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* [PATCH] KEYS: fix userspace buffer overflow in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
@ 2026-11-20  2:24 Guicai Ma
  2026-11-20  2:36 ` sashiko-bot
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Guicai Ma @ 2026-11-20  2:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen
  Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E . Hallyn, Florian Bauckholt,
	keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, Guicai Ma

Commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()")
changed keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() to set params->out_len to the maximum
output size of the operation instead of uparams.out_len, so that the
kernel buffer allocated in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() is large enough.

Because uparams.out_len is no longer kept, keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() copies
ret bytes to _out without checking whether the result fits in the
caller's buffer. If a smaller out_len was passed, copy_to_user() writes
past the end of _out instead of failing with -EOVERFLOW.

uparams.out_len cannot simply be required to be at least the maximum
output size in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(), since KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT
with enc=pkcs1 can return a plaintext shorter than max_dec_size into a
matching smaller buffer.

Pass uparams.out_len back to keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() and return -EOVERFLOW
before copy_to_user() if ret exceeds it.

Fixes: cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guicai Ma <maguicai@kylinos.cn>
---
 security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
index e7121523b9c9..31bd55c4ca70 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get(key_serial_t id,
 static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
 				    const char __user *_info,
 				    int op,
-				    struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+				    struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+				    u32 *user_out_len)
 {
 	struct keyctl_pkey_params uparams;
 	struct kernel_pkey_query info;
@@ -183,6 +184,8 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
 	}
 
 	params->in_len  = uparams.in_len;
+	if (user_out_len)
+		*user_out_len = uparams.out_len;
 
 	switch (op) {
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
@@ -264,10 +267,12 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
 		       void __user *_out)
 {
 	struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+	u32 user_out_len;
 	void *in, *out;
 	long ret;
 
-	ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, op, &params);
+	ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, op, &params,
+				       &user_out_len);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_params;
 
@@ -310,6 +315,10 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_out;
 
+	if (ret > user_out_len) {
+		ret = -EOVERFLOW;
+		goto error_out;
+	}
 	if (copy_to_user(_out, out, ret) != 0)
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 
@@ -349,7 +358,7 @@ long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
 	long ret;
 
 	ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
-				       &params);
+				       &params, NULL);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out_free_params;
 

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