From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] userns: check the writer too before mapping uid 0
Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:52:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261006155256.1FCAB1F0089B@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261006-b4-setfcap-userns-v1-3-f47e7ed66072@toxicpanda.com>
> verify_root_map() only looks at file->f_cred. For every other privileged
> id mapping new_idmap_permitted() wants the capability from the opener of
> the map file and from the task that calls write(), but a map that consists
> of the single line "0 0 1" takes the unprivileged branch, where only the
> opener's euid counts. So an open uid_map file is a token for mapping
> uid 0:
>
> task A: uid 0, full caps task B: uid 0, no CAP_SETFCAP
> fd = open("/proc/<pid>/uid_map")
> B gets fd by inheritance
> or SCM_RIGHTS
> write(fd, "0 0 1")
> opener had CAP_SETFCAP -> allowed
>
> B set up a mapping that it is not allowed to set up.
>
> Apply to the writer what is applied to the opener: in the namespace that
> is being mapped, its credentials must have come in with CAP_SETFCAP over
> the parent; anywhere else it needs CAP_SETFCAP over the parent now.
>
> This only affects maps that contain uid 0 of the parent namespace, and
> only when the file was opened by a task with CAP_SETFCAP and is written to
> by one without. Those writes now fail with -EPERM.
>
> Fixes: db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0")
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261006-b4-setfcap-userns-v1-0-f47e7ed66072@toxicpanda.com?part=3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-06 15:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-06 15:44 [PATCH 0/5] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0 Josef Bacik
2026-10-06 15:44 ` [PATCH 1/5] cred: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches Josef Bacik
2026-10-06 15:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-06 15:44 ` [PATCH 2/5] userns: don't let setns() lend the right to map uid 0 Josef Bacik
2026-10-06 15:54 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-06 15:44 ` [PATCH 3/5] userns: check the writer too before mapping " Josef Bacik
2026-10-06 15:52 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-06 15:44 ` [PATCH 4/5] capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches Josef Bacik
2026-10-06 15:53 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-06 15:44 ` [PATCH 5/5] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP Josef Bacik
2026-10-06 15:51 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-08 13:57 ` [PATCH 0/5] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0 Serge E. Hallyn
2026-10-08 15:39 ` Josef Bacik
2026-10-08 16:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-10-09 7:41 ` Christian Brauner
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