From: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
To: paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: chuck.lever@oracle.com, marek.gresko@protonmail.com,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2024 15:51:29 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240828195129.223395-2-smayhew@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240828195129.223395-1-smayhew@redhat.com>
Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to
change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is
exported with root squashing enabled.
The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states:
* This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
* is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate
* permission checks.
nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and
nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks
that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do.
Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(),
simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to
__vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked(). This
fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to
recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change
its security label.
Reported-by: Marek Gresko <marek.gresko@protonmail.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218809
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index bfa61e005aac..400eca4ad0fb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6660,8 +6660,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen
*/
static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
- ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+ ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
}
static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 4164699cd4f6..002a1b9ed83a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4880,8 +4880,8 @@ static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
- ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+ ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
}
static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
--
2.46.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-28 19:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-28 19:51 [PATCH 0/1] selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook Scott Mayhew
2024-08-28 19:51 ` Scott Mayhew [this message]
2024-08-28 20:03 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Jeff Layton
2024-08-28 21:05 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-28 21:28 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-08-28 23:08 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-28 23:19 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-29 14:16 ` Chuck Lever III
2024-08-29 14:51 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-28 21:08 ` Chuck Lever
2024-08-29 11:15 ` Jeff Layton
2024-08-29 13:03 ` Stephen Smalley
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20240828195129.223395-2-smayhew@redhat.com \
--to=smayhew@redhat.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=chuck.lever@oracle.com \
--cc=linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=marek.gresko@protonmail.com \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox