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From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
	kpsingh@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, mic@digikod.net,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org
Cc: gnoack@google.com, jack@suse.cz, song@kernel.org,
	yonghong.song@linux.dev, martin.lau@linux.dev, m@maowtm.org,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 12/13] landlock: Document the BPF kfunc interface
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 22:20:45 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260731022047.189137-13-utilityemal77@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260731022047.189137-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com>

Describe the new BPF kfuncs for Landlock.

Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
---
 Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
index c5186526e76f..01197c7580ec 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
@@ -129,6 +129,31 @@ The reasoning is:
   restrictions, because access within the same scope is already
   allowed based on ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX``.
 
+BPF kfuncs
+==========
+
+BPF programs can apply a userspace-created Landlock ruleset to an
+execution.  A syscall program (``BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL``), running in
+the context of the process that set the ruleset up, acquires the
+ruleset from its file descriptor and typically hands it over through
+a map kptr field; a sleepable LSM BPF program attached to the
+``bprm_creds_for_exec`` or ``bprm_creds_from_file`` hooks then
+enforces it on an execution.
+
+This can be used to inspect the runtime context of a pending execution,
+and enforce a Landlock policy through BPF.
+
+The restriction is staged in the Landlock blob of the
+credentials prepared for the execution and committed past the exec
+point of no return, so a failed execution leaves the calling task
+untouched.  The ``landlock_restrict_self(2)`` flags apply, with the
+exception of ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC``.
+
+.. kernel-doc:: kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+    :identifiers: bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_from_fd
+                  bpf_landlock_put_ruleset
+                  bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm
+
 Tests
 =====
 
-- 
2.54.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-07-31  2:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-31  2:20 [PATCH bpf-next 00/13] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_policy_kptr_from_fd Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_policy_kptr_put Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_bprm_enforce_policy_kptr Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 04/13] landlock: Expose the ruleset fd lookup to the rest of Landlock Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 05/13] landlock: Factor the credential restriction out of landlock_restrict_self() Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 06/13] landlock: Implement the LSM policy kptr hooks Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/13] bpf: Add the LSM policy kfunc infrastructure Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 08/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_put_ruleset kfunc and ruleset destructor Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_from_fd kfunc Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 10/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm kfunc Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 11/13] selftests/bpf: Add tests for the Landlock policy kfuncs Justin Suess
2026-07-31  2:20 ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-07-31  2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 13/13] lsm: Document the LSM policy kptr hooks Justin Suess

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