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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Gordeev" <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Anna Schumaker" <anna@kernel.org>,
	"Bharath SM" <bharathsm@microsoft.com>,
	"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	"Heiko Carstens" <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Jakub Kicinski" <kuba@kernel.org>,
	"James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Marc Dionne" <marc.dionne@auristor.com>,
	"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Namjae Jeon" <linkinjeon@kernel.org>,
	"Paolo Abeni" <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Paulo Alcantara" <pc@manguebit.org>,
	"Ronnie Sahlberg" <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Shyam Prasad N" <sprasad@microsoft.com>,
	"Simon Horman" <horms@kernel.org>,
	"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
	"Sven Schnelle" <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Tom Talpey" <tom@talpey.com>,
	"Trond Myklebust" <trondmy@kernel.org>,
	"Vasily Gorbik" <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Chuck Lever" <cel@kernel.org>,
	"Jeff Layton" <jlayton@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 06/11] KEYS: trusted: TEE: Disable sysfs bind attributes
Date: Sun, 08 Nov 2026 13:16:18 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-203765@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261107131512.3603168-7-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found no new issues
in this patch, but noticed 1 related pre-existing issue it does not
introduce:
- [High] KEYS: trusted: premature register_key_type() before
  init_trusted() setup [1]
--

commit 3bd98fb38b1322342ed23c63a9f83d8e5a79dd02
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

KEYS: trusted: TEE: Disable sysfs bind attributes

This commit sets suppress_bind_attrs on trusted_key_driver to prevent
userspace from unbinding the driver via sysfs and unregistering
key_type_trusted while the module is loaded.

> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
> index 6e465c8bef5e5..227efb668aa95 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
> @@ -263,7 +263,8 @@ static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = {
>  	.remove		= trusted_key_remove,
>  	.id_table	= trusted_key_id_table,
>  	.driver		= {
> -		.name		= DRIVER_NAME,
> +		.name			= DRIVER_NAME,
> +		.suppress_bind_attrs	= true,
>  	},
>  };

[Severity: High]
This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but can a concurrent
add_key() syscall invoke trusted_instantiate() before the backend is fully
initialized [1]?

Each backend's ->init() callback (including trusted_key_probe() for
trusted_key_driver) calls register_key_type(&key_type_trusted) before
returning to init_trusted(), which only then populates the static calls
and backend state:

CPU0                              CPU1
init_trusted()                    sys_add_key()
  ops->init()
    register_key_type(&key_type_trusted)
                                    key_type_lookup("trusted")
                                    ...
                                      trusted_instantiate()
                                        static_call(trusted_key_unseal)()
  static_call_update(trusted_key_seal, ...)
  static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal, ...)
  static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random, ...)
  migratable = ...

Calling an uninitialized DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL target dereferences a
NULL function pointer when CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL is disabled, or runs
__static_call_nop() and leaves the return value uninitialized when it is
enabled.  In addition, trusted_key_probe() calls register_key_type()
before setting pvt_data.dev, and if TEE probing is deferred until after
init_trusted() returns, the static_call_update() calls in init_trusted()
never run at all.

[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/bug/linux-384065c3-cac2-4397-8b30-74edea3d1ff3

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261107131512.3603168-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=6

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-08 13:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-07 13:15 [PATCH v4 00/11] KEYS: Sanitize the garbage collector Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] KEYS: Add key_gc_flush() for draining RCU callbacks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] dns_resolver: Move the key type into a separate module Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] NFSv4: Clear idmap keyring cache when the last client unloads Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] smb: client: Clear idmap/SPNEGO caches when the last session is unloaded Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] s390/cert_store: Start tracking subsystem keys Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] KEYS: trusted: TEE: Disable sysfs bind attributes Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] KEYS: trusted: TEE: Synchronize session lifetime Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] rxrpc: Move key types to their own module Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] KEYS: Pin the backing kernel module for a key type Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] KEYS: Remove key_type_dead Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-08 13:36     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-07 13:15 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] KEYS: key_garbage_collector(): process in chunks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 13:16   ` sashiko-bot

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