From: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 13:01:42 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <213d770e-1d10-4505-adbe-4212a65e4e63@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260729095821.1DE5D1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>
This is fixed by patch 2/2 of this series.
On 7/29/26 11:58, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
>
> Pre-existing issues:
> - [Critical] Heap buffer overflow in `cca_ecc2protkey` when copying a user-provided ECC key token into a fixed-size buffer.
> --
>
> --- Patch [1]: [PATCH v1 1/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests ---
> commit 7b35c8aa05e7fb7c7837b88e5f3b7fc85f721c98
> Author: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
>
> s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests
>
> This commit adds a bounds check in cca_cipher2protkey() to ensure the copy
> length derived from the key token does not exceed the available space in the
> CPRB parameter block. If the length is too large, the request is rejected
> early with -EINVAL.
>
>> diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c
>> index 84936a795b956..db6a4211a97e0 100644
>> --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c
>> +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c
>> @@ -1261,6 +1261,9 @@ int cca_cipher2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *ckey,
>> } __packed * prepparm;
>> int keytoklen = ((struct cipherkeytoken *)ckey)->len;
>>
>> + if (keytoklen > PARMBSIZE - sizeof(struct aureqparm))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>
> [Severity: Critical]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but does a similar heap buffer overflow exist in
> cca_ecc2protkey()?
>
> It appears cca_ecc2protkey() also copies a user-provided ECC key token into a
> fixed-size buffer without a similar bounds check. A user with access to
> /dev/pkey could call the PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2 ioctl, passing an
> eccprivkeytoken with a large len field.
>
> This would be passed down through cca_key2protkey() to cca_ecc2protkey(),
> where it allocates a 512-byte parameter block via
> alloc_and_prep_cprbmem() and copies the token:
>
> drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c:cca_ecc2protkey() {
> ...
> int keylen = ((struct eccprivkeytoken *)key)->len;
>
> /* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */
> rc = alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(PARMBSIZE, &mem,
> &preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);
> ...
> /* kb, cca token */
> preqparm->kb.len = keylen + 3 * sizeof(uint16_t);
> preqparm->kb.cca_key_token_len = keylen + 2 * sizeof(uint16_t);
> memcpy(preqparm->kb.cca_key_token, key, keylen);
> ...
> }
>
> Since the parameter block header consumes 90 bytes, any keylen > 422 bytes
> could overflow the allocated memory. Is a similar check needed there?
>
>> /* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */
>> rc = alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(PARMBSIZE, &mem,
>> &preqcblk, &prepcblk, xflags);
>
--
Mit freundlichen Grüßen / Kind regards
Holger Dengler
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-29 11:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-29 9:36 [PATCH v1 0/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length in CCA key requests Holger Dengler
2026-07-29 9:36 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher " Holger Dengler
2026-07-29 9:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-29 11:01 ` Holger Dengler [this message]
2026-07-29 10:10 ` Harald Freudenberger
2026-07-29 9:36 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private " Holger Dengler
2026-07-29 10:10 ` Harald Freudenberger
2026-07-29 10:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-29 11:22 ` Holger Dengler
2026-07-29 13:30 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] s390/zcrypt: Validate length in CCA " Vasily Gorbik
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