From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
To: <mic@digikod.net>, <gnoack@google.com>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
<jmorris@namei.org>, <serge@hallyn.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>,
<skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: [PATCH v2 -next 10/18] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2026 20:54:16 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261015125425.3246251-11-caixinchen1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261015125425.3246251-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com>
The inode_getattr hook receives a struct path, so rename it to
path_getattr to follow the path_* naming convention used for the
other hooks that take a struct path (path_chmod, path_chown, ...).
Rename the security_inode_getattr() inline wrapper to
security_path_getattr() and the SELinux, Smack, AppArmor, TOMOYO and
Landlock implementations accordingly.
BPF programs attach to LSM hooks and to the security_*() wrappers by
name ("lsm/inode_getattr", "fentry/security_inode_getattr"), so
update the BPF selftests to the new names, along with the d_path BTF
allowlist in kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c.
Assisted-by: opencode: glm-5.3
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
---
fs/stat.c | 4 ++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++--
kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 2 +-
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 ++--
security/landlock/fs.c | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 6 +++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++---
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 6 +++---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/d_path.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path.c | 2 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path_check_rdonly_mem.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path_check_types.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c | 2 +-
16 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c
index a2e63c6c45b7..06e4a5dcea57 100644
--- a/fs/stat.c
+++ b/fs/stat.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(generic_fill_statx_atomic_writes);
* @request_mask: STATX_xxx flags indicating what the caller wants
* @query_flags: Query mode (AT_STATX_SYNC_TYPE)
*
- * Get attributes without calling security_inode_getattr.
+ * Get attributes without calling security_path_getattr.
*
* Currently the only caller other than vfs_getattr is internal to the
* filehandle lookup code, which uses only the inode number and returns no
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ int vfs_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
{
int retval;
- retval = security_inode_getattr(path);
+ retval = security_path_getattr(path);
if (unlikely(retval))
return retval;
return vfs_getattr_nosec(path, stat, request_mask, query_flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 25655b3eca71..ea1df85b5fd4 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, const struct path *path,
struct iattr *attr)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getattr, const struct path *path)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_getattr, const struct path *path)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_xattr_skipcap, const char *name)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setxattr, const struct path *path,
const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 633c8225524a..630a19a63291 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode
int security_inode_setattr(const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr);
void security_inode_post_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
int ia_valid);
-int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path);
+int security_path_getattr(const struct path *path);
int security_inode_setxattr(const struct path *path,
const char *name, const void *value,
size_t size, int flags);
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ security_inode_post_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry
int ia_valid)
{ }
-static inline int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+static inline int security_path_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
index f58dce888ff4..293f849879e2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_receive)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_create)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_free_security)
-BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_getattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_getattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_getxattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_mknod)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_need_killpriv)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 195f78db9bda..6f3664718842 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, const struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz)
BTF_SET_START(btf_allowlist_d_path)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
BTF_ID(func, security_file_permission)
-BTF_ID(func, security_inode_getattr)
+BTF_ID(func, security_path_getattr)
BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 9d572cf8486b..a2886f6ece78 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
}
-static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+static int apparmor_path_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
}
@@ -1785,7 +1785,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_getattr, apparmor_path_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index f56277c67a24..439a6159e24a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
}
-static int hook_inode_getattr(const struct path *const path)
+static int hook_path_getattr(const struct path *const path)
{
return current_check_access_path(path,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA);
@@ -2215,7 +2215,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, hook_inode_getattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_getattr, hook_path_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_file_getattr, hook_inode_file_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, hook_inode_setattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_file_setattr, hook_inode_file_setattr),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 10b331749889..c7cb96db7299 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1926,18 +1926,18 @@ void security_inode_post_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *d
}
/**
- * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed
+ * security_path_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed
* @path: file
*
* Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+int security_path_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
return 0;
- return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, path);
+ return call_int_hook(path_getattr, path);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0a841777fe12..93e3d9223e34 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3376,7 +3376,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(const struct path *path,
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
}
-static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+static int selinux_path_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
@@ -7756,7 +7756,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_getattr, selinux_path_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 8cfe5d522246..43b9877d6a00 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1293,12 +1293,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(const struct path *path,
}
/**
- * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
+ * smack_path_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
* @path: path to extract the info from
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+static int smack_path_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
@@ -5179,7 +5179,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_getattr, smack_path_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, smack_inode_xattr_skipcap),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index c66e02ed8ee3..901eefa84ea6 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
/**
- * tomoyo_inode_getattr - Target for security_inode_getattr().
+ * tomoyo_path_getattr - Target for security_path_getattr().
*
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
-static int tomoyo_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+static int tomoyo_path_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_GETATTR, path, NULL);
}
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, tomoyo_path_mknod),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, tomoyo_path_link),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, tomoyo_path_rename),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, tomoyo_inode_getattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_getattr, tomoyo_path_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, tomoyo_file_ioctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, tomoyo_file_ioctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, tomoyo_path_chmod),
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/d_path.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/d_path.c
index 1a2a2f1abf03..9877c098e5c1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/d_path.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/d_path.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static void test_d_path_basic(void)
if (CHECK(!bss->called_stat,
"stat",
- "trampoline for security_inode_getattr was not called\n"))
+ "trampoline for security_path_getattr was not called\n"))
goto cleanup;
if (CHECK(!bss->called_close,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path.c
index 561b2f861808..b97c203e3992 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ int called_stat = 0;
int called_close = 0;
int path_match_fallocate = 0;
-SEC("fentry/security_inode_getattr")
+SEC("fentry/security_path_getattr")
int BPF_PROG(prog_stat, struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
__u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
{
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path_check_rdonly_mem.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path_check_rdonly_mem.c
index 27c27cff6a3a..5e0e3d4828d7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path_check_rdonly_mem.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path_check_rdonly_mem.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
extern const int bpf_prog_active __ksym;
-SEC("fentry/security_inode_getattr")
+SEC("fentry/security_path_getattr")
int BPF_PROG(d_path_check_rdonly_mem, struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
__u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
{
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path_check_types.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path_check_types.c
index 7e02b7361307..fba3d527b4df 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path_check_types.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_d_path_check_types.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ struct {
__uint(max_entries, 1 << 12);
} ringbuf SEC(".maps");
-SEC("fentry/security_inode_getattr")
+SEC("fentry/security_path_getattr")
int BPF_PROG(d_path_check_rdonly_mem, struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
__u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
{
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c
index 55398c04290a..55e292a41d30 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(get_task_exe_file_and_put_kfunc_from_argument,
return 0;
}
-SEC("lsm.s/inode_getattr")
+SEC("lsm.s/path_getattr")
__success
int BPF_PROG(path_d_path_from_path_argument, struct path *path)
{
--
2.18.0.huawei.25
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-15 12:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-15 12:54 [PATCH v2 -next 00/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 01/18] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 02/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 03/18] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 04/18] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:37 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 05/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setattr hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 06/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 07/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 08/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode fileattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 09/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:37 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` Cai Xinchen [this message]
2026-10-15 12:32 ` [PATCH v2 -next 10/18] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 11/18] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 12/18] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 13/18] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:39 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 14/18] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 15/18] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 16/18] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 17/18] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 18/18] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:39 ` sashiko-bot
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