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From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
To: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, marek.gresko@protonmail.com,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2024 17:08:44 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zs+R3GXS93LL+PJB@tissot.1015granger.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240828195129.223395-2-smayhew@redhat.com>

On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 03:51:29PM -0400, Scott Mayhew wrote:
> Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to
> change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is
> exported with root squashing enabled.
> 
> The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states:
> 
>  *  This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
>  *  is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate
>  *  permission checks.
> 
> nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and
> nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks
> that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do.
> 
> Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(),
> simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to
> __vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked().  This
> fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to
> recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change
> its security label.
> 
> Reported-by: Marek Gresko <marek.gresko@protonmail.com>
> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218809
> Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c   | 4 ++--
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
>  2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index bfa61e005aac..400eca4ad0fb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6660,8 +6660,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen
>   */
>  static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
>  {
> -	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
> -				     ctx, ctxlen, 0);
> +	return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
> +				     ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
>  }
>  
>  static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 4164699cd4f6..002a1b9ed83a 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4880,8 +4880,8 @@ static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
>  
>  static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
>  {
> -	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
> -				     ctx, ctxlen, 0);
> +	return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
> +				     ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
>  }
>  
>  static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> -- 
> 2.46.0
> 

Nice, thorough work, Scott.

Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

-- 
Chuck Lever

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-08-28 21:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-28 19:51 [PATCH 0/1] selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook Scott Mayhew
2024-08-28 19:51 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Scott Mayhew
2024-08-28 20:03   ` Jeff Layton
2024-08-28 21:05   ` Paul Moore
2024-08-28 21:28     ` Casey Schaufler
2024-08-28 23:08       ` Paul Moore
2024-08-28 23:19     ` Paul Moore
2024-08-29 14:16       ` Chuck Lever III
2024-08-29 14:51         ` Paul Moore
2024-08-28 21:08   ` Chuck Lever [this message]
2024-08-29 11:15   ` Jeff Layton
2024-08-29 13:03     ` Stephen Smalley

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