Linux SCSI subsystem development
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From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
	Greg KH  <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev, Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>,
	Roman Gushchin	 <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
	linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, ksummit@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: How to fix problems with the sashiko review model
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 17:09:01 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260722170901.30bdae6a@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5a2ce0b0eab27354d62450018f9843be83c72697.camel@HansenPartnership.com>

On Wed, 22 Jul 2026 10:17:40 -0400
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote:

> On Wed, 2026-07-22 at 16:00 +0200, Johannes Berg wrote:
> > On Wed, 2026-07-22 at 09:42 -0400, James Bottomley wrote:  
> > > 
> > > Well, I noted that in my reply above.  The way I was thinking of
> > > implementing it was to add a general instruction file for drivers
> > > which would make hardware trusted for pretty much everything and
> > > then instruct the AI to consult driver specific files for overrides
> > > to this so we could add the additional threat checks to usb.md and
> > > virt.md  
> > 
> > I guess it's a question which way around it should be - but I'll note
> > that generally for wifi customers tend to not trust the "hardware"
> > because it's mostly firmware, is generally buggy and can be attacked
> > over the air too...
> > 
> > Personally (with that background) I'd tend to lean towards saying the
> > high-performance stuff that does want/need to trust the device should
> > opt out, it's harder to get that wrong. If we generally opt out as
> > you describe and then forgot to include something, we might have
> > issues.  
> 
> So this is just an efficiency thing.  There are 144 driver subsystems,
> so if most of the want to trust the hardware it makes more sense to
> have this as default but overriden by subsystems.  However, if most of
> the 144 don't trust their hardware then absolutely, I agree, it should
> be per-subsystem opt in.  Part of the reason for the post was to gauge
> this ... and so far I count three opt outs.

I don't trust hardware/firmware. They can be buggy. 

For instance, there's currently a bug at UEFI spec affecting RAS where
one particular field may have 3 different meanings because UEFI changed
its meaning on different versions of the spec without changing the version
field inside the CPER record:

	https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/issues/12708	

If even firmware specs can't be trusted, I don't think it is safe to
assume that any particular implementation of the firmware or hardware
would be safe.

Thanks,
Mauro

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-07-22 15:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-22  4:12 [PATCH] scsi: mpt3sas: validate variable event array spans Pengpeng Hou
2026-07-22  4:27 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 11:58   ` How to fix problems with the sashiko review model James Bottomley
2026-07-22 12:11     ` Laurent Pinchart
2026-07-22 12:42       ` James Bottomley
2026-07-22 13:08     ` Greg KH
2026-07-22 13:10       ` Greg KH
2026-07-22 13:45         ` James Bottomley
2026-07-22 14:08           ` Theodore Tso
2026-07-22 15:29           ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-07-22 13:42       ` James Bottomley
2026-07-22 14:00         ` Johannes Berg
2026-07-22 14:17           ` James Bottomley
2026-07-22 14:25             ` Johannes Berg
2026-07-22 15:39               ` Steven Rostedt
2026-07-22 15:55                 ` James Bottomley
2026-07-22 16:36                   ` Johannes Berg
2026-07-22 15:09             ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab [this message]
2026-07-22 15:24               ` James Bottomley
2026-07-22 20:25                 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2026-07-22 14:20           ` Mark Brown
2026-07-22 13:43       ` Guenter Roeck
2026-07-22 15:10         ` James Bottomley
2026-07-22 15:41           ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-07-22 15:54           ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-07-22 16:40           ` Roman Gushchin
2026-07-22 15:55     ` Roman Gushchin
2026-07-22 11:32 ` [PATCH] scsi: mpt3sas: validate variable event array spans James Bottomley

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