Re: [PATCH v2] integrity: Extract secure boot enquiry function out of IMA

[GONG Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>]

On 7/26/2025 2:29 AM, Nayna Jain wrote:
> 
> On 7/17/25 8:29 AM, GONG Ruiqi wrote:
>> On 7/8/2025 4:35 AM, Nayna Jain wrote:
>>> On 7/2/25 10:07 PM, GONG Ruiqi wrote:
>>>> ...
>>
>> Yes, IMA_ARCH_POLICY was not set. The testing was conducted on
>> openEuler[1], a Linux distro mainly for arm64 & x86, and the kernel was
>> compiled based on its own openeuler_defconfig[2], which set
>> IMA_ARCH_POLICY to N.
> 
> Thanks Ruiqi for the response.
> 
> It seems the main cause of the problem was that IMA_ARCH_POLICY config
> wasn't enabled; and it sounds like you don't need IMA arch policies but
> you do need the arch specific function to get the secure boot status.
> 
> In that case, removing IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT config dependency
> on IMA_ARCH_POLICY config and updating the corresponding help is all
> that is needed.

I think it doesn't solve the real problems, which are: 1. the implicit
dependency of LOAD_UEFI_KEYS to IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT, which
surprises people, and 2. what arch_ima_get_secureboot() does is
essentially a stand-alone function and it's not necessarily be a part of
IMA, but it's still controlled by IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT.

I agree that adjusting Kconfig could be simpler, but breaking
IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT's dependency to IMA_ARCH_POLICY doesn't
help on both. If that's gonna be the way we will take, what I would
propose is to let LOAD_UEFI_KEYS select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT,
which states the dependency explicitly so at least solves the problem 1.

-Ruiqi

> 
> The help text can be updated to:
> This option is selected by architectures to detect systems with secure
> and/or trusted boot enabled, in order to load the appropriate IMA
> runtime policies and keys.
> 
> Thanks & Regards,
> 
>     - Nayna
>