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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] security, selinux: get rid of security_delete_hooks()
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2020 09:49:00 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <826c1199-80c8-419c-909a-98fe90c097bc@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhRMLJLSUY5VfdDRv=OuyLkvzsyqfpNhf_SfC9V8OALJ4g@mail.gmail.com>

On 1/8/20 12:31 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 7, 2020 at 9:46 AM Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>> On 1/7/20 8:31 AM, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
>>> The only user is SELinux, which is hereby converted to check the
>>> disabled flag in each hook instead of removing the hooks from the list.
>>>
>>> The __lsm_ro_after_init macro is now removed and replaced with
>>> __ro_after_init directly.
>>>
>>> This fixes a race condition in SELinux runtime disable, which was
>>> introduced with the switch to hook lists in b1d9e6b0646d ("LSM: Switch
>>> to lists of hooks").
>>
>> Not opposed (naturally, since I suggested it) but my impression from the
>> earlier thread was that Paul preferred the less invasive approach of
>> your original patch (just reordering the hooks) as a short term fix with
>> an eye toward full removal of disable support in the not-too-distant future.
> 
> Unless we are seeing wide spread breakages (I don't think we are), or
> we decide we can never remove the runtime disable, I still prefer the
> hook-shuffle over the changes proposed in this patchset.

Note that the first patch is a necessary and correct cleanup regardless 
of this one.



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-01-08 14:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-07 13:31 [PATCH 0/2] LSM: Drop security_delete_hooks() Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-07 13:31 ` [PATCH 1/2] selinux: treat atomic flags more carefully Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-07 14:45   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-07 18:09   ` Kees Cook
2020-01-07 19:45   ` James Morris
2020-01-10 20:22     ` Paul Moore
2020-01-10 20:21   ` Paul Moore
2020-01-07 13:31 ` [PATCH 2/2] security,selinux: get rid of security_delete_hooks() Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-07 14:47   ` [PATCH 2/2] security, selinux: " Stephen Smalley
2020-01-08  5:31     ` Paul Moore
2020-01-08  8:15       ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-08 13:45         ` Paul Moore
2020-01-08 14:49       ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2020-01-07 16:46   ` [PATCH 2/2] security,selinux: " Casey Schaufler
2020-01-07 18:10   ` Kees Cook
2020-01-07 19:59   ` James Morris
2020-01-08  8:21     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-01-08 18:47       ` James Morris

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