From: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 6/7] s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PHMAC when req is pushed to crypto engine
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 15:23:09 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cf1644a4ca745c763a041f5a8a54c836@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260819093709.52A491F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>
On 2026-08-19 11:37, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential
> issue(s) to consider:
>
> Pre-existing issues:
> - [Critical] Thread-local memory mapping (kmap_local_page) is leaked
> across an asynchronous boundary, leading to an invalid cross-thread
> kunmap_local.
> - [High] Double completion of asynchronous requests on error paths in
> `phmac_do_one_request`.
> - [High] Persistent hardware busy state causes the driver to complete
> the request with `-EBUSY`, which the crypto API swallows, leading to
> an infinite wait.
> --
>
> --- Patch [6]: [PATCH v4 6/7] s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in
> PHMAC when req is pushed to crypto engine ---
> commit 85264caf4d41b4adaeaed2f15efd8b287915969c
> Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
>
> s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PHMAC when req is pushed to
> crypto engine
>
> This commit fixes the handling of the -EBUSY return code when a request
> is
> transferred to the crypto engine via
> crypto_transfer_hash_request_to_engine().
> It adds -EBUSY as a successful transfer indicator alongside
> -EINPROGRESS,
> preventing premature cleanup of the request context.
>
>> diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c
>> b/arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c
>> index 03ca33ffe6ccf..30c8a59af1a4e 100644
>> --- a/arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c
>> +++ b/arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c
>
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -629,12 +632,15 @@ static int phmac_update(struct ahash_request
>> *req)
>> req_ctx->async_op = OP_UPDATE;
>> atomic_inc(&tfm_ctx->via_engine_ctr);
>> rc = crypto_transfer_hash_request_to_engine(phmac_crypto_engine,
>> req);
>> - if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
>> + if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
>> + cleanup = false;
>
> [Severity: Critical]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but does setting cleanup = false here
> leak a
> thread-local memory mapping across an asynchronous boundary?
>
> When the submitter thread maps the scatterlist page using
> kmap_local_page()
> via hwh_prepare() calling into crypto_hash_walk_first(), the map is
> strictly
> thread-local. If the request is pushed to the engine and the submitter
> thread
> returns, the local memory remains mapped in its thread context.
>
> Later, the crypto_engine kworker thread processes the queued request in
> arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c:phmac_do_one_request(), calling
> crypto_hash_walk_done(), which invokes kunmap_local() cross-thread. Can
> this
> cause a kernel BUG or panic by violating the thread-locality
> requirements of
> kmap_local_page()?
>
This is not exactly true. On s390 CONFIG_HIGHMEM is NOT set.
From /ext/git/s390-linux/include/crypto/scatterwalk.h:
static inline void scatterwalk_map(struct scatter_walk *walk)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HIGHMEM)) {
// Uses kmap_local_page() - THREAD-LOCAL
addr = kmap_local_page(page) + offset;
} else {
// Direct mapping - NO thread restrictions
addr = page_address(base_page) + offset;
}
}
So there is no thread restriction on s390 and paes and phmac are both
only s390.
>> + else
>> atomic_dec(&tfm_ctx->via_engine_ctr);
>> }
>>
>> - if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
>> - hwh_advance(hwh, rc);
>> + if (cleanup) {
>> + if (hwh->walkbytes > 0)
>> + hwh_advance(hwh, rc);
>> memzero_explicit(kmac_ctx, sizeof(*kmac_ctx));
>> }
>>
>
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -667,12 +674,14 @@ static int phmac_final(struct ahash_request
>> *req)
>> req_ctx->async_op = OP_FINAL;
>> atomic_inc(&tfm_ctx->via_engine_ctr);
>> rc = crypto_transfer_hash_request_to_engine(phmac_crypto_engine,
>> req);
>> - if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
>> + if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
>> + cleanup = false;
>
> [Severity: High]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but does the driver properly translate
> persistent
> -EBUSY hardware errors before completion?
>
> If the hardware persistently returns -EBUSY when deriving a protected
> key in
> arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c:convert_key(), it exhausts its retries
> and
> returns -EBUSY. This propagates to phmac_do_one_request(), which
> explicitly
> finalizes the request:
>
> crypto_finalize_hash_request(engine, req, rc);
>
> Since the crypto API's completion wrapper ahash_op_done() explicitly
> swallows
> -EBUSY because it treats it as a queueing status, completing a request
> with
> -EBUSY prevents the final completion callback from firing. Could this
> cause
> callers using crypto_wait_req() to block forever?
>
>> + else
>> atomic_dec(&tfm_ctx->via_engine_ctr);
>> }
>>
>> out:
>> - if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
>> + if (cleanup)
>> memzero_explicit(kmac_ctx, sizeof(*kmac_ctx));
>> pr_debug("rc=%d\n", rc);
>> return rc;
>
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -716,15 +726,17 @@ static int phmac_finup(struct ahash_request
>> *req)
>> /* req->async_op has been set to either OP_FINUP or OP_FINAL */
>> atomic_inc(&tfm_ctx->via_engine_ctr);
>> rc = crypto_transfer_hash_request_to_engine(phmac_crypto_engine,
>> req);
>> - if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
>> + if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
>> + cleanup = false;
>> + else
>> atomic_dec(&tfm_ctx->via_engine_ctr);
>> }
>
> [Severity: High]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but is there a risk of double completion
> on error
> paths in arch/s390/crypto/phmac_s390.c:phmac_do_one_request()?
>
> If hardware execution fails and returns an error like -EIO,
> phmac_do_one_request() manually completes the request:
>
> crypto_finalize_hash_request(engine, req, rc);
> local_bh_enable();
> return rc;
>
> By returning the negative rc back to the crypto_engine core, and
> because the
> engine allocates with retry_support=true, the core in
> crypto_pump_requests()
> will treat this as a failure it must handle. Does this trigger an
> automatic
> fallback crypto_request_complete() that invokes the user's completion
> callback
> a second time?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-19 13:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-19 9:17 [PATCH v4 0/7] Fixes and rework for paes_s390 and phmac_s390 Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-19 9:17 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] s390/crypto: Fix return code handling at skcipher_walk_done in PAES algorithms Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-19 9:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 9:17 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] s390/crypto: Fix missing scrub of temp buffers with PAES algorithm Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-19 9:30 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 9:17 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] s390/crypto: Fix use of mutex in atomic context in PAES Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-19 9:27 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 9:17 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] s390/crypto: Fix missing cra_flags in paes_s390 Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-19 9:22 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 9:17 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PAES when req is pushed to crypto engine Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-19 9:30 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 9:47 ` Holger Dengler
2026-08-19 9:17 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PHMAC " Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-19 9:37 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 13:23 ` Harald Freudenberger [this message]
2026-08-19 14:03 ` Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-19 9:17 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] s390/crypto: Fix wrong return code to engine in asynch callbacks Harald Freudenberger
2026-08-19 9:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 10:00 ` Holger Dengler
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