* [PATCH 0/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces
@ 2026-11-20 12:29 Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 1/2] mount: pass flags to alloc_mnt_ns() Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 2/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces Christian Brauner
0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2026-11-20 12:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-fsdevel
Cc: linux-security-module, Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, bpf, Zhiqi Zhang,
Christian Brauner (Amutable)
mount_subtree() allocates a private anonymous mount namespace so that
automounts during the path lookup have somewhere to go. btrfs goes
through it on every mount and NFS on every NFSv4 mount and whenever it
follows a referral.
Since the namespace LSM hooks went in that namespace goes through
security_namespace_init() like any other. Landlock enforces
LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE in its namespace_init hook. So a
sandbox that handles that permission without allowing CLONE_NEWNS can't
mount btrfs or NFSv4 anymore. mount(2) fails with EPERM even though
nobody asked for a mount namespace. Zhiqi reported that and sent a fix
that skips namespace_init for this namespace (cf. [1]).
But namespace_free needs to be skipped as well. Otherwise a bpf program
attached to namespace_free would see these namespaces go away without
ever having seen them being created. Right now that can't happen but
only because security_namespace_free() skips the hook if no LSM
requested a namespace blob. So mark such namespaces as kernel-internal
and keep them away from both hooks. The first patch turns the anon
argument of alloc_mnt_ns() into flags so we don't end up with two
booleans.
The anonymous mount namespaces created by open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE)
and fsmount() are handed to userspace and keep going through the hooks.
Landlock covers them on purpose.
I tested this on v7.4-rc3 with a btrfs loop mount and an NFSv4 mount
in a Landlock domain that handles LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE but
doesn't allow CLONE_NEWNS. Both fail with EPERM without this series and
work with it. unshare(CLONE_NEWNS), clone(CLONE_NEWNS),
open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE), fsmount() and setns() are still denied and
the Landlock namespace selftests pass.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/20261114141323.19029-1-zhiqizhangg@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
---
Christian Brauner (2):
mount: pass flags to alloc_mnt_ns()
ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces
fs/namespace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h | 2 ++
include/linux/ns_common.h | 20 +++++++++++++-------
kernel/nscommon.c | 9 ++++++---
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 666539eecdf4db623f5e3c3e55cf9f2dfad24aa4
change-id: 20261120-work-ns-mount_subtree-d429ad72f8ac
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] mount: pass flags to alloc_mnt_ns()
2026-11-20 12:29 [PATCH 0/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces Christian Brauner
@ 2026-11-20 12:29 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 12:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 14:02 ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 2/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces Christian Brauner
1 sibling, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2026-11-20 12:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-fsdevel
Cc: linux-security-module, Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, bpf, Zhiqi Zhang,
Christian Brauner (Amutable)
Turn the anon argument of alloc_mnt_ns() into a flags argument. The
next patch needs to pass another property of the new mount namespace
and two booleans in a row would make the callers unreadable.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
---
fs/namespace.c | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index aecd05ac01705..756f9011cbf1d 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2353,7 +2353,12 @@ void drop_collected_paths(const struct path *paths, const struct path *prealloc)
kfree(paths);
}
-static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *, bool);
+enum mnt_ns_flags_t {
+ MNT_NS_ANON = (1 << 0),
+};
+
+static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *,
+ enum mnt_ns_flags_t);
/* Consumes the caller's reference to @mnt. */
void dissolve_on_fput(struct vfsmount *mnt)
@@ -3149,7 +3154,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *get_detached_copy(const struct path *path, unsigned
struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_ns->user_ns;
struct mount *mnt, *p;
- ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, true);
+ ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, MNT_NS_ANON);
if (IS_ERR(ns))
return ns;
@@ -3230,7 +3235,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *create_new_namespace(struct path *path,
if (foreign)
copy_flags |= CL_SLAVE | CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE;
- new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, false);
+ new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, 0);
if (IS_ERR(new_ns))
return ERR_CAST(new_ns);
@@ -4369,7 +4374,8 @@ static void free_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns)
mnt_ns_tree_remove(ns);
}
-static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, bool anon)
+static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+ enum mnt_ns_flags_t flags)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns;
struct ucounts *ucounts;
@@ -4385,7 +4391,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, bool a
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
- if (anon)
+ if (flags & MNT_NS_ANON)
ret = ns_common_init_inum(new_ns, MNT_NS_ANON_INO);
else
ret = ns_common_init(new_ns);
@@ -4394,7 +4400,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, bool a
dec_mnt_namespaces(ucounts);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
- new_ns->is_anon = anon;
+ new_ns->is_anon = flags & MNT_NS_ANON;
refcount_set(&new_ns->passive, 1);
new_ns->mounts = RB_ROOT;
init_waitqueue_head(&new_ns->poll);
@@ -4422,7 +4428,7 @@ struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(u64 flags, struct mnt_namespace *ns,
old = ns->root;
- new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, false);
+ new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, 0);
if (IS_ERR(new_ns))
return new_ns;
@@ -4509,7 +4515,7 @@ struct dentry *mount_subtree(struct vfsmount *m, const char *name)
struct path path;
int err;
- ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns, true);
+ ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns, MNT_NS_ANON);
if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
mntput(m);
return ERR_CAST(ns);
@@ -4699,7 +4705,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fsmount, int, fs_fd, unsigned int, flags,
return FD_ADD((flags & FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0,
open_new_namespace(&new_path, MOUNT_COPY_NEW));
- ns = alloc_mnt_ns(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns, true);
+ ns = alloc_mnt_ns(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns, MNT_NS_ANON);
if (IS_ERR(ns))
return PTR_ERR(ns);
mnt = real_mount(new_path.mnt);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces
2026-11-20 12:29 [PATCH 0/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 1/2] mount: pass flags to alloc_mnt_ns() Christian Brauner
@ 2026-11-20 12:29 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 12:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 14:03 ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
1 sibling, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2026-11-20 12:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-fsdevel
Cc: linux-security-module, Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, bpf, Zhiqi Zhang,
Christian Brauner (Amutable)
mount_subtree() allocates a private anonymous mount namespace so that
automounts triggered while it looks up the path have somewhere to go.
That namespace never becomes anyone's namespace and it's gone again
before mount_subtree() returns. btrfs goes through it on every mount:
btrfs_get_tree()
-> btrfs_get_tree_subvol()
-> mount_subvol()
-> mount_subtree()
and NFS on every NFSv4 mount and whenever it follows a referral:
nfs4_try_get_tree() / nfs4_get_referral_tree()
-> do_nfs4_mount()
-> mount_subtree()
But __ns_common_init() calls security_namespace_init() for it like for
any other namespace. Since commit 15dd86021b57a ("landlock: Enforce
namespace use restrictions") Landlock enforces
LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE in its namespace_init hook. So a task
in a domain that handles that permission without allowing CLONE_NEWNS
can't mount btrfs or NFSv4 anymore. mount(2) fails with EPERM even
though the caller never asked for a mount namespace.
Mark such namespaces as kernel-internal and don't call the namespace
LSM hooks for them at all. That includes namespace_free. Currently
security_namespace_free() only calls the hook if an LSM requested a
namespace blob and none does. But we shouldn't rely on that. Otherwise
a bpf program attached to namespace_free would see namespaces go away
that it never saw being created.
The anonymous mount namespaces created by open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE)
and fsmount() are handed to userspace and keep going through the hooks.
Landlock covers them on purpose.
Fixes: f675d2e95569 ("lsm: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces")
Reported-by: Zhiqi Zhang <zhiqizhangg@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20261114141323.19029-1-zhiqizhangg@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
---
fs/namespace.c | 9 +++++++--
include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h | 2 ++
include/linux/ns_common.h | 20 +++++++++++++-------
kernel/nscommon.c | 9 ++++++---
4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 756f9011cbf1d..82738b818c1d0 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2355,6 +2355,7 @@ void drop_collected_paths(const struct path *paths, const struct path *prealloc)
enum mnt_ns_flags_t {
MNT_NS_ANON = (1 << 0),
+ MNT_NS_KERNEL = (1 << 1),
};
static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *,
@@ -4377,10 +4378,14 @@ static void free_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns)
static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
enum mnt_ns_flags_t flags)
{
+ enum ns_common_flags_t ns_flags = 0;
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns;
struct ucounts *ucounts;
int ret;
+ if (flags & MNT_NS_KERNEL)
+ ns_flags |= NS_COMMON_KERNEL;
+
ucounts = inc_mnt_namespaces(user_ns);
if (!ucounts)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
@@ -4392,7 +4397,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
}
if (flags & MNT_NS_ANON)
- ret = ns_common_init_inum(new_ns, MNT_NS_ANON_INO);
+ ret = ns_common_init_inum(new_ns, MNT_NS_ANON_INO, ns_flags);
else
ret = ns_common_init(new_ns);
if (ret) {
@@ -4515,7 +4520,7 @@ struct dentry *mount_subtree(struct vfsmount *m, const char *name)
struct path path;
int err;
- ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns, MNT_NS_ANON);
+ ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns, MNT_NS_ANON | MNT_NS_KERNEL);
if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
mntput(m);
return ERR_CAST(ns);
diff --git a/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h b/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
index 47a5cfe2326a3..5f8b0930ae065 100644
--- a/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ extern const struct proc_ns_operations utsns_operations;
* __ns_ref_active = 1 and remain active forever.
*
* @ns_type: type of namespace (e.g., CLONE_NEWNET)
+ * @ns_flags: NS_COMMON_* flags
* @stashed: cached dentry to be used by the vfs
* @ops: namespace operations
* @inum: namespace inode number (quickly recycled for non-initial namespaces)
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ struct ns_common {
refcount_t __ns_ref; /* do not use directly */
} ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
u32 ns_type;
+ u32 ns_flags;
struct dentry *stashed;
const struct proc_ns_operations *ops;
unsigned int inum;
diff --git a/include/linux/ns_common.h b/include/linux/ns_common.h
index e8b2bf0da5ede..524b77904d3b4 100644
--- a/include/linux/ns_common.h
+++ b/include/linux/ns_common.h
@@ -8,9 +8,14 @@
#include <uapi/linux/sched.h>
#include <uapi/linux/nsfs.h>
+enum ns_common_flags_t {
+ /* Kernel-internal namespace. The LSM namespace hooks never see it. */
+ NS_COMMON_KERNEL = (1 << 0),
+};
+
bool is_current_namespace(struct ns_common *ns);
int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_operations *ops,
- int inum, u64 ns_id);
+ int inum, u64 ns_id, enum ns_common_flags_t flags);
void __ns_common_free(struct ns_common *ns);
struct ns_common *__must_check ns_owner(struct ns_common *ns);
@@ -47,13 +52,14 @@ static __always_inline bool is_ns_init_id(const struct ns_common *ns)
ns_common_type(__ns), \
to_ns_operations(__ns), \
(((__ns) == ns_init_ns(__ns)) ? ns_init_inum(__ns) : 0), \
- (((__ns) == ns_init_ns(__ns)) ? ns_init_id(__ns) : 0))
+ (((__ns) == ns_init_ns(__ns)) ? ns_init_id(__ns) : 0), \
+ 0)
-#define ns_common_init_inum(__ns, __inum) \
- __ns_common_init(to_ns_common(__ns), \
- ns_common_type(__ns), \
- to_ns_operations(__ns), \
- __inum, 0)
+#define ns_common_init_inum(__ns, __inum, __flags) \
+ __ns_common_init(to_ns_common(__ns), \
+ ns_common_type(__ns), \
+ to_ns_operations(__ns), \
+ __inum, 0, __flags)
#define ns_common_free(__ns) __ns_common_free(to_ns_common((__ns)))
diff --git a/kernel/nscommon.c b/kernel/nscommon.c
index 4438c6b663f91..20fc0d0e98212 100644
--- a/kernel/nscommon.c
+++ b/kernel/nscommon.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static void ns_debug(struct ns_common *ns, const struct proc_ns_operations *ops)
#endif
int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_operations *ops,
- int inum, u64 ns_id)
+ int inum, u64 ns_id, enum ns_common_flags_t flags)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope
#endif
ns->ops = ops;
ns->ns_type = ns_type;
+ ns->ns_flags = flags;
ns_tree_node_init(&ns->ns_tree_node);
ns_tree_node_init(&ns->ns_unified_node);
ns_tree_node_init(&ns->ns_owner_node);
@@ -85,7 +86,8 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope
/* Allocate the id before the LSM hook so it can track the namespace by it. */
__ns_tree_gen_id(ns, ns_id);
- ret = security_namespace_init(ns);
+ if (!(flags & NS_COMMON_KERNEL))
+ ret = security_namespace_init(ns);
if (ret) {
if (!inum)
proc_free_inum(ns->inum);
@@ -106,7 +108,8 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope
void __ns_common_free(struct ns_common *ns)
{
- security_namespace_free(ns);
+ if (!(ns->ns_flags & NS_COMMON_KERNEL))
+ security_namespace_free(ns);
if (ns->inum > MNT_NS_INO_SPECIAL_MAX)
proc_free_inum(ns->inum);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mount: pass flags to alloc_mnt_ns()
2026-11-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 1/2] mount: pass flags to alloc_mnt_ns() Christian Brauner
@ 2026-11-20 12:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 14:02 ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-20 12:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: linux-security-module
> Turn the anon argument of alloc_mnt_ns() into a flags argument. The
> next patch needs to pass another property of the new mount namespace
> and two booleans in a row would make the callers unreadable.
>
> No functional changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120-work-ns-mount_subtree-v1-0-06337377f94a@kernel.org?part=1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces
2026-11-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 2/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces Christian Brauner
@ 2026-11-20 12:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 14:03 ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-20 12:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: linux-security-module
> mount_subtree() allocates a private anonymous mount namespace so that
> automounts triggered while it looks up the path have somewhere to go.
> That namespace never becomes anyone's namespace and it's gone again
> before mount_subtree() returns. btrfs goes through it on every mount:
>
> btrfs_get_tree()
> -> btrfs_get_tree_subvol()
> -> mount_subvol()
> -> mount_subtree()
>
> and NFS on every NFSv4 mount and whenever it follows a referral:
>
> nfs4_try_get_tree() / nfs4_get_referral_tree()
> -> do_nfs4_mount()
> -> mount_subtree()
> [ ... ]
>
> Fixes: f675d2e95569 ("lsm: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces")
> Reported-by: Zhiqi Zhang <zhiqizhangg@gmail.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20261114141323.19029-1-zhiqizhangg@gmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120-work-ns-mount_subtree-v1-0-06337377f94a@kernel.org?part=2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mount: pass flags to alloc_mnt_ns()
2026-11-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 1/2] mount: pass flags to alloc_mnt_ns() Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 12:32 ` sashiko-bot
@ 2026-11-20 14:02 ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Mikhalitsyn @ 2026-11-20 14:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner, linux-fsdevel
Cc: linux-security-module, Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, bpf, Zhiqi Zhang
On Fri, 2026-11-20 at 13:29 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> Turn the anon argument of alloc_mnt_ns() into a flags argument. The
> next patch needs to pass another property of the new mount namespace
> and two booleans in a row would make the callers unreadable.
>
> No functional changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>
> ---
> fs/namespace.c | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index aecd05ac01705..756f9011cbf1d 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -2353,7 +2353,12 @@ void drop_collected_paths(const struct path
> *paths, const struct path *prealloc)
> kfree(paths);
> }
>
> -static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *,
> bool);
> +enum mnt_ns_flags_t {
> + MNT_NS_ANON = (1 << 0),
> +};
> +
> +static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *,
> + enum mnt_ns_flags_t);
>
> /* Consumes the caller's reference to @mnt. */
> void dissolve_on_fput(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> @@ -3149,7 +3154,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace
> *get_detached_copy(const struct path *path, unsigned
> struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_ns->user_ns;
> struct mount *mnt, *p;
>
> - ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, true);
> + ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, MNT_NS_ANON);
> if (IS_ERR(ns))
> return ns;
>
> @@ -3230,7 +3235,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace
> *create_new_namespace(struct path *path,
> if (foreign)
> copy_flags |= CL_SLAVE | CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE;
>
> - new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, false);
> + new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, 0);
> if (IS_ERR(new_ns))
> return ERR_CAST(new_ns);
>
> @@ -4369,7 +4374,8 @@ static void free_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace
> *ns)
> mnt_ns_tree_remove(ns);
> }
>
> -static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace
> *user_ns, bool anon)
> +static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace
> *user_ns,
> + enum mnt_ns_flags_t flags)
> {
> struct mnt_namespace *new_ns;
> struct ucounts *ucounts;
> @@ -4385,7 +4391,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace
> *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, bool a
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> }
>
> - if (anon)
> + if (flags & MNT_NS_ANON)
> ret = ns_common_init_inum(new_ns, MNT_NS_ANON_INO);
> else
> ret = ns_common_init(new_ns);
> @@ -4394,7 +4400,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace
> *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, bool a
> dec_mnt_namespaces(ucounts);
> return ERR_PTR(ret);
> }
> - new_ns->is_anon = anon;
> + new_ns->is_anon = flags & MNT_NS_ANON;
> refcount_set(&new_ns->passive, 1);
> new_ns->mounts = RB_ROOT;
> init_waitqueue_head(&new_ns->poll);
> @@ -4422,7 +4428,7 @@ struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(u64 flags,
> struct mnt_namespace *ns,
>
> old = ns->root;
>
> - new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, false);
> + new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns, 0);
> if (IS_ERR(new_ns))
> return new_ns;
>
> @@ -4509,7 +4515,7 @@ struct dentry *mount_subtree(struct vfsmount
> *m, const char *name)
> struct path path;
> int err;
>
> - ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns, true);
> + ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns, MNT_NS_ANON);
> if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
> mntput(m);
> return ERR_CAST(ns);
> @@ -4699,7 +4705,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fsmount, int, fs_fd, unsigned
> int, flags,
> return FD_ADD((flags & FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC
> : 0,
> open_new_namespace(&new_path,
> MOUNT_COPY_NEW));
>
> - ns = alloc_mnt_ns(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns, true);
> + ns = alloc_mnt_ns(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns,
> MNT_NS_ANON);
> if (IS_ERR(ns))
> return PTR_ERR(ns);
> mnt = real_mount(new_path.mnt);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces
2026-11-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 2/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 12:33 ` sashiko-bot
@ 2026-11-20 14:03 ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Mikhalitsyn @ 2026-11-20 14:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner, linux-fsdevel
Cc: linux-security-module, Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, bpf, Zhiqi Zhang
On Fri, 2026-11-20 at 13:29 +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> mount_subtree() allocates a private anonymous mount namespace so that
> automounts triggered while it looks up the path have somewhere to go.
> That namespace never becomes anyone's namespace and it's gone again
> before mount_subtree() returns. btrfs goes through it on every mount:
>
> btrfs_get_tree()
> -> btrfs_get_tree_subvol()
> -> mount_subvol()
> -> mount_subtree()
>
> and NFS on every NFSv4 mount and whenever it follows a referral:
>
> nfs4_try_get_tree() / nfs4_get_referral_tree()
> -> do_nfs4_mount()
> -> mount_subtree()
>
> But __ns_common_init() calls security_namespace_init() for it like
> for
> any other namespace. Since commit 15dd86021b57a ("landlock: Enforce
> namespace use restrictions") Landlock enforces
> LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE in its namespace_init hook. So a
> task
> in a domain that handles that permission without allowing CLONE_NEWNS
> can't mount btrfs or NFSv4 anymore. mount(2) fails with EPERM even
> though the caller never asked for a mount namespace.
>
> Mark such namespaces as kernel-internal and don't call the namespace
> LSM hooks for them at all. That includes namespace_free. Currently
> security_namespace_free() only calls the hook if an LSM requested a
> namespace blob and none does. But we shouldn't rely on that.
> Otherwise
> a bpf program attached to namespace_free would see namespaces go away
> that it never saw being created.
>
> The anonymous mount namespaces created by open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE)
> and fsmount() are handed to userspace and keep going through the
> hooks.
> Landlock covers them on purpose.
>
> Fixes: f675d2e95569 ("lsm: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces")
> Reported-by: Zhiqi Zhang <zhiqizhangg@gmail.com>
> Closes:
> https://lore.kernel.org/20261114141323.19029-1-zhiqizhangg@gmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>
> ---
> fs/namespace.c | 9 +++++++--
> include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h | 2 ++
> include/linux/ns_common.h | 20 +++++++++++++-------
> kernel/nscommon.c | 9 ++++++---
> 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index 756f9011cbf1d..82738b818c1d0 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -2355,6 +2355,7 @@ void drop_collected_paths(const struct path
> *paths, const struct path *prealloc)
>
> enum mnt_ns_flags_t {
> MNT_NS_ANON = (1 << 0),
> + MNT_NS_KERNEL = (1 << 1),
> };
>
> static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *,
> @@ -4377,10 +4378,14 @@ static void free_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace
> *ns)
> static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace
> *user_ns,
> enum mnt_ns_flags_t flags)
> {
> + enum ns_common_flags_t ns_flags = 0;
> struct mnt_namespace *new_ns;
> struct ucounts *ucounts;
> int ret;
>
> + if (flags & MNT_NS_KERNEL)
> + ns_flags |= NS_COMMON_KERNEL;
> +
> ucounts = inc_mnt_namespaces(user_ns);
> if (!ucounts)
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
> @@ -4392,7 +4397,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace
> *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
> }
>
> if (flags & MNT_NS_ANON)
> - ret = ns_common_init_inum(new_ns, MNT_NS_ANON_INO);
> + ret = ns_common_init_inum(new_ns, MNT_NS_ANON_INO,
> ns_flags);
> else
> ret = ns_common_init(new_ns);
> if (ret) {
> @@ -4515,7 +4520,7 @@ struct dentry *mount_subtree(struct vfsmount
> *m, const char *name)
> struct path path;
> int err;
>
> - ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns, MNT_NS_ANON);
> + ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns, MNT_NS_ANON |
> MNT_NS_KERNEL);
> if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
> mntput(m);
> return ERR_CAST(ns);
> diff --git a/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
> b/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
> index 47a5cfe2326a3..5f8b0930ae065 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
> @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ extern const struct proc_ns_operations
> utsns_operations;
> * __ns_ref_active = 1 and remain active forever.
> *
> * @ns_type: type of namespace (e.g., CLONE_NEWNET)
> + * @ns_flags: NS_COMMON_* flags
> * @stashed: cached dentry to be used by the vfs
> * @ops: namespace operations
> * @inum: namespace inode number (quickly recycled for non-initial
> namespaces)
> @@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ struct ns_common {
> refcount_t __ns_ref; /* do not use directly */
> } ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
> u32 ns_type;
> + u32 ns_flags;
> struct dentry *stashed;
> const struct proc_ns_operations *ops;
> unsigned int inum;
> diff --git a/include/linux/ns_common.h b/include/linux/ns_common.h
> index e8b2bf0da5ede..524b77904d3b4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ns_common.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ns_common.h
> @@ -8,9 +8,14 @@
> #include <uapi/linux/sched.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/nsfs.h>
>
> +enum ns_common_flags_t {
> + /* Kernel-internal namespace. The LSM namespace hooks never
> see it. */
> + NS_COMMON_KERNEL = (1 << 0),
> +};
> +
> bool is_current_namespace(struct ns_common *ns);
> int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct
> proc_ns_operations *ops,
> - int inum, u64 ns_id);
> + int inum, u64 ns_id, enum ns_common_flags_t
> flags);
> void __ns_common_free(struct ns_common *ns);
> struct ns_common *__must_check ns_owner(struct ns_common *ns);
>
> @@ -47,13 +52,14 @@ static __always_inline bool is_ns_init_id(const
> struct ns_common *ns)
>
> ns_common_type(__ns), \
>
> to_ns_operations(__ns), \
> (((__ns) == ns_init_ns(__ns)) ?
> ns_init_inum(__ns) : 0), \
> - (((__ns) == ns_init_ns(__ns)) ?
> ns_init_id(__ns) : 0))
> + (((__ns) == ns_init_ns(__ns)) ?
> ns_init_id(__ns) : 0), \
> + 0)
>
> -#define ns_common_init_inum(__ns, __inum) \
> - __ns_common_init(to_ns_common(__ns), \
> - ns_common_type(__ns), \
> - to_ns_operations(__ns), \
> - __inum, 0)
> +#define ns_common_init_inum(__ns, __inum, __flags) \
> + __ns_common_init(to_ns_common(__ns), \
> + ns_common_type(__ns), \
> + to_ns_operations(__ns), \
> + __inum, 0, __flags)
>
> #define ns_common_free(__ns) __ns_common_free(to_ns_common((__ns)))
>
> diff --git a/kernel/nscommon.c b/kernel/nscommon.c
> index 4438c6b663f91..20fc0d0e98212 100644
> --- a/kernel/nscommon.c
> +++ b/kernel/nscommon.c
> @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static void ns_debug(struct ns_common *ns, const
> struct proc_ns_operations *ops)
> #endif
>
> int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct
> proc_ns_operations *ops,
> - int inum, u64 ns_id)
> + int inum, u64 ns_id, enum ns_common_flags_t
> flags)
> {
> int ret = 0;
>
> @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32
> ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope
> #endif
> ns->ops = ops;
> ns->ns_type = ns_type;
> + ns->ns_flags = flags;
> ns_tree_node_init(&ns->ns_tree_node);
> ns_tree_node_init(&ns->ns_unified_node);
> ns_tree_node_init(&ns->ns_owner_node);
> @@ -85,7 +86,8 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32
> ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope
> /* Allocate the id before the LSM hook so it can track the
> namespace by it. */
> __ns_tree_gen_id(ns, ns_id);
>
> - ret = security_namespace_init(ns);
> + if (!(flags & NS_COMMON_KERNEL))
> + ret = security_namespace_init(ns);
> if (ret) {
> if (!inum)
> proc_free_inum(ns->inum);
> @@ -106,7 +108,8 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32
> ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope
>
> void __ns_common_free(struct ns_common *ns)
> {
> - security_namespace_free(ns);
> + if (!(ns->ns_flags & NS_COMMON_KERNEL))
> + security_namespace_free(ns);
>
> if (ns->inum > MNT_NS_INO_SPECIAL_MAX)
> proc_free_inum(ns->inum);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-20 14:03 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-11-20 12:29 [PATCH 0/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 1/2] mount: pass flags to alloc_mnt_ns() Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 12:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 14:02 ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 2/2] ns: don't call the namespace LSM hooks for kernel-internal namespaces Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 12:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 14:03 ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
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