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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Cai Xinchen" <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	"Chuck Lever" <cel@kernel.org>,
	"Jeff Layton" <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	"Anna Schumaker" <anna@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 -next 16/18] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata access rights
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2026 12:46:31 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-172860@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261015125425.3246251-17-caixinchen1@huawei.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] selftests/landlock: test logic and commit message contradiction in fileattr_write_only
- [Medium] selftests: hardcoded syscall fallbacks 468/469 are incorrect on Alpha
--

commit 14e6c962c9835f4d2f9d99bb2bfea0e277c3117a
Author: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>

selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata access rights

This commit adds layout1 and layout2 tests for the newly introduced
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA
access rights. It verifies metadata restriction behaviors for various
system calls and fileattr interfaces, including overlayfs scenarios.

> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c

[ ... ]

> +#ifndef __NR_file_getattr
> +#define __NR_file_getattr 468
> +#endif
> +#ifndef __NR_file_setattr
> +#define __NR_file_setattr 469
> +#endif

[Severity: Medium]
Are these hardcoded syscall fallbacks correct for all architectures?

The assumption that syscalls post-424 are unified across all
architectures is incorrect for Alpha, which uses 578 and 579 for
these syscalls. 

If the selftests are built on an Alpha platform with older host headers,
it will invoke incorrect system calls (such as splice and sync_file_range),
leading to failures or undefined behavior.

[ ... ]

> +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, fileattr_write_only)
> +{
> +	const struct rule rules[] = {
> +		{
> +			.path = file1_s1d1,
> +			.access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA,
> +		},
> +		{},
> +	};
> +	unsigned int flags;
> +	int fd, ruleset_fd;
> +
> +	ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata,
> +				    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA, rules);
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
> +
> +	fd = open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
> +	ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
> +
> +	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * WRITE_METADATA alone must be enough to set flags: the kernel-side
> +	 * read of the old flags must not require READ_METADATA.
> +	 */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_setflags(fd, FS_NODUMP_FL));
> +	flags = 0;
> +	/* READ_METADATA is not handled: reading is allowed. */
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_getflags(fd, &flags));

[Severity: Medium]
Does this test logic contradict the commit message?

The commit message states that for fileattr_write_only: "metadata
reads (ioctl(FS_IOC_GETFLAGS)) are still denied". 

However, the test explicitly creates a ruleset that only handles
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA. Because
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA is unhandled, reading metadata is globally
permitted, and the test expects test_getflags() to succeed.

Additionally, by leaving READ_METADATA unhandled, does this test fail to
effectively verify that FS_IOC_SETFLAGS (which internally reads metadata)
works when READ_METADATA is actively restricted?

> +	EXPECT_EQ(FS_NODUMP_FL, flags & FS_NODUMP_FL);
> +	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_setflags(fd, 0));
> +
> +	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
> +}

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261015125425.3246251-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com?part=16

  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-15 12:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-15 12:54 [PATCH v2 -next 00/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 01/18] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:31   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 02/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:28   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 03/18] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 04/18] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 05/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setattr hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:32   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 06/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:32   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 07/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:31   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 08/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode fileattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:34   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 09/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 10/18] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:32   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 11/18] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 12/18] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:39   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 13/18] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:39   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 14/18] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:40   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 15/18] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 16/18] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:46   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 17/18] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 18/18] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:39   ` sashiko-bot

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