From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
To: Linlin Zhang <linlin.zhang@oss.qualcomm.com>
Cc: ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, mst@redhat.com,
jasowangio@gmail.com, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
martin.petersen@oracle.com, robh@kernel.org, krzk+dt@kernel.org,
conor+dt@kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
virtualization@lists.linux.dev, devicetree@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org, neeraj.soni@oss.qualcomm.com,
gaurav.kashyap@oss.qualcomm.com, mani@kernel.org,
andersson@kernel.org, konradybcio@kernel.org, bvanassche@acm.org,
alim.akhtar@samsung.com, avri.altman@sandisk.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, eperezma@redhat.com,
xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 08/11] block: add /dev/blk-crypto-proxy for host-side virtio-blk inline encryption
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 15:43:17 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260901194316.GD729142@fedora> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260827160806.1295313-9-linlin.zhang@oss.qualcomm.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 36392 bytes --]
On Thu, Aug 27, 2026 at 09:07:17AM -0700, Linlin Zhang wrote:
> From: linlzhan <linlin.zhang@oss.qualcomm.com>
>
> A userspace virtio-blk backend receives VIRTIO_BLK_T_CRYPTO_IN/OUT
> requests from guests that carry a virtual ICE keyslot index and a data
> unit number. The backend must submit the bio to the host storage
> controller with the correct inline encryption context, but it has
> no in-kernel interface to do so.
>
> Add /dev/blk-crypto-proxy, a misc character device that bridges a
> userspace virtio-blk backend to the kernel blk-crypto layer. The
Question for blk-crypto folks: should this new userspace blk-crypto
interface be at the block device level or at the VFS level? If you
envision that applications might want to manage their own keys and
perform encrypted I/O on files, then maybe this should be at the VFS
level. Block devices would of course be supported by a VFS interface
too.
> interface is three ioctls:
>
> BCP_BIND_CONTEXT — bind a host block device fd and a hypervisor
> VM fd to this file descriptor; the kernel
> resolves the VM fd to a guest id and holds
> the bdev reference for the fd lifetime.
Is there anything virtualization-specific in this interface? I think
it's really a userspace interface for blk-crypto that can be used by any
userspace application.
It would be nice to name and document the interface without mentioning
virtualization so that we can think about it from a more generic point
of view that allows for new use cases in the future rather than
focussing too much on just the virtualization use case.
> BCP_GET_CRYPTO_CAPS — query the bound device's blk_crypto_profile
> capabilities (supported modes, key types, max
> DUN bytes) and the number of ICE keyslots
> allocated to the bound VM, so the backend can
> populate the virtio config space crypto fields.
> BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT — submit an inline-encrypted bio using the
> virtual slot index supplied by the guest. The
> kernel resolves virt_slot to a physical ICE
> keyslot via bcp_slot_virt_ops, calls
> bio_crypt_set_ctx_by_slot(), and submits the
> bio synchronously. Large requests are split
> at data-unit boundaries (BIO_MAX_VECS per bio)
> to preserve DUN/IV correctness. The
> implementation follows the block layer's
> direct-I/O path, with two differences: each
> bio carries an inline encryption context, and
> multiple bios are submitted sequentially
> rather than concurrently now.
Linux already has multiple userspace interfaces for submitting I/O, like
preadv(2), io_uring, Linux AIO, etc. I don't think a new ioctl-based
interface just for submitting I/O with blk-crypto metadata makes sense
because applications sometimes spend a lot of time optimizing for the
I/O submission interface (e.g. io_uring) and integrating a new interface
makes adoption hard.
Did you look at how to extend preadv()-related interfaces and io_uring
operations?
>
> The driver is hypervisor-agnostic and storage-vendor-agnostic. Two
> pluggable op-sets registered by platform drivers fill the gaps:
>
> bcp_hypervisor_ops — translate a hypervisor VM fd to an opaque
> guest_id; implemented by the hypervisor driver.
> bcp_slot_virt_ops — map (profile, guest_id, virt_slot) to a
> physical ICE keyslot; implemented by the
> platform storage virtualization layer.
>
> Both op-sets are RCU-protected singletons; the hot path reads them
> lock-free.
>
> Signed-off-by: linlzhan <linlin.zhang@oss.qualcomm.com>
> ---
> drivers/block/Kconfig | 15 +
> drivers/block/Makefile | 1 +
> drivers/block/blk-crypto-proxy.c | 667 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h | 100 ++++
> include/uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h | 122 +++++
> 5 files changed, 905 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 drivers/block/blk-crypto-proxy.c
> create mode 100644 include/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
> create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
>
> diff --git a/drivers/block/Kconfig b/drivers/block/Kconfig
> index 7790ee2c700c..48ad79734c09 100644
> --- a/drivers/block/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/block/Kconfig
> @@ -176,6 +176,21 @@ config BLK_DEV_LOOP
>
> Most users will answer N here.
>
> +config BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY
> + tristate "Inline encryption proxy for virtio-blk guests"
> + depends on BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION
> + help
> + Provides /dev/blk-crypto-proxy, a misc character device that allows a
> + userspace virtio-blk backend to submit inline-encrypted block I/O
> + on behalf of guest virtual machines.
> +
> + Guests supply a virtual keyslot index and data unit number with
> + each encrypted request. The host kernel translates the virtual
> + slot to a physical hardware keyslot and issues the bio to the
> + storage controller with the correct inline encryption context.
> +
> + If unsure, say N.
> +
> config BLK_DEV_LOOP_MIN_COUNT
> int "Number of loop devices to pre-create at init time"
> depends on BLK_DEV_LOOP
> diff --git a/drivers/block/Makefile b/drivers/block/Makefile
> index 079c910d5fc9..636137248d0d 100644
> --- a/drivers/block/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/block/Makefile
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP) += loop.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_SUNVDC) += sunvdc.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NBD) += nbd.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY) += blk-crypto-proxy.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_VIRTIO_BLK) += virtio_blk.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_VIRTBLK_CRYPTO_VIRTUALIZATION) += virtio_blk_crypto_ext.o
> diff --git a/drivers/block/blk-crypto-proxy.c b/drivers/block/blk-crypto-proxy.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..60722884dbcd
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/block/blk-crypto-proxy.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,667 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto-proxy: " fmt
> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/blkdev.h>
> +#include <linux/bio.h>
> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
> +#include <linux/overflow.h>
> +#include <linux/file.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/pagemap.h>
> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> +#include <linux/uio.h>
> +#include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
> +#include <linux/blk-crypto-profile.h>
> +#include <linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h>
> +#include <linux/virtio_blk.h>
> +
> +static const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops __rcu *g_hypervisor_ops;
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(g_hypervisor_ops_lock);
> +
> +static const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops __rcu *g_slot_virt_ops;
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(g_slot_virt_ops_lock);
> +
> +int bcp_register_hypervisor_ops(const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops *ops)
> +{
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&g_hypervisor_ops_lock);
> + if (rcu_access_pointer(g_hypervisor_ops))
> + ret = -EBUSY;
> + else
> + rcu_assign_pointer(g_hypervisor_ops, ops);
> + mutex_unlock(&g_hypervisor_ops_lock);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bcp_register_hypervisor_ops);
> +
> +void bcp_unregister_hypervisor_ops(const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops *ops)
> +{
> + mutex_lock(&g_hypervisor_ops_lock);
> + if (rcu_access_pointer(g_hypervisor_ops) == ops)
> + rcu_assign_pointer(g_hypervisor_ops, NULL);
> + mutex_unlock(&g_hypervisor_ops_lock);
> + synchronize_rcu();
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bcp_unregister_hypervisor_ops);
> +
> +int bcp_register_slot_virt_ops(const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *ops)
> +{
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&g_slot_virt_ops_lock);
> + if (rcu_access_pointer(g_slot_virt_ops))
> + ret = -EBUSY;
> + else
> + rcu_assign_pointer(g_slot_virt_ops, ops);
> + mutex_unlock(&g_slot_virt_ops_lock);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bcp_register_slot_virt_ops);
> +
> +void bcp_unregister_slot_virt_ops(const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *ops)
> +{
> + mutex_lock(&g_slot_virt_ops_lock);
> + if (rcu_access_pointer(g_slot_virt_ops) == ops)
> + rcu_assign_pointer(g_slot_virt_ops, NULL);
> + mutex_unlock(&g_slot_virt_ops_lock);
> + synchronize_rcu();
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bcp_unregister_slot_virt_ops);
> +
> +/**
> + * struct bcp_ctx - per-fd state for /dev/blk-crypto-proxy
> + * @bdev_file: file handle for the bound block device; NULL until BCP_BIND_CONTEXT.
> + * Published with smp_store_release() so hot-path ioctls can read it
> + * lock-free via smp_load_acquire() in bcp_ctx_bound().
> + * @guest_id: guest identifier resolved from vm_fd at bind time.
> + * @bdev_writable: block_dev_fd was opened with write access.
> + * @bind_lock: serializes concurrent BCP_BIND_CONTEXT calls on this fd.
> + */
> +struct bcp_ctx {
> + struct file *bdev_file;
> + u32 guest_id;
> + bool bdev_writable;
> + struct mutex bind_lock;
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * True once BCP_BIND_CONTEXT has published ctx->bdev_file. The acquire pairs
> + * with smp_store_release() in bcp_ioctl_bind_context(), ensuring ctx->guest_id
> + * and ctx->bdev_writable are visible to any caller that observes true.
> + */
> +static bool bcp_ctx_bound(struct bcp_ctx *ctx)
> +{
> + return smp_load_acquire(&ctx->bdev_file) != NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static int bcp_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +{
> + struct bcp_ctx *ctx;
> +
> + ctx = kzalloc_obj(*ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!ctx)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + mutex_init(&ctx->bind_lock);
> + file->private_data = ctx;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int bcp_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +{
> + struct bcp_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
> +
> + if (ctx) {
> + if (ctx->bdev_file)
> + bdev_fput(ctx->bdev_file);
> + mutex_destroy(&ctx->bind_lock);
> + kfree(ctx);
> + file->private_data = NULL;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Resolve a userspace block device fd to a struct file holding a reference
> + * to the block device, opened with the same access mode as @fd so that a
> + * read-only fd cannot gain write access via BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT.
> + */
> +static struct file *bcp_bdev_from_fd(int fd, bool *writable)
> +{
> + struct file *f;
> + struct inode *inode;
> + dev_t dev;
> + blk_mode_t mode = 0;
> +
> + f = fget(fd);
> + if (!f)
> + return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
> + inode = file_inode(f);
> + if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
> + fput(f);
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOTBLK);
> + }
> + if (f->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
> + mode |= BLK_OPEN_READ;
> + if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
> + mode |= BLK_OPEN_WRITE;
> + if (!mode) {
> + fput(f);
> + return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
> + }
> + *writable = !!(mode & BLK_OPEN_WRITE);
> + dev = inode->i_rdev;
> + fput(f);
> + return bdev_file_open_by_dev(dev, mode, NULL, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static long bcp_ioctl_bind_context(struct file *file,
> + struct bcp_bind_context_arg __user *argp)
> +{
> + struct bcp_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
> + struct bcp_bind_context_arg arg;
> + const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops *hv_ops;
> + struct file *bdev_file;
> + u32 guest_id;
> + bool writable = false;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!ctx)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (copy_from_user(&arg, argp, sizeof(arg)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + if (arg.reserved)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /*
> + * get_guest_id() may sleep; call it before taking bind_lock.
> + */
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + hv_ops = rcu_dereference(g_hypervisor_ops);
> + if (!hv_ops) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> + ret = hv_ops->get_guest_id(arg.vm_fd, &guest_id);
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * Serialize against concurrent BCP_BIND_CONTEXT calls: two callers
> + * could both pass the ctx->bdev_file == NULL check before either stores.
> + */
> + guard(mutex)(&ctx->bind_lock);
> +
> + if (ctx->bdev_file)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + bdev_file = bcp_bdev_from_fd(arg.block_dev_fd, &writable);
> + if (IS_ERR(bdev_file))
> + return PTR_ERR(bdev_file);
> +
> + ctx->guest_id = guest_id;
> + ctx->bdev_writable = writable;
> + /*
> + * Publish ctx->bdev_file last with a release barrier; bcp_ctx_bound()
> + * reads it with smp_load_acquire() without taking @bind_lock.
> + */
> + smp_store_release(&ctx->bdev_file, bdev_file);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Maps VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_* to enum blk_crypto_mode_num. The two index
> + * spaces do not coincide, so modes_supported[] must not be copied positionally.
> + * Keep in sync with virtio_blk_crypto_mode_map[] in drivers/block/virtio_blk.c.
> + */
> +static const enum blk_crypto_mode_num
> + bcp_virtio_crypto_mode_map[VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_MAX + 1] = {
> + [VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_INVALID] = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID,
> + [VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS,
> +};
> +
> +static long bcp_ioctl_get_crypto_caps(struct file *file,
> + struct bcp_get_crypto_caps_arg __user *argp)
> +{
> + struct bcp_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
> + struct bcp_get_crypto_caps_arg arg;
> + struct block_device *bdev;
> + u32 modes[VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_MAX + 1] = {0};
> + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile;
> + unsigned int i, n;
> + u32 cap, written;
> +
> + if (!ctx || !bcp_ctx_bound(ctx))
> + return -ENXIO;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&arg, argp, sizeof(arg)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + if (arg.num_modes && !arg.modes_ptr)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + bdev = file_bdev(ctx->bdev_file);
> + profile = bdev_get_queue(bdev)->crypto_profile;
> + if (!profile)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + arg.key_types_supported = profile->key_types_supported;
> + /*
> + * Clamp to 8: the @dun wire field is a single __aligned_u64 so nothing
> + * upstream can deliver a wider DUN regardless of what the profile claims.
> + */
> + arg.max_dun_bytes = min_t(u32, profile->max_dun_bytes_supported, 8);
> +
> + /*
> + * arg.modes_supported[] is indexed by VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_* (index 0
> + * is always 0 per the virtio spec). Translate via the map above; do not
> + * copy profile->modes_supported[] positionally.
> + */
> + n = VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_MAX + 1;
> + cap = arg.num_modes;
> + written = min_t(u32, cap, n);
> +
> + for (i = 1; i < n; i++) {
> + enum blk_crypto_mode_num kmode = bcp_virtio_crypto_mode_map[i];
> +
> + if (!kmode)
> + continue;
> + modes[i] = profile->modes_supported[kmode];
> + }
> +
> + if (written &&
> + copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(arg.modes_ptr), modes,
> + written * sizeof(modes[0])))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + arg.num_modes = written;
> +
> + arg.max_slots = 0;
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + {
> + const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *sv_ops =
> + rcu_dereference(g_slot_virt_ops);
> + if (sv_ops) {
> + int nslots = sv_ops->get_guest_slots(profile, ctx->guest_id);
> +
> + if (nslots > 0)
> + arg.max_slots = nslots;
> + }
> + }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(argp, &arg, sizeof(arg)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Compute the number of pages needed for up to @want_bytes of iovec data
> + * starting at cursor (@start_idx, @start_off). The page count is capped at
> + * @cap to bound the arithmetic; *bytes_out receives the actual byte count.
> + */
> +static unsigned int bcp_iov_pages_for_bytes(const struct iovec *iov, u32 iov_cnt,
> + u32 start_idx, u64 start_off,
> + u64 want_bytes, unsigned int cap,
> + u64 *bytes_out)
> +{
> + u64 pages = 0, taken = 0;
> + u32 i;
> +
> + for (i = start_idx; i < iov_cnt && taken < want_bytes; i++) {
> + u64 base, len;
> +
> + if (i == start_idx) {
> + base = (u64)(uintptr_t)iov[i].iov_base + start_off;
> + len = iov[i].iov_len - start_off;
> + } else {
> + base = (u64)(uintptr_t)iov[i].iov_base;
> + len = iov[i].iov_len;
> + }
> + if (len == 0)
> + continue;
> + if (len > want_bytes - taken)
> + len = want_bytes - taken;
> + pages += DIV_ROUND_UP(len + offset_in_page(base), PAGE_SIZE);
> + taken += len;
> + if (pages >= cap) {
> + *bytes_out = taken;
> + return cap;
> + }
> + }
> + *bytes_out = taken;
> + return (unsigned int)pages;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Advance cursor (*idx, *off) forward by @bytes within @iov[0..iov_cnt).
> + */
> +static void bcp_iov_advance_cursor(const struct iovec *iov, u32 iov_cnt,
> + u32 *idx, u64 *off, u64 bytes)
> +{
> + while (bytes > 0 && *idx < iov_cnt) {
> + u64 seg_remaining = iov[*idx].iov_len - *off;
> + u64 take = min_t(u64, seg_remaining, bytes);
> +
> + *off += take;
> + bytes -= take;
> + if (*off == iov[*idx].iov_len) {
> + (*idx)++;
> + *off = 0;
> + }
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static long bcp_ioctl_submit_io_by_vslot(struct file *file,
> + struct bcp_submit_io_by_vslot_arg __user *argp)
> +{
> + struct bcp_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
> + struct bcp_submit_io_by_vslot_arg arg;
> + struct block_device *bdev;
> + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile;
> + struct iovec *iov = NULL;
> + struct iov_iter iter;
> + struct blk_crypto_slot slot;
> + u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
> + u64 bytes_done = 0;
> + u64 align, stride;
> + u64 total_bytes;
> + u32 seg_idx = 0;
> + u64 seg_off = 0;
> + unsigned int phy_slot;
> + int ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (!ctx || !bcp_ctx_bound(ctx))
> + return -ENXIO;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&arg, argp, sizeof(arg)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + if (arg.reserved2)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + bdev = file_bdev(ctx->bdev_file);
> +
> + if (arg.direction != BCP_DIR_READ && arg.direction != BCP_DIR_WRITE)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + /*
> + * blk_mode_t does not stop submit_bio() from writing; enforce the
> + * caller's original fd permission explicitly.
> + */
> + if (arg.direction == BCP_DIR_WRITE && !ctx->bdev_writable)
> + return -EACCES;
> + /*
> + * bdev_read_only() can change after bind time; submit_bio_noacct()'s
> + * bio_check_ro() only warns rather than errors in this kernel.
> + */
> + if (arg.direction == BCP_DIR_WRITE && bdev_read_only(bdev))
> + return -EROFS;
> + if (arg.flags != BCP_SUBMIT_IO_F_IOV)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (arg.iov_cnt == 0 || arg.iov_cnt > BCP_MAX_IOV)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + /* A shift amount >= 64 would be undefined behavior. */
> + if (arg.data_unit_size_bits >= 64)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + profile = bdev_get_queue(bdev)->crypto_profile;
> + if (!profile)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + /* Resolve virt_slot → phy_slot. */
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + {
> + const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *sv_ops =
> + rcu_dereference(g_slot_virt_ops);
> + if (!sv_ops) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> + ret = sv_ops->vslot_to_pslot(profile, ctx->guest_id,
> + arg.virt_slot, &phy_slot);
> + }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + memset(dun, 0, sizeof(dun));
> + dun[0] = arg.dun;
> +
> + slot.phy_slot = phy_slot;
> + slot.data_unit_size_bits = arg.data_unit_size_bits;
> +
> + align = 1ULL << arg.data_unit_size_bits;
> + /*
> + * Split bios at stride (smallest multiple of the data unit size >=
> + * PAGE_SIZE) boundaries so each bio ends on a whole data unit.
> + * bio_crypt_check_alignment() is skipped for slot-based bios (bc_key
> + * == NULL), so a mid-unit split would silently mis-encrypt/mis-decrypt.
> + */
> + stride = DIV_ROUND_UP(PAGE_SIZE, align) * align;
> +
> + /*
> + * Import the caller's iovec once. import_iovec() validates every
> + * segment with access_ok(), returns the total byte count, and takes a
> + * private kernel copy that eliminates TOCTOU from a guest mutating its
> + * own iovec array mid-ioctl.
> + */
> + ret = import_iovec(arg.direction == BCP_DIR_READ ? ITER_DEST : ITER_SOURCE,
> + (const struct iovec __user *)u64_to_user_ptr(arg.iov_ptr),
> + arg.iov_cnt, 0, &iov, &iter);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> + total_bytes = ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * Reject a misaligned total length up front: bio_crypt_check_alignment()
> + * is skipped for slot-based bios so nothing downstream will catch it.
> + */
> + if (total_bytes == 0 || (total_bytes & (align - 1)) ||
> + (total_bytes & (SECTOR_SIZE - 1))) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Fail fast if the request exceeds the device. bio_check_eod() would
> + * also catch this, but only on the last bio after earlier bios have
> + * already done real I/O.
> + */
> + {
> + sector_t nr_sectors = total_bytes >> SECTOR_SHIFT;
> + sector_t maxsector = bdev_nr_sectors(bdev);
> +
> + if (nr_sectors > maxsector || arg.sector > maxsector - nr_sectors) {
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Reject an out-of-range DUN: slot-based bios skip
> + * bio_crypt_check_alignment(), so an overflow would silently truncate
> + * in the hardware DUN field rather than error out.
> + */
> + {
> + u64 total_units = total_bytes >> arg.data_unit_size_bits;
> + u64 max_dun_used, dun_limit;
> +
> + if (check_add_overflow(arg.dun, total_units - 1, &max_dun_used)) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + dun_limit = profile->max_dun_bytes_supported >= 8 ? U64_MAX :
> + (1ULL << (8 * profile->max_dun_bytes_supported)) - 1;
> + if (max_dun_used > dun_limit) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Submit the request as a sequence of bios (submit_bio_wait() per
> + * bio), each holding at most BIO_MAX_VECS pages. Sequential
> + * submission avoids DUN/IV correctness concerns across concurrent
> + * in-flight bios.
> + */
> + while (seg_idx < arg.iov_cnt) {
> + unsigned int pages_used = 0;
> + u64 bio_bytes = 0;
> + u32 la_idx = seg_idx;
> + u64 la_off = seg_off;
> + u64 remaining_before;
> + struct bio *bio;
> +
> + /*
> + * Lookahead: count how many whole stride units fit within a
> + * fresh bio's BIO_MAX_VECS page budget.
> + */
> + for (;;) {
> + u64 unit_bytes;
> + unsigned int unit_pages;
> +
> + unit_pages = bcp_iov_pages_for_bytes(iov, arg.iov_cnt,
> + la_idx, la_off, stride,
> + BIO_MAX_VECS + 1,
> + &unit_bytes);
> + if (unit_bytes == 0)
> + break; /* only empty segments remain */
> +
> + if (pages_used + unit_pages > BIO_MAX_VECS) {
> + if (pages_used == 0) {
> + /* data_unit_size_bits too large to fit one unit. */
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + break; /* finalize this bio; unit deferred to next */
> + }
> +
> + pages_used += unit_pages;
> + bio_bytes += unit_bytes;
> + bcp_iov_advance_cursor(iov, arg.iov_cnt, &la_idx, &la_off,
> + unit_bytes);
> + }
> +
> + if (bio_bytes == 0)
> + break;
> +
> + bio = bio_alloc(bdev, pages_used,
> + arg.direction == BCP_DIR_WRITE ?
> + REQ_OP_WRITE : REQ_OP_READ,
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!bio) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = arg.sector + (bytes_done >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
> +
> + /*
> + * Use bio_iov_iter_get_pages() to pin pages into the bio,
> + * the same as the O_DIRECT path. Truncate the iter to this
> + * bio's byte budget, then reexpand for the next iteration.
> + */
> + remaining_before = iov_iter_count(&iter);
> + iov_iter_truncate(&iter, bio_bytes);
> + ret = bio_iov_iter_get_pages(bio, &iter, 0, 0);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + bio_put(bio);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (iov_iter_count(&iter) != 0) {
> + /*
> + * The lookahead verified bio_bytes fits in BIO_MAX_VECS;
> + * if bio_iov_iter_get_pages() stopped early, its page
> + * accounting disagreed with bcp_iov_pages_for_bytes().
> + */
> + bio_put(bio);
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + iov_iter_reexpand(&iter, remaining_before - bio_bytes);
> +
> + /*
> + * Match __blkdev_direct_IO(): mark pages dirty on reads into
> + * user-backed memory.
> + */
> + if (arg.direction == BCP_DIR_READ && user_backed_iter(&iter))
> + bio_set_pages_dirty(bio);
> +
> + bcp_iov_advance_cursor(iov, arg.iov_cnt, &seg_idx, &seg_off,
> + bio_bytes);
> +
> + bio_crypt_set_ctx_by_slot(bio, &slot, dun, GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> + ret = submit_bio_wait(bio);
> + bio_put(bio);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> + /*
> + * Advance dun by this bio's contribution only, not by
> + * recomputing from arg.dun + bytes_done, to avoid silent
> + * truncation when bytes_done grows past UINT_MAX data units.
> + */
> + bio_crypt_dun_increment(dun, (unsigned int)(bio_bytes >> arg.data_unit_size_bits));
> + bytes_done += bio_bytes;
> + }
> + ret = 0;
> +
> +out:
> + kfree(iov);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static long bcp_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> +{
> + void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
> +
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case BCP_BIND_CONTEXT:
> + return bcp_ioctl_bind_context(file, argp);
> + case BCP_GET_CRYPTO_CAPS:
> + return bcp_ioctl_get_crypto_caps(file, argp);
> + case BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT:
> + return bcp_ioctl_submit_io_by_vslot(file, argp);
> + default:
> + return -ENOTTY;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static const struct file_operations bcp_fops = {
> + .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> + .open = bcp_open,
> + .release = bcp_release,
> + .unlocked_ioctl = bcp_ioctl,
> + .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
> +};
> +
> +static struct miscdevice bcp_misc = {
> + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
> + .name = "blk-crypto-proxy",
> + .fops = &bcp_fops,
> +};
> +
> +static int __init blk_crypto_proxy_init(void)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = misc_register(&bcp_misc);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void __exit blk_crypto_proxy_exit(void)
> +{
> + misc_deregister(&bcp_misc);
> +}
> +
> +module_init(blk_crypto_proxy_init);
> +module_exit(blk_crypto_proxy_exit);
> +
> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Host-side inline crypto proxy for virtio-blk guests");
> diff --git a/include/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h b/include/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..6cf1ff0703e9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +
> +#ifndef __LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H
> +#define __LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H
> +
> +#include <uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +struct blk_crypto_profile;
> +
> +/**
> + * struct bcp_hypervisor_ops - hypervisor VM identity operations
> + *
> + * Translates a hypervisor-specific VM fd to the opaque u32 vm_id used
> + * throughout blk-crypto-proxy. Register once at module init time.
> + */
> +struct bcp_hypervisor_ops {
> + /**
> + * @get_guest_id: Resolve @vm_fd to an opaque guest identifier.
> + *
> + * Verify the caller is permitted to act on behalf of the VM and write
> + * its u32 id to @guest_id_out. The value is passed verbatim to
> + * bcp_slot_virt_ops callbacks.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -errno on failure.
> + */
> + int (*get_guest_id)(int vm_fd, u32 *guest_id_out);
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * bcp_register_hypervisor_ops() - register the hypervisor op-set
> + * @ops: op-set to register; must remain valid until unregistered.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -EBUSY if an op-set is already registered.
> + */
> +int bcp_register_hypervisor_ops(const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops *ops);
> +
> +/**
> + * bcp_unregister_hypervisor_ops() - unregister the hypervisor op-set
> + * @ops: must be the pointer that was passed to bcp_register_hypervisor_ops().
> + *
> + * Blocks until all in-flight callers have finished, then clears the
> + * registration. Safe to call from module exit.
> + */
> +void bcp_unregister_hypervisor_ops(const struct bcp_hypervisor_ops *ops);
> +
> +/**
> + * struct bcp_slot_virt_ops - ICE keyslot virtualization operations
> + *
> + * Per-VM ICE keyslot accounting and virtual-to-physical slot translation.
> + * The implementation owns the slot allocation table and is registered once
> + * at platform driver probe time.
> + *
> + * @profile is passed to every callback so an implementation supporting
> + * multiple storage controllers can distinguish between them.
> + *
> + * All callbacks may be called concurrently and must not sleep (called
> + * under RCU read lock).
> + */
> +struct bcp_slot_virt_ops {
> + /**
> + * @get_guest_slots: Return the number of ICE keyslots allocated to @guest_id.
> + *
> + * Returns the slot count (≥ 1) on success, -ENOKEY if @guest_id is
> + * not in the allocation table.
> + */
> + int (*get_guest_slots)(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, u32 guest_id);
> +
> + /**
> + * @vslot_to_pslot: Translate a VM-local virtual slot to a physical slot.
> + * @guest_id: hypervisor-assigned VM identifier.
> + * @virt_slot: 0-based slot index within @guest_id's allocation.
> + * @phy_slot_out: receives the physical ICE keyslot index on success.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOKEY if @guest_id is unknown, -EINVAL if
> + * @virt_slot >= the VM's allocation.
> + */
> + int (*vslot_to_pslot)(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile,
> + u32 guest_id, u32 virt_slot,
> + unsigned int *phy_slot_out);
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * bcp_register_slot_virt_ops() - register the slot-virt op-set
> + * @ops: op-set to register; must remain valid until unregistered.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -EBUSY if an op-set is already registered.
> + */
> +int bcp_register_slot_virt_ops(const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *ops);
> +
> +/**
> + * bcp_unregister_slot_virt_ops() - unregister the slot-virt op-set
> + * @ops: must be the pointer passed to bcp_register_slot_virt_ops().
> + *
> + * Blocks until all in-flight callers have finished, then clears the
> + * registration. Safe to call from module exit.
> + */
> +void bcp_unregister_slot_virt_ops(const struct bcp_slot_virt_ops *ops);
> +
> +#endif /* __LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H */
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h b/include/uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..dc8adc8ef5ed
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/blk-crypto-proxy.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
> +
> +#ifndef __UAPI_LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H
> +#define __UAPI_LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/ioctl.h>
> +
> +#define BCP_DIR_READ 0
> +#define BCP_DIR_WRITE 1
> +
> +/*
> + * BCP_BIND_CONTEXT - bind a host block device and hypervisor VM fd.
> + *
> + * Must be called once after open(), before any other ioctl.
> + * Returns -EBUSY if already bound, -EOPNOTSUPP if no hypervisor op-set
> + * is registered.
> + *
> + * @block_dev_fd: fd of the host block device to bind.
> + * @vm_fd: hypervisor VM fd identifying the guest.
> + * @reserved: must be zero.
> + */
> +struct bcp_bind_context_arg {
> + __s32 block_dev_fd;
> + __s32 vm_fd;
> + __u32 reserved;
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * BCP_GET_CRYPTO_CAPS - query crypto capabilities of the bound block device.
> + *
> + * Requires BCP_BIND_CONTEXT; returns -ENXIO otherwise.
> + *
> + * @key_types_supported: [out] BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_* bitmask.
> + * @max_dun_bytes: [out] maximum DUN bytes supported.
> + * @max_slots: [out] maximum ICE keyslots available for the bound VM;
> + * 0 if the VM is not found in the table.
> + * @num_modes: [in] capacity of the buffer pointed to by @modes_ptr,
> + * in entries. [out] number of entries actually
> + * written to @modes_ptr (may be less than the
> + * given capacity; the caller must use this
> + * value, not its own capacity, to know how many
> + * entries are valid).
> + * @modes_ptr: [in] pointer to a caller-allocated __u32 array of
> + * at least @num_modes (as given) entries. Must
> + * be non-NULL if @num_modes (as given) is > 0.
> + * On return, holds a per-mode data_unit_size
> + * bitmask array indexed by VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_*
> + * (virtio wire numbering, uapi/linux/virtio_blk.h)
> + * -- NOT by enum blk_crypto_mode_num. Index 0 is
> + * reserved and always 0, matching struct
> + * virtio_blk_crypto_modes.modes[].
> + *
> + * @modes_ptr is a pointer + count rather than a fixed-size array embedded in
> + * this struct so that sizeof(struct bcp_get_crypto_caps_arg) -- and hence the
> + * _IOWR-encoded ioctl number -- does not depend on VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_MAX.
> + * The caller and this kernel may be built against different virtio_blk.h
> + * versions (and thus different values of that constant); embedding a
> + * VIRTIO_BLK_CRYPTO_MODE_MAX-sized array directly in this struct would make
> + * the ioctl fail to even dispatch (-ENOTTY) whenever the two disagree.
> + */
> +
> +struct bcp_get_crypto_caps_arg {
> + __u32 key_types_supported;
> + __u32 max_dun_bytes;
> + __u32 max_slots;
> + __u32 num_modes;
> + __aligned_u64 modes_ptr;
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT - submit an encrypted bio using a virtual slot.
> + *
> + * The kernel resolves virt_slot to a physical ICE keyslot and submits the
> + * I/O synchronously. Large requests are split at data-unit boundaries
> + * (BIO_MAX_VECS pages per bio). Requires BCP_BIND_CONTEXT; returns -ENXIO
> + * otherwise.
> + *
> + * @virt_slot: guest-visible slot index (0-based within the VM's range).
> + * @direction: BCP_DIR_READ or BCP_DIR_WRITE.
> + * @flags: must be BCP_SUBMIT_IO_F_IOV.
> + * @data_unit_size_bits: log2 of the encryption data unit size in bytes.
> + * @sector: start sector (512-byte units).
> + * @dun: data unit number (single 64-bit limb, little-endian).
> + * @iov_ptr: pointer to scatter-gather array of struct bcp_iovec.
> + * @iov_cnt: number of entries in @iov_ptr[].
> + * @reserved2: must be zero.
> + *
> + * @sector, @dun and @iov_ptr use __aligned_u64 to guarantee identical struct
> + * layout between 32-bit and 64-bit callers, as required by
> + * .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl.
> + */
> +
> +/* Maximum iovec segments per BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT call (matches UIO_MAXIOV). */
> +#define BCP_MAX_IOV 1024
> +
> +#define BCP_SUBMIT_IO_F_IOV (1U << 0) /* scatter-gather mode; must always be set */
> +
> +struct bcp_iovec {
> + __u64 iov_base;
> + __u64 iov_len;
> +};
> +
> +struct bcp_submit_io_by_vslot_arg {
> + __u32 virt_slot;
> + __u32 direction;
> + __u32 flags;
> + __u32 data_unit_size_bits;
> + __aligned_u64 sector;
> + __aligned_u64 dun;
> + __aligned_u64 iov_ptr;
> + __u32 iov_cnt;
> + __u32 reserved2;
> +};
> +
> +#define BCP_IOC_MAGIC 0xC7
> +
> +#define BCP_BIND_CONTEXT _IOW(BCP_IOC_MAGIC, 1, struct bcp_bind_context_arg)
> +#define BCP_GET_CRYPTO_CAPS _IOWR(BCP_IOC_MAGIC, 2, struct bcp_get_crypto_caps_arg)
> +#define BCP_SUBMIT_IO_BY_VSLOT _IOW(BCP_IOC_MAGIC, 3, struct bcp_submit_io_by_vslot_arg)
> +
> +#endif /* __UAPI_LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROXY_H */
> --
> 2.34.1
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-01 19:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-27 16:07 [PATCH v1 00/11] FBE virtualization: inline encryption for virtio-blk guests Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 01/11] virtio_blk: add inline encryption support Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 19:48 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 02/11] soc: qcom: add crypto_virt backend for virtio-blk inline crypto Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 6:56 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-01 9:39 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 13:58 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 03/11] soc: qcom: crypto_virt: add support for create, prepare and import keys Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 6:58 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-01 10:31 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 14:01 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 04/11] dt-bindings: soc: qcom: add binding for qcom,crypto-virt Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:14 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 7:01 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-01 10:40 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 05/11] blk-crypto: add slot-based inline encryption path Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 19:06 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 06/11] scsi: ufs: core: add slot path to ufshcd_prepare_lrbp_crypto Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 19:08 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 07/11] blk-crypto: move bio_crypt_dun_increment() to the public header Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 19:13 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 08/11] block: add /dev/blk-crypto-proxy for host-side virtio-blk inline encryption Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-01 19:43 ` Stefan Hajnoczi [this message]
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 09/11] soc: qcom: add ICE keyslot partitioning driver for guest VMs Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 7:02 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-01 10:48 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 10/11] blk-crypto: add slot_offset to blk_crypto_profile Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-27 16:07 ` [PATCH v1 11/11] scsi: ufs: ufs-qcom: support ICE keyslot partitioning for guest VMs Linlin Zhang
2026-08-27 16:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 7:03 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-09-01 10:54 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 14:02 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
[not found] ` <20260827184219.GB2137493@google.com>
2026-08-28 15:37 ` [PATCH v1 00/11] FBE virtualization: inline encryption for virtio-blk guests Linlin Zhang
2026-08-28 15:56 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-31 6:21 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-08-31 20:41 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-09-01 9:21 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 18:47 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-08-31 21:07 ` Eric Biggers
2026-09-01 8:22 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 8:45 ` Linlin Zhang
2026-09-01 19:44 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2026-09-01 21:28 ` Eric Biggers
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