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* [PATCH v2 0/2] KEYS: two fixes for the asymmetric keyctl operations
@ 2026-11-18 23:19 Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay
  2026-11-18 23:19 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay
  2026-11-18 23:19 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay @ 2026-11-18 23:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin,
	Herbert Xu, David S. Miller
  Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Hui Peng,
	Stefan Berger, Rodolfo Giometti, keyrings, linux-crypto,
	linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable, Florian Bauckholt

Hi,

two small fixes for KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY and KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT that I
ran into while doing differential testing of crypto implementations
with the kernel hooked up via UML:

Patch 1 fixes a regression from commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow
in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()"), which was tagged for stable:
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY ignores the signature length passed by the caller.
It also is a prerequisite for making the x962 ECDSA template reject
signatures that are not DER-encoded, which I posted separately to
linux-crypto [2].

Patch 2 fixes PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message returning the
ciphertext.

Both changes were part of a patch posted by Hui Peng in September that
did not get a reply [1]. That patch also changed the out_len checks in
keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(), which is not included here.

Thanks!

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260919221742.3709658-1-benquike@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261112-ecdsa-x962-der-v1-1-36b24c5f5e11@cispa.de/

---
Changes in v2:
- Rebased onto jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git for-next-keys (141b164bbe18).
  Patch 1 no longer applied after commit bab48a104447 ("KEYS: Protect
  pkey method checks against type removal"). The code change itself is
  the same.
- Patch 1: the commit message now mentions that a truncated RSA
  signature can be accepted (Rodolfo Giometti).
- Patch 2: unchanged.
- Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20261111-keyctl-pkey-fixes-v1-0-934ebaa267a7@cispa.de

---
Florian Bauckholt (2):
      KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY
      KEYS: asymmetric: Fix PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message

 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 6 +++---
 security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c         | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 141b164bbe186423e295b139e40e8e2d11cf1341
change-id: 20261111-keyctl-pkey-fixes-26358a8707b6

Best regards,
--  
Florian Bauckholt <florian.bauckholt@cispa.de>



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-19 10:25 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-11-18 23:19 [PATCH v2 0/2] KEYS: two fixes for the asymmetric keyctl operations Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay
2026-11-18 23:19 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay
2026-11-18 23:24   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19  7:50   ` Guicai Ma
2026-11-19 10:25   ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 23:19 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay
2026-11-18 23:25   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19  7:50   ` Guicai Ma

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