From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
"Dr . Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, william.c.roberts@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 01:22:14 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190620221954.GF20474@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1906200702040.28119@namei.org>
On Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 07:13:50AM +1000, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 19 Jun 2019, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>
> > Can LSM callbacks ever non-generic when it comes to hardware? This is
> > the very first time I ever see such callbacks being introduced.
> >
> > I suspect that from maintainers perspective, accepting such changes for
> > Intel hardware, could open a pandoras box.
>
> If there's a major distro/userbase committing to ship with these hooks
> enabled via a supported in-tree LSM, the case for inclusion is clear.
I think there is.
> If the hooks could be generalized beyond just SGX, that would be ideal,
> but it's not clear if that's feasible.
OK, thanks for responding. This was really important to know what to
focus on (and what not).
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-20 22:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-17 22:24 [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:32 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 23:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 14:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 16:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 12:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 13:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-20 20:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 13:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 14:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 22:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 15:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 22:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 19:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 15:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 16:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 16:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 17:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-15 22:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-01 16:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 22:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 20:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-05 21:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-07 18:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_EXECMEM to map enclave page WX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 21:13 ` James Morris
2019-06-20 9:28 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-20 22:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2019-06-23 17:16 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-26 20:39 ` James Morris
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 14:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-19 20:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/12] security/apparmor: " Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 13:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 Stephen Smalley
2019-06-18 13:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 15:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-25 16:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20190620221954.GF20474@linux.intel.com \
--to=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
--cc=cedric.xing@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=greg@enjellic.com \
--cc=jethro@fortanix.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
--cc=william.c.roberts@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox