From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
To: <mic@digikod.net>, <gnoack@google.com>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
<jmorris@namei.org>, <serge@hallyn.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>,
<skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <ast@kernel.org>, <daniel@iogearbox.net>, <andrii@kernel.org>,
<eddyz87@gmail.com>, <memxor@gmail.com>, <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
<song@kernel.org>, <yonghong.song@linux.dev>, <jolsa@kernel.org>,
<emil@etsalapatis.com>, <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>,
<rdunlap@infradead.org>, <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
<rafael@kernel.org>, <dakr@kernel.org>, <johan@kernel.org>,
<dlemoal@kernel.org>, <hch@lst.de>, <axboe@kernel.dk>,
<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, <brauner@kernel.org>, <jack@suse.cz>,
<dhowells@redhat.com>, <code@tyhicks.com>,
<linkinjeon@kernel.org>, <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>,
<yuezhang.mo@sony.com>, <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>,
<cel@kernel.org>, <jlayton@kernel.org>, <neil@brown.name>,
<okorniev@redhat.com>, <Dai.Ngo@oracle.com>, <tom@talpey.com>,
<hyc.lee@gmail.com>, <miklos@szeredi.hu>, <amir73il@gmail.com>,
<senozhatsky@chromium.org>, <chenxiaosong@chenxiaosong.com>,
<kpsingh@kernel.org>, <matt@bobrowski.net>, <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
<mhiramat@kernel.org>, <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
<john.johansen@canonical.com>, <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>,
<zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
<dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>, <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
<stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>, <omosnacek@gmail.com>,
<casey@schaufler-ca.com>, <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
<penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>, <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>,
<nanx95726@gmail.com>, <djwong@kernel.org>,
<lujialin4@huawei.com>, <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
<driver-core@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-block@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, <netfs@lists.linux.dev>,
<ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org>, <exfat@lists.linux.dev>,
<linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>, <ntfs@lists.linux.dev>,
<linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com>,
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 -next 05/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setattr hook
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2026 20:54:11 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261015125425.3246251-6-caixinchen1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261015125425.3246251-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com>
The inode_setattr hook is called from notify_change(), which now
holds a struct path and used to derive the idmap and dentry from it
just for the hook. The other in-kernel caller, the fat and exfat
attribute ioctls, already holds a struct file and can pass its
f_path directly.
Convert the hook and its SELinux, Smack and EVM implementations to
take a const struct path. The implementations derive the idmap and
dentry they still need from the path, so this is a purely mechanical
change with no behavior change.
Assisted-by: opencode: glm-5.3
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
---
fs/attr.c | 2 +-
fs/exfat/file.c | 3 +--
fs/fat/file.c | 3 +--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++----
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 7 ++++---
security/security.c | 10 ++++------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++-
9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 8524d35421f0..3a05e50d9c51 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static int do_notify_change(const struct path *const path,
* filesystem, were already checked on the user-facing path.
*/
if (path) {
- error = security_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
+ error = security_inode_setattr(path, attr);
if (error)
return error;
}
diff --git a/fs/exfat/file.c b/fs/exfat/file.c
index 1386149916bb..0d431c0b595b 100644
--- a/fs/exfat/file.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/file.c
@@ -551,8 +551,7 @@ static int exfat_ioctl_set_attributes(struct file *file, u32 __user *user_attr)
* out the RO attribute for checking by the security
* module, just because it maps to a file mode.
*/
- err = security_inode_setattr(file_mnt_idmap(file),
- file->f_path.dentry, &ia);
+ err = security_inode_setattr(&file->f_path, &ia);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_inode;
diff --git a/fs/fat/file.c b/fs/fat/file.c
index d4f1b360b974..4f8dbca28667 100644
--- a/fs/fat/file.c
+++ b/fs/fat/file.c
@@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ static int fat_ioctl_set_attributes(struct file *file, u32 __user *user_attr)
* out the RO attribute for checking by the security
* module, just because it maps to a file mode.
*/
- err = security_inode_setattr(file_mnt_idmap(file),
- file->f_path.dentry, &ia);
+ err = security_inode_setattr(&file->f_path, &ia);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_inode;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 98ce7c814f01..ff3dbe443007 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
bool rcu)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode, int mask)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, const struct path *path,
struct iattr *attr)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 26996f546ab2..e821adaeaf01 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -429,8 +429,7 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
bool rcu);
int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
int mask);
-int security_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
+int security_inode_setattr(const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr);
void security_inode_post_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
int ia_valid);
int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path);
@@ -1001,8 +1000,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry,
+static inline int security_inode_setattr(const struct path *path,
struct iattr *attr)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index ac8328812e6e..61460e3caedc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -949,18 +949,19 @@ static int evm_attr_change(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
/**
* evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
- * @idmap: idmap of the mount
- * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @path: pointer to the affected object
* @attr: iattr structure containing the new file attributes
*
* Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
* except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
*/
-static int evm_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+static int evm_inode_setattr(const struct path *path,
struct iattr *attr)
{
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
enum integrity_status evm_status;
+ struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
+ const struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(path->mnt);
/* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though
* there's no HMAC key loaded
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c9fb7c3380ad..5f2cd3e89d65 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1891,8 +1891,7 @@ int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode
/**
* security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed
- * @idmap: idmap of the mount
- * @dentry: file
+ * @path: file
* @attr: new attributes
*
* Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call
@@ -1902,12 +1901,11 @@ int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+int security_inode_setattr(const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr)
{
- if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
return 0;
- return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, idmap, dentry, attr);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, path, attr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index df1d0e7ce3a0..cc43e08e68c5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3346,10 +3346,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+static int selinux_inode_setattr(const struct path *path,
struct iattr *iattr)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 42b028bbcd02..fdc74ca0e870 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1272,10 +1272,11 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *i
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+static int smack_inode_setattr(const struct path *path,
struct iattr *iattr)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
int rc;
/*
--
2.18.0.huawei.25
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-15 12:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-15 12:54 [PATCH v2 -next 00/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 01/18] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 02/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 03/18] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 04/18] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:37 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` Cai Xinchen [this message]
2026-10-15 12:32 ` [PATCH v2 -next 05/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setattr hook sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 06/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 07/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 08/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode fileattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:34 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 09/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:37 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 10/18] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 11/18] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:35 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 12/18] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:39 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 13/18] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:39 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 14/18] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:40 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 15/18] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:37 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 16/18] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 17/18] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 18/18] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:39 ` sashiko-bot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261015125425.3246251-6-caixinchen1@huawei.com \
--to=caixinchen1@huawei.com \
--cc=Dai.Ngo@oracle.com \
--cc=amir73il@gmail.com \
--cc=andrii@kernel.org \
--cc=apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=axboe@kernel.dk \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=cel@kernel.org \
--cc=chenxiaosong@chenxiaosong.com \
--cc=code@tyhicks.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dakr@kernel.org \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=djwong@kernel.org \
--cc=dlemoal@kernel.org \
--cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
--cc=driver-core@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=eddyz87@gmail.com \
--cc=emil@etsalapatis.com \
--cc=eric.snowberg@oracle.com \
--cc=exfat@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=georgia.garcia@canonical.com \
--cc=gnoack@google.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=hch@lst.de \
--cc=hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp \
--cc=hyc.lee@gmail.com \
--cc=ihor.solodrai@linux.dev \
--cc=jack@suse.cz \
--cc=jlayton@kernel.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=johan@kernel.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=jolsa@kernel.org \
--cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
--cc=linkinjeon@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-block@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=lujialin4@huawei.com \
--cc=martin.lau@linux.dev \
--cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
--cc=matt@bobrowski.net \
--cc=memxor@gmail.com \
--cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=miklos@szeredi.hu \
--cc=nanx95726@gmail.com \
--cc=neil@brown.name \
--cc=netfs@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=ntfs@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=okorniev@redhat.com \
--cc=omosnacek@gmail.com \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp \
--cc=rafael@kernel.org \
--cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
--cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=senozhatsky@chromium.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=sj1557.seo@samsung.com \
--cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=song@kernel.org \
--cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
--cc=takedakn@nttdata.co.jp \
--cc=tom@talpey.com \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=xiujianfeng@huawei.com \
--cc=yonghong.song@linux.dev \
--cc=yuezhang.mo@sony.com \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox