From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/25] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:59:52 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906182157.29524DC78@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190618230551.7475-8-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
typo in Subject -> "secuirty" -> "security"
On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 04:05:33PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a
> secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the
> security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the
> lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code
> that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx()
> code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
Can you spell this out a little more, "scaffolding code passes slot 1
unconditionally while the following patches will fix this up when they
are made aware of lsmblob" etc. (Also, why slot 1 and not slot 0?)
-Kees
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
> include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++---
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++---
> net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++---
> security/security.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
> 6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 89a5391f2441..64f5cc2dd249 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1276,7 +1276,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
> int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *l);
> int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
> void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
> void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
> @@ -1414,7 +1415,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> + struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *l)
> {
> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
> index 3426d6dacc45..933492c08b8c 100644
> --- a/include/net/af_unix.h
> +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
> @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
> kgid_t gid;
> struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> - u32 secid; /* Security ID */
> + struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Security LSM data */
> #endif
> u32 consumed;
> } __randomize_layout;
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 1ce365f4c256..c87a17101c86 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
> struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
> struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> - u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
> + struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Passed LSM data */
> #endif
> };
>
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> {
> - security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
> + security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob);
> }
> #else
> static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> @@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> + /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 1 for now */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[1],
> + &secdata, &seclen);
>
> if (!err) {
> put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 82f341e84fae..fbe2147ee595 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> + struct lsmblob lb;
> char *secdata;
> - u32 seclen, secid;
> + u32 seclen;
> int err;
>
> - err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
> + err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> + /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 1 */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[1], &secdata, &seclen);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index ddb838a1b74c..c50a004a1389 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -143,17 +143,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
> + UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob = scm->lsmblob;
> }
>
> static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
> + scm->lsmblob = UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob;
> }
>
> static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
> + return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, &(UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob));
> }
> #else
> static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 4296cd2ca508..5ed818699e15 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2132,10 +2132,20 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> optval, optlen, len);
> }
>
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *l)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> - skb, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
> + list) {
> + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
> + &l->secid[hp->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + break;
> + }
> + return rc;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>
> --
> 2.20.1
>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-19 4:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-18 23:05 [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 4:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 6:17 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 16:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 4:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 4:59 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-19 16:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:03 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:11 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 4:33 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 15:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:28 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 17:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:34 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 17:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:41 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 17:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-20 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] Fix slotted list and getpeersec_d Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 5:50 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-19 17:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-18 23:05 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 4:34 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
2019-06-19 15:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-19 20:08 ` James Morris
2019-06-20 17:33 ` Stacked LSMs (was Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor) Kees Cook
2019-06-22 14:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2019-06-19 5:21 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
2019-06-19 16:48 ` Casey Schaufler
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