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260820141957.19091-7-freude@linux.ibm.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Incorrect module teardown order in `s390_phmac_exit` leads to kthread leaks and Use-After-Free of the `crypto_engine`.
--
--- Patch [6]: [PATCH v5 6/8] s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PHMAC when req is pushed to crypto engine ---
commit c74c807c2aeebffc7e981ca45b5b377727342ad1
Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PHMAC when req is pushed to crypto engine
When a request is transferred to the engine via
crypto_transfer_hash_request_to_engine() there are two return codes
signaling a successful transfer: EINPROGRESS and EBUSY. However the
correct handling of EBUSY was missing and has been added as a return
code indicating a successful transfer to the crypto engine.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.17+
> diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c
> index 03ca33ffe6ccf..30c8a59af1a4e 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -716,15 +726,17 @@ static int phmac_finup(struct ahash_request *req)
> /* req->async_op has been set to either OP_FINUP or OP_FINAL */
> atomic_inc(&tfm_ctx->via_engine_ctr);
> rc = crypto_transfer_hash_request_to_engine(phmac_crypto_engine, req);
> - if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
> + if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
> + cleanup = false;
> + else
> atomic_dec(&tfm_ctx->via_engine_ctr);
> }
>
> - if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
> + if (cleanup && hwh->walkbytes > 0)
> hwh_advance(hwh, rc);
>
> out:
> - if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
> + if (cleanup)
> memzero_explicit(kmac_ctx, sizeof(*kmac_ctx));
> pr_debug("rc=%d\n", rc);
> return rc;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but while reviewing this file I noticed a
potential module teardown order problem in s390_phmac_exit() in
arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c:
if (phmac_crypto_engine) {
crypto_engine_stop(phmac_crypto_engine);
crypto_engine_exit(phmac_crypto_engine);
}
for (i = ARRAY_SIZE(phmac_algs) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
phmac = &phmac_algs[i];
if (phmac->registered)
crypto_engine_unregister_ahash(&phmac->alg);
}
Could this lead to kthread leaks and a use-after-free of the crypto_engine?
If s390_phmac_init() fails to register a subsequent algorithm after
successfully registering the first, it jumps to the error path and
calls s390_phmac_exit().
Because the first algorithm is already registered and the module is in
MODULE_STATE_COMING, a concurrent userspace program can successfully
allocate it and continuously submit hash requests.
Since s390_phmac_exit() calls crypto_engine_stop() before unregistering
the algorithms, the continuous stream of requests keeps the engine busy.
This can cause crypto_engine_stop() to time out and return -EBUSY,
which leads to crypto_engine_exit() returning without destroying the
kworker thread.
Finally, misc_deregister() destroys the device, freeing the devm-managed
crypto_engine struct, and the module is subsequently unloaded.
Would the still-running kworker thread then access freed memory and
execute freed module code, potentially causing a kernel panic?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260820141957.19091-1-freude@linux.ibm.com?part=6
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-20 14:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-20 14:19 [PATCH v5 0/8] Fixes and rework for paes_s390 and phmac_s390 Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-20 14:19 ` [PATCH v5 1/8] s390/crypto: Fix return code handling at skcipher_walk_done in PAES algorithms Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-20 14:30 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 14:19 ` [PATCH v5 2/8] s390/crypto: Fix missing scrub of temp buffers with PAES algorithm Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-20 14:29 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 14:19 ` [PATCH v5 3/8] s390/crypto: Fix use of mutex in atomic context in PAES Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-20 14:29 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 14:19 ` [PATCH v5 4/8] s390/crypto: Fix missing cra_flags in paes_s390 Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-20 14:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 14:19 ` [PATCH v5 5/8] s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PAES when req is pushed to crypto engine Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-20 14:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 14:19 ` [PATCH v5 6/8] s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PHMAC " Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-20 14:35 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-20 14:19 ` [PATCH v5 7/8] s390/crypto: Fix wrong return code to engine in asynch callbacks Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-20 14:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 14:19 ` [PATCH v5 8/8] s390/crypto: Map EBUSY to EIO when key conversion fails repeatedly Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-20 14:32 ` sashiko-bot
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