From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
kpsingh@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, mic@digikod.net,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org
Cc: gnoack@google.com, jack@suse.cz, song@kernel.org,
yonghong.song@linux.dev, martin.lau@linux.dev, m@maowtm.org,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 03/15] lsm: Move the lsm_for_each_hook() macro to security/lsm.h
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 10:58:45 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831145858.3869191-4-utilityemal77@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831145858.3869191-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Move the lsm_for_each_hook() iterator from security/security.c to
security/lsm.h, verbatim: a following commit adds a user outside
security.c, the file implementing the LSM policy object kfuncs.
No functional change.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
---
security/lsm.h | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 5 -----
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/lsm.h b/security/lsm.h
index 32f808ad4335..264ae63290a8 100644
--- a/security/lsm.h
+++ b/security/lsm.h
@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ extern bool lsm_debug;
extern unsigned int lsm_active_cnt;
extern const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[];
+/* Iterate over the active implementations of a given hook */
+#define lsm_for_each_hook(scall, NAME) \
+ for (scall = static_calls_table.NAME; \
+ scall - static_calls_table.NAME < MAX_LSM_COUNT; scall++) \
+ if (static_key_enabled(&scall->active->key))
+
/* LSM blob configuration */
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 71aea8fdf014..0a6fa21cc31b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -495,11 +495,6 @@ OUT: \
RC; \
})
-#define lsm_for_each_hook(scall, NAME) \
- for (scall = static_calls_table.NAME; \
- scall - static_calls_table.NAME < MAX_LSM_COUNT; scall++) \
- if (static_key_enabled(&scall->active->key))
-
/* Security operations */
/**
--
2.55.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 14:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-31 14:58 [PATCH v2 00/15] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 01/15] lsm: Add the LSM policy object lifetime hooks Justin Suess
2026-08-31 17:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-08-31 17:41 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-02 13:05 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-02 17:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-09-02 18:28 ` Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 02/15] lsm: Add the bprm_apply_policy_object LSM hook Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 04/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_release kfunc and policy object destructor Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 05/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_from_fd kfunc Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 06/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_acquire kfunc Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 07/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_apply_bprm kfunc Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 08/15] lsm: Document the LSM policy object interface Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 09/15] selftests/bpf: Add tests for the LSM policy object kfuncs Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 10/15] landlock: Expose the ruleset fd lookup to the rest of Landlock Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 11/15] landlock: Factor the credential restriction out of landlock_restrict_self() Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 12/15] landlock: Free rulesets after an RCU grace period Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 13/15] landlock: Implement the LSM policy object hooks Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 14/15] selftests/bpf: Test the LSM policy object kfuncs with Landlock Justin Suess
[not found] ` <20260831195327.1282C1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>
2026-09-02 12:24 ` Justin Suess
2026-08-31 14:58 ` [PATCH v2 15/15] landlock: Document the BPF policy interface Justin Suess
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