Re: [PATCH v2 01/15] lsm: Add the LSM policy object lifetime hooks

[Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>]

On 9/2/2026 6:05 AM, Justin Suess wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2026 at 10:58:43AM -0400, Justin Suess wrote:
>> Add struct lsm_policy_object, the identity an LSM embeds in a policy
>> object it shares with BPF programs, and the three hooks managing such
>> an object's lifetime:
>>
>>   policy_object_from_fd(fd, &object)
>>   policy_object_get(object)
>>   policy_object_put(object)
>>
>> The object records the owning LSM's LSM_ID_* value.  The BPF kfuncs
>> built on these hooks dispatch each call on an object to the one LSM
>> matching its lsmid, which resolves the containing object with
>> container_of(); the framework never interprets an object beyond its
>> lsmid.  The type field discriminates between the owning LSM's own
>> policy object kinds and is private to it, with 0 reserved as "unset"
>> so a zeroed, untagged object fails every type check.
>>
>> from_fd has no object to route by: the fd refers to a file set up
>> through the owning LSM's own userspace interface, so the fd itself
>> identifies its LSM.  The framework offers the fd to every
>> implementation in turn; an LSM declines a fd that is not one of its
>> policy objects with -EOPNOTSUPP, and any other error is a definitive
>> translation failure.
>>
>> The hooks back referenced BPF kptrs, which imposes the same lifetime
>> contract on every implementation: from_fd returns a reference on a
>> live object, get acquires with inc-not-zero semantics and fails with
>> -ENOENT once the count dropped to zero, put may be called from
>> contexts that cannot sleep (BPF drives it from map destructors), and
>> the containing object is freed only after an RCU grace period, as
>> programs load policy object kptrs from maps under RCU and may examine
>> an object concurrently with its last put.
>>
>> The hooks are excluded from the "bpf" LSM's attachment points.  The
>> object-routed hooks are unreachable there, as LSM_ID_BPF policy
>> objects cannot exist; for from_fd, whose walk visits every
>> implementation, a BPF program cannot fill the object out parameter,
>> so an attachment returning 0 would hand the caller an uninitialized
>> pointer.
>>
>> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
>> ---
>>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  4 ++++
>>  include/linux/security.h      | 11 +++++++++++
>>  kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c          |  3 +++
>>  3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> index 65c9609ec207..d7684407737a 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> @@ -452,6 +452,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_create, struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr
>>  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_token_free, struct bpf_token *token)
>>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_cmd, const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
>>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_capable, const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
>> +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, policy_object_from_fd, int fd,
>> +	 struct lsm_policy_object **object)
>> +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, policy_object_get, struct lsm_policy_object *object)
>> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, policy_object_put, struct lsm_policy_object *object)
>>  #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
>>  
>>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, locked_down, enum lockdown_reason what)
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index 153e9043058f..5e423bea080e 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -168,6 +168,17 @@ struct lsm_prop {
>>  	struct lsm_prop_bpf bpf;
>>  };
>>  
>> +/*
>> + * Identity of a policy object an LSM shares with BPF programs,
>> + * embedded in the LSM's own object.  @lsmid identifies the owning
>> + * LSM; @type discriminates that LSM's policy object types, with 0
>> + * reserved as "unset".
>> + */
>> +struct lsm_policy_object {
>> +	u64 lsmid;
>> +	u32 type;
>> +};
> For some clarity:
>
> lsm_policy_object is just a handle to a refcounted lsm-private struct.
>
> It can't be forged / created manually because it's a trusted kernel
> pointer, so the only way to get it is through policy_object_from_fd.
> And you cannot mutate any part of it from BPF.
>
> But it's what enables the generic model. Calling it a "policy object"
> may be short sighted though, that term is heavily overloaded in the LSM
> space. I don't want to prescribe any restrictions on what an LSM can use
> it for, after all some LSM have no notion of "policy" at all or have a
> different meaning for it.
>
> For SELinux, this "lsm_policy_object" could be an sid, for AppArmor an aa_label,
> for Smack a label, etc. The intention was to allow writing programs that
> don't care about any details of a particular LSM.

Why aren't you using an lsm_prop pointer? What if the operation you're
planning to perform is relevant to multiple active LSMs? Today you can't
use SELinux and AppArmor together on an upstream Linus kernel, but that
should be changing sometime this decade.