From: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com>
To: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, borntraeger@de.ibm.com,
frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
david@redhat.com, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mimu@linux.ibm.com,
nrb@linux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 01/17] KVM: s390: pv: leak the topmost page table when destroy fails
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 17:34:59 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e3e768d6-08f5-c38d-b73d-2d9cbdfc38dc@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220303160547.391db6d9@p-imbrenda>
On 3/3/22 16:05, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
> On Thu, 3 Mar 2022 15:40:42 +0100
> Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
>> On 3/2/22 19:11, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
>>> Each secure guest must have a unique ASCE (address space control
>>> element); we must avoid that new guests use the same page for their
>>> ASCE, to avoid errors.
>>>
>>> Since the ASCE mostly consists of the address of the topmost page table
>>> (plus some flags), we must not return that memory to the pool unless
>>> the ASCE is no longer in use.
>>>
>>> Only a successful Destroy Secure Configuration UVC will make the ASCE
>>> reusable again.
>>>
>>> If the Destroy Configuration UVC fails, the ASCE cannot be reused for a
>>> secure guest (either for the ASCE or for other memory areas). To avoid
>>> a collision, it must not be used again. This is a permanent error and
>>> the page becomes in practice unusable, so we set it aside and leak it.
>>> On failure we already leak other memory that belongs to the ultravisor
>>> (i.e. the variable and base storage for a guest) and not leaking the
>>> topmost page table was an oversight.
>>>
>>> This error (and thus the leakage) should not happen unless the hardware
>>> is broken or KVM has some unknown serious bug.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
>>> Fixes: 29b40f105ec8d55 ("KVM: s390: protvirt: Add initial vm and cpu lifecycle handling")
>>> ---
>>> arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h | 2 +
>>> arch/s390/kvm/pv.c | 9 +++--
>>> arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> +/**
>>> + * s390_replace_asce - Try to replace the current ASCE of a gmap with
>>> + * another equivalent one.
>>> + * @gmap the gmap
>>> + *
>>> + * If the allocation of the new top level page table fails, the ASCE is not
>>> + * replaced.
>>> + * In any case, the old ASCE is always removed from the list. Therefore the
>>> + * caller has to make sure to save a pointer to it beforehands, unless an
>>> + * intentional leak is intended.
>>> + */
>>> +int s390_replace_asce(struct gmap *gmap)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned long asce;
>>> + struct page *page;
>>> + void *table;
>>> +
>>> + s390_remove_old_asce(gmap);
>>> +
>>> + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, CRST_ALLOC_ORDER);
>>> + if (!page)
>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>> + table = page_to_virt(page);
>>> + memcpy(table, gmap->table, 1UL << (CRST_ALLOC_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT));
>>
>> Is concurrent modification of *gmap->table possible during the copy?
>
> that would only be possible if the guest touches memory in such way
> that the table needs to be changed.
>
> this function is only called when the guest is not running (e.g. during
> reboot), so nobody should touch the table
Is that asserted?
I guess if modifications to the table are block concurrent and entries are only
freed when the vm is destroyed you cannot intentionally do any funny business.
>
>>
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * The caller has to deal with the old ASCE, but here we make sure
>>> + * the new one is properly added to the list of page tables, so that
>>> + * it will be freed when the VM is torn down.
>>> + */
>>> + spin_lock(&gmap->guest_table_lock);
>>> + list_add(&page->lru, &gmap->crst_list);
>>> + spin_unlock(&gmap->guest_table_lock);
>>> +
>>> + /* Set new table origin while preserving existing ASCE control bits */
>>> + asce = (gmap->asce & _ASCE_ORIGIN) | __pa(table);
>>> + WRITE_ONCE(gmap->asce, asce);
>>> + WRITE_ONCE(gmap->mm->context.gmap_asce, asce);
>>> + WRITE_ONCE(gmap->table, table);
>>> +
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_replace_asce);
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-03 16:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-02 18:11 [PATCH v8 00/17] KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy for reboot Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 01/17] KVM: s390: pv: leak the topmost page table when destroy fails Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-03 14:40 ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-03-03 15:05 ` Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-03 16:34 ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch [this message]
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 02/17] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations for protected guests Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 03/17] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage exceptions for normal guests Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 04/17] KVM: s390: pv: refactor s390_reset_acc Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 05/17] KVM: s390: pv: usage counter instead of flag Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 06/17] KVM: s390: pv: add export before import Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 07/17] KVM: s390: pv: module parameter to fence lazy destroy Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 08/17] KVM: s390: pv: clear the state without memset Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 09/17] KVM: s390: pv: Add kvm_s390_cpus_from_pv to kvm-s390.h and add documentation Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 10/17] KVM: s390: pv: add mmu_notifier Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-03 3:12 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-03 3:12 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 11/17] s390/mm: KVM: pv: when tearing down, try to destroy protected pages Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 12/17] KVM: s390: pv: refactoring of kvm_s390_pv_deinit_vm Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 13/17] KVM: s390: pv: cleanup leftover protected VMs if needed Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 14/17] KVM: s390: pv: asynchronous destroy for reboot Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 15/17] KVM: s390: pv: api documentation for asynchronous destroy Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 16/17] KVM: s390: pv: add KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED_ASYNC_DISABLE Claudio Imbrenda
2022-03-02 18:11 ` [PATCH v8 17/17] KVM: s390: pv: avoid export before import if possible Claudio Imbrenda
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