* [PATCH v2] KEYS: protect construct_key type dereference with key semaphore
@ 2026-11-21 12:50 Tristan Madani
2026-11-21 13:05 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Tristan Madani @ 2026-11-21 12:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings,
linux-security-module, linux-kernel, Tristan Madani, stable
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
construct_key() reads key->type->request_key without holding key->sem,
then calls the resulting actor function pointer. While the
sys_request_key() syscall path holds key_types_sem for reading (via
key_type_lookup()), which prevents concurrent type removal, in-kernel
request_key() callers pass struct key_type directly without holding
key_types_sem. If unregister_key_type() races with such a caller,
key_garbage_collector() can retype the key to key_type_dead and the
module text backing the original request_key method can be freed before
the actor call executes.
Take key->sem for reading around both the key->type->request_key lookup
and the actor() call, consistent with the approach used by 925c84e3cc21
("KEYS: Protect the read method check against type removal"),
51bcd09b9ffc ("KEYS: Protect the update method check against type
removal") and bab48a104447 ("KEYS: Protect the pkey method checks
against type removal") which protect analogous method dereferences in
the keyctl paths.
Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Hold key->sem across the actor() call, not just the type pointer read,
matching the established pattern from the three prior fixes (Sashiko)
- Clarify that in-kernel request_key() callers do not hold key_types_sem
so the race is reachable outside the syscall path (Sashiko)
security/keys/request_key.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 22cd66a44da56..60a8cb5924e11 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -241,10 +241,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
/* Make the call */
actor = call_sbin_request_key;
+ down_read(&key->sem);
if (key->type->request_key)
actor = key->type->request_key;
ret = actor(authkey, aux);
+ up_read(&key->sem);
/* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to
* returning an error */
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: protect construct_key type dereference with key semaphore
2026-11-21 12:50 [PATCH v2] KEYS: protect construct_key type dereference with key semaphore Tristan Madani
@ 2026-11-21 13:05 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-21 13:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tristan Madani, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings,
linux-security-module, Tristan Madani
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue to consider:
- [High] KEYS: deadlock in construct_key() holding key->sem across
actor() call
--
commit 89caf57fd1a6b94038c074beb5c384911f131253
Author: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
KEYS: protect construct_key type dereference with key semaphore
This commit acquires key->sem for reading around the key->type->request_key
lookup and actor() invocation in construct_key().
> diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
> index fa2bb9f2f5381..afc9df61506b9 100644
> --- a/security/keys/request_key.c
> +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
> @@ -241,10 +241,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
>
> /* Make the call */
> actor = call_sbin_request_key;
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> if (key->type->request_key)
> actor = key->type->request_key;
>
> ret = actor(authkey, aux);
> + up_read(&key->sem);
>
> /* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to
> * returning an error */
[Severity: High]
Can holding key->sem across actor() deadlock against the /sbin/request-key
userspace helper?
For key types without a custom ->request_key method, actor() is
call_sbin_request_key(), which calls call_usermodehelper_keys(...,
UMH_WAIT_PROC) and blocks until the userspace helper exits. Standard
helpers (such as key.dns_resolver, nfsidmap, and cifs.upcall) invoke
keyctl(KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT) on the key under construction before exiting,
which keyctl_set_timeout() explicitly permits via KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL and
KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
Requesting task /sbin/request-key helper
--------------- ------------------------
construct_key()
down_read(&key->sem)
call_sbin_request_key()
call_usermodehelper_keys(..., UMH_WAIT_PROC)
keyctl_set_timeout()
key_set_timeout()
down_write(&key->sem) <-- blocks
up_read(&key->sem)
*** DEADLOCK ***
keyctl_setperm_key() and keyctl_chown_key() likewise look up keys under
construction with KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL and take down_write(&key->sem).
Also, taking key->sem in construct_key() does not protect in-kernel
request_key() callers against concurrent unregister_key_type(): the sole
caller request_key_and_link() requires struct key_type *type to remain
registered across the call and dereferences type without key->sem both
before construct_key() (type->match_preparse and key_alloc()) and after it
returns (type->match_free).
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261121125039.2532663-1-tristmd@gmail.com?part=1
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