* [PATCH] KEYS: fix userspace buffer overflow in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
@ 2026-11-20 2:24 Guicai Ma
2026-11-20 2:36 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Guicai Ma @ 2026-11-20 2:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E . Hallyn, Florian Bauckholt,
keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, Guicai Ma
Commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()")
changed keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() to set params->out_len to the maximum
output size of the operation instead of uparams.out_len, so that the
kernel buffer allocated in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() is large enough.
Because uparams.out_len is no longer kept, keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() copies
ret bytes to _out without checking whether the result fits in the
caller's buffer. If a smaller out_len was passed, copy_to_user() writes
past the end of _out instead of failing with -EOVERFLOW.
uparams.out_len cannot simply be required to be at least the maximum
output size in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(), since KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT
with enc=pkcs1 can return a plaintext shorter than max_dec_size into a
matching smaller buffer.
Pass uparams.out_len back to keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() and return -EOVERFLOW
before copy_to_user() if ret exceeds it.
Fixes: cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guicai Ma <maguicai@kylinos.cn>
---
security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
index e7121523b9c9..31bd55c4ca70 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get(key_serial_t id,
static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
const char __user *_info,
int op,
- struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+ struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+ u32 *user_out_len)
{
struct keyctl_pkey_params uparams;
struct kernel_pkey_query info;
@@ -183,6 +184,8 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
}
params->in_len = uparams.in_len;
+ if (user_out_len)
+ *user_out_len = uparams.out_len;
switch (op) {
case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
@@ -264,10 +267,12 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
void __user *_out)
{
struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+ u32 user_out_len;
void *in, *out;
long ret;
- ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, op, ¶ms);
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, op, ¶ms,
+ &user_out_len);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_params;
@@ -310,6 +315,10 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
if (ret < 0)
goto error_out;
+ if (ret > user_out_len) {
+ ret = -EOVERFLOW;
+ goto error_out;
+ }
if (copy_to_user(_out, out, ret) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
@@ -349,7 +358,7 @@ long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
long ret;
ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
- ¶ms);
+ ¶ms, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free_params;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] KEYS: fix userspace buffer overflow in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
2026-11-20 2:24 [PATCH] KEYS: fix userspace buffer overflow in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() Guicai Ma
@ 2026-11-20 2:36 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-20 2:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Guicai Ma, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E . Hallyn, Florian Bauckholt,
keyrings, linux-security-module
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found no new issues
in this patch, but noticed 1 related pre-existing issue it does not
introduce:
- [High] KEYS: in2_len overwritten with max_sig_size in
keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() [1]
--
commit a87f672b96b4f7c3b4eabf969b369139c77f96be
Author: Guicai Ma <maguicai@kylinos.cn>
KEYS: fix userspace buffer overflow in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
This commit passes the caller-supplied uparams.out_len back from
keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() to keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() and returns -EOVERFLOW if
the operation output exceeds the userspace buffer size.
> diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
> index e7121523b9c9a..b5f82804b5ad1 100644
> --- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
> +++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
> @@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get(key_serial_t id,
> static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
> const char __user *_info,
> int op,
> - struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
> + struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
> + u32 *user_out_len)
> {
> struct keyctl_pkey_params uparams;
> struct kernel_pkey_query info;
> @@ -183,6 +184,8 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
> }
>
> params->in_len = uparams.in_len;
> + if (user_out_len)
> + *user_out_len = uparams.out_len;
>
> switch (op) {
> case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
[Severity: High]
This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but in the
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY case just above this hunk, commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS:
fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()") also overwrote params->out_len
(which aliases params->in2_len in struct kernel_pkey_params) with
info.max_sig_size instead of preserving uparams.in2_len [1]:
security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c:keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() {
...
case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size ||
uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_up_key_sem;
}
params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
break;
...
}
When keyctl_pkey_verify() verifies a variable-length signature shorter than
info.max_sig_size (such as an ASN.1 DER-encoded ECDSA signature), does
memdup_user(_in2, params.in2_len) read past the end of the userspace _in2
buffer and either fail with -EFAULT or pass trailing garbage bytes to
asym_verify_signature()?
Should KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY set params->in2_len = uparams.in2_len instead?
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/bug/linux-dd9ad2ca-a846-4d0d-89d6-aa262ffd40f1
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120022447.789625-1-maguicai@kylinos.cn?part=1
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2026-11-20 2:24 [PATCH] KEYS: fix userspace buffer overflow in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() Guicai Ma
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