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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	"Dr . Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 01:07:05 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190620220705.GC20474@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190619140853.GA1203@linux.intel.com>

On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 07:08:53AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 04:24:05PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, 2019-06-17 at 15:24 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > >  {
> > > -	if (len < 2 * PAGE_SIZE || len & (len - 1) || flags & MAP_PRIVATE)
> > > +	if (flags & MAP_PRIVATE)
> > > +		return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > +	if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
> > > +		return addr;
> > > +
> > > +	if (len < 2 * PAGE_SIZE || len & (len - 1))
> > >  		return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > >  	addr = current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, 2 * len, pgoff,
> > 
> > Just sanity checking that for MAP_FIXED case the mm checks that the area is
> > unmapped before calling this?
> 
> No, straight MAP_FIXED unmaps any existing mappings.  The NOREPLACE variant
> fails with -EEXIST if there are existing mappings.

Ah so it was [1]!

> The MAP_FIXED behavior is actually useful, bordering on mandatory, for the
> new flow.  It allows the loader to keep its initial mmap(PROT_NONE) of
> ELRANGE while (re)mapping the individual enclave sections, e.g. to prevent
> a different aspect of the process from mapping the require ELRANGE.

Yeah, totally agree.

[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mmap.2.html

/Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-20 22:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-17 22:24 [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:32   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 23:42   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 14:11     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 16:06       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 12:56   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 13:00     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-20 20:09       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 13:24   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 14:08     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 22:07       ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:43   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 15:20     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 22:17       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 19:08         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 15:23           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 16:19             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 16:06               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 17:25                 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-15 22:29                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-01 16:38                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 22:20                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 20:51                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-05 21:30                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-07 18:51                             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:46   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_EXECMEM to map enclave page WX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:56   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 21:13     ` James Morris
2019-06-20  9:28       ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-20 22:22       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-23 17:16       ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-26 20:39         ` James Morris
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 14:49   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-19 20:59     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/12] security/apparmor: " Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 13:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 Stephen Smalley
2019-06-18 13:55   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 15:13     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-25 16:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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