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From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
	kpsingh@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, mic@digikod.net,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org
Cc: gnoack@google.com, jack@suse.cz, song@kernel.org,
	yonghong.song@linux.dev, martin.lau@linux.dev, m@maowtm.org,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 10/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm kfunc
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 22:20:43 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260731022047.189137-11-utilityemal77@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260731022047.189137-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com>

Add the enforcement kfunc for Landlock rulesets:

  bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm(bprm, ruleset, flags)

It restricts the credentials prepared in @bprm with @ruleset, so that
the executed task starts confined by it, through
security_bprm_enforce_policy_kptr() invoked with LSM_ID_LANDLOCK.
When Landlock is compiled out or not enabled in the LSM order, the
call fails with -EOPNOTSUPP.

The kfunc keeps the BPF-facing interface strongly BTF-typed: with
kfunc arguments trusted by default, both the binprm (from the LSM
hook context) and the ruleset (an acquired reference) must be trusted
pointers whose provenance the verifier guarantees, not merely
type-matching ones.

The flags take the landlock_restrict_self(2) flags with their usual
semantics.  Only LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC is rejected (-EINVAL),
as it targets the calling threads rather than the execution.

The filter makes enforcement exclusive to the sleepable LSM programs
attached to the bprm_creds_for_exec() or bprm_creds_from_file()
hooks.

Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
index 9ff1c35fcd6e..67aa902f1257 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
@@ -486,8 +486,8 @@ int bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
 struct bpf_landlock_ruleset {};
 
 /*
- * The sleepable LSM hooks bpf_landlock_put_ruleset() may be called
- * from.
+ * The sleepable LSM hooks bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm() and
+ * bpf_landlock_put_ruleset() may be called from.
  */
 BTF_SET_START(bpf_landlock_kfunc_hooks)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bprm_creds_for_exec)
@@ -535,6 +535,42 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_landlock_put_ruleset(struct bpf_landlock_ruleset *ruleset)
 	security_policy_kptr_put(LSM_ID_LANDLOCK, &policy);
 }
 
+/**
+ * bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm - Enforce a Landlock ruleset on exec
+ *                                credentials
+ * @bprm: execution context providing the prepared credentials to
+ *        restrict
+ * @ruleset: Landlock ruleset to enforce
+ * @flags: landlock_restrict_self(2) flags, except
+ *         %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC
+ *
+ * Restrict the credentials prepared in @bprm with @ruleset, so that
+ * the executed task starts confined by it, following the same domain
+ * composition rules as landlock_restrict_self(2).  The restriction is
+ * staged and only committed at the execution's point of no return: an
+ * execution that fails before that point is unaffected, and a later
+ * call on the same execution replaces a previously staged
+ * restriction.  @ruleset is only borrowed: the caller keeps its
+ * reference.
+ *
+ * The landlock_restrict_self(2) flags apply with their usual
+ * semantics.  Only %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC is rejected, as it
+ * targets the calling threads rather than the execution.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -EOPNOTSUPP if the Landlock LSM is not
+ * enabled, -EINVAL if @flags contains an unsupported flag, other
+ * negative values on failure as for landlock_restrict_self(2).
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+					     struct bpf_landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
+					     u32 flags)
+{
+	union lsm_policy_kptr policy = { .landlock.ruleset = ruleset };
+
+	return security_bprm_enforce_policy_kptr(LSM_ID_LANDLOCK, bprm,
+						 &policy, flags);
+}
+
 /* Destructor for referenced bpf_landlock_ruleset kptrs. */
 __bpf_kfunc void bpf_landlock_put_ruleset_dtor(void *ruleset)
 {
@@ -550,6 +586,7 @@ BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_landlock_kfunc_ids)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_from_fd,
 	     KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_landlock_put_ruleset, KF_RELEASE | KF_SLEEPABLE)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm, KF_SLEEPABLE)
 BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_landlock_kfunc_ids)
 
 BTF_ID_LIST(bpf_landlock_dtor_ids)
@@ -558,6 +595,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_landlock_put_ruleset_dtor)
 
 BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_ids, func,
 		   bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_from_fd)
+BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm_ids, func,
+		   bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm)
 
 /*
  * BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL share their kfunc
@@ -566,7 +605,10 @@ BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_ids, func,
  * in the fd table of the task that set the ruleset up, so
  * bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_from_fd() is exclusive to syscall
  * programs, which run in that task's context; an LSM program runs in
- * the context of the task it mediates.
+ * the context of the task it mediates.  Enforcement is exclusive to
+ * the sleepable bprm LSM hooks the policy operation is specified
+ * for, and the release kfunc is allowed wherever a reference can be
+ * held.
  */
 static int bpf_landlock_kfunc_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
 {
@@ -575,6 +617,8 @@ static int bpf_landlock_kfunc_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
 
 	switch (prog->type) {
 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL:
+		if (kfunc_id == bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm_ids[0])
+			return -EACCES;
 		return 0;
 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
 		if (kfunc_id == bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_ids[0])
-- 
2.54.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-07-31  2:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-31  2:20 [PATCH bpf-next 00/13] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_policy_kptr_from_fd Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_policy_kptr_put Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_bprm_enforce_policy_kptr Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 04/13] landlock: Expose the ruleset fd lookup to the rest of Landlock Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 05/13] landlock: Factor the credential restriction out of landlock_restrict_self() Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 06/13] landlock: Implement the LSM policy kptr hooks Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/13] bpf: Add the LSM policy kfunc infrastructure Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 08/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_put_ruleset kfunc and ruleset destructor Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_from_fd kfunc Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 11/13] selftests/bpf: Add tests for the Landlock policy kfuncs Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 12/13] landlock: Document the BPF kfunc interface Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 13/13] lsm: Document the LSM policy kptr hooks Justin Suess

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