From: cem@kernel.org
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jack@suze.cz, djwong@kernel.org, hch@lst.de, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org,
Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/4] capabily: Add new capable_noaudit
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 13:45:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260626114533.102138-2-cem@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260626114533.102138-1-cem@kernel.org>
From: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
In some situations (quota enforcement bypass in this case) we'd like to
check for a specific capability without triggering spurious audit
messages from security modules like selinux.
Add a new helper so we don't need to use ns_capable_noaudit() directly.
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++
kernel/capability.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 37db92b3d6f8..873416ba884c 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
+extern bool capable_noaudit(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
@@ -167,6 +168,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap)
{
return true;
}
+static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
+{
+ return true;
+}
static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
return true;
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 829f49ae07b9..2c2d1e8300bd 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -416,6 +416,23 @@ bool capable(int cap)
return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
+
+/**
+ * capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior
+ * capability in effect (unaudited).
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * This is the same as capable(), except it uses CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT as to prevent
+ * issuing spurious audit messages.
+ *
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ */
+bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
+{
+ return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit);
#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
/**
--
2.54.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-26 11:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-26 11:45 [RFC PATCH 0/4] Introduce capable_noaudit cem
2026-06-26 11:45 ` cem [this message]
2026-06-26 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] capabily: Add new capable_noaudit Darrick J. Wong
2026-06-26 15:31 ` Paul Moore
2026-06-26 17:46 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-06-26 11:45 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] quota: Don't issue audit messages on quota enforcing cem
2026-06-26 15:18 ` Darrick J. Wong
2026-06-26 11:45 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit() cem
2026-06-26 15:19 ` Darrick J. Wong
2026-06-26 11:45 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] capability: unexport has_capability_noaudit cem
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