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From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
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Subject: [PATCH v2 -next 13/18] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2026 20:54:19 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261015125425.3246251-14-caixinchen1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261015125425.3246251-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com>

The inode_set_acl, inode_get_acl and inode_remove_acl hooks receive a
struct path, so rename them to path_set_acl, path_get_acl and
path_remove_acl to follow the path_* naming convention used for the
other hooks that take a struct path (path_chmod, path_chown, ...).
Rename the security_inode_*_acl() inline wrappers to
security_path_*_acl() and the SELinux, Smack, EVM, IMA and Landlock
implementations accordingly.  The inode_post_set_acl and
inode_post_remove_acl notification hooks still take a dentry and keep
their names.

Assisted-by: opencode: glm-5.3
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
---
 fs/posix_acl.c                        |  6 +++---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h         |  6 +++---
 include/linux/security.h              | 12 ++++++------
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c     | 16 ++++++++--------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 +++++-----
 security/landlock/fs.c                | 12 ++++++------
 security/security.c                   | 18 +++++++++---------
 security/selinux/hooks.c              | 12 ++++++------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c            | 18 +++++++++---------
 9 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index 75a90921a241..d4715c383e04 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ int vfs_set_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name,
 	if (error)
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 
-	error = security_inode_set_acl(path, acl_name, kacl);
+	error = security_path_set_acl(path, acl_name, kacl);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 
@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ struct posix_acl *vfs_get_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
 	 * The VFS has no restrictions on reading POSIX ACLs so calling
 	 * something like xattr_permission() isn't needed. Only LSMs get a say.
 	 */
-	error = security_inode_get_acl(path, acl_name);
+	error = security_path_get_acl(path, acl_name);
 	if (error)
 		return ERR_PTR(error);
 
@@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
 	if (error)
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 
-	error = security_inode_remove_acl(path, acl_name);
+	error = security_path_remove_acl(path, acl_name);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 83b04d64a906..867a43e5c771 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -162,13 +162,13 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_setattr, const struct path *path,
 	 struct file_kattr *fa)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_file_getattr, const struct path *path,
 	 struct file_kattr *fa)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, const struct path *path,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_set_acl, const struct path *path,
 	 const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
 	 const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, const struct path *path,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_get_acl, const struct path *path,
 	 const char *acl_name)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, const struct path *path,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_remove_acl, const struct path *path,
 	 const char *acl_name)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_remove_acl, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 15a8bd6c16e5..d695f963fae0 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -435,12 +435,12 @@ int security_path_getattr(const struct path *path);
 int security_path_setxattr(const struct path *path,
 			    const char *name, const void *value,
 			    size_t size, int flags);
-int security_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+int security_path_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 			   const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl);
 void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
 				 struct posix_acl *kacl);
-int security_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name);
-int security_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name);
+int security_path_get_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name);
+int security_path_remove_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name);
 void security_inode_post_remove_acl(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 				    struct dentry *dentry,
 				    const char *acl_name);
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static inline int security_path_setxattr(const struct path *path,
 	return cap_inode_setxattr(path, name, value, size, flags);
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+static inline int security_path_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 					 const char *acl_name,
 					 struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
@@ -1030,13 +1030,13 @@ static inline void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
 					       struct posix_acl *kacl)
 { }
 
-static inline int security_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path,
+static inline int security_path_get_acl(const struct path *path,
 					 const char *acl_name)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
+static inline int security_path_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
 					    const char *acl_name)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 5d8fd1ee6a3b..5c2ce1d00fb8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  *
  * File: evm_main.c
  *	implements evm_path_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
- *	evm_path_removexattr, evm_verifyxattr, and evm_inode_set_acl.
+ *	evm_path_removexattr, evm_verifyxattr, and evm_path_set_acl.
  */
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 #endif
 
 /**
- * evm_inode_set_acl - protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * evm_path_set_acl - protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
  * @path: pointer to the affected object
  * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
  * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  *
  * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
  */
-static int evm_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+static int evm_path_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ static int evm_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 }
 
 /**
- * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * evm_path_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
  * @path: pointer to the affected object
  * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
  *
@@ -748,10 +748,10 @@ static int evm_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
  *
  * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
  */
-static int evm_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
+static int evm_path_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
 				const char *acl_name)
 {
-	return evm_inode_set_acl(path, acl_name, NULL);
+	return evm_path_set_acl(path, acl_name, NULL);
 }
 
 static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
@@ -1204,9 +1204,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, evm_inode_copy_up_xattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_setxattr, evm_path_setxattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_set_acl, evm_path_set_acl),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_remove_acl, evm_path_remove_acl),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_removexattr, evm_path_removexattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr),
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 3a6cb541ab32..f5068f881a24 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ static int ima_path_setxattr(const struct path *path,
 	return result;
 }
 
-static int ima_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+static int ima_path_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name))
@@ -818,18 +818,18 @@ static int ima_path_removexattr(const struct path *path,
 	return result;
 }
 
-static int ima_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
+static int ima_path_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
 				const char *acl_name)
 {
-	return ima_inode_set_acl(path, acl_name, NULL);
+	return ima_path_set_acl(path, acl_name, NULL);
 }
 
 static struct security_hook_list ima_appraise_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, ima_inode_post_setattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_setxattr, ima_path_setxattr),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, ima_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_set_acl, ima_path_set_acl),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_removexattr, ima_path_removexattr),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, ima_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_remove_acl, ima_path_remove_acl),
 };
 
 void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 33bca2d878c8..380a80247b6d 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ static int hook_path_removexattr(const struct path *const path,
 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA);
 }
 
-static int hook_inode_set_acl(const struct path *const path,
+static int hook_path_set_acl(const struct path *const path,
 			      const char *const acl_name,
 			      struct posix_acl *const kacl)
 {
@@ -1777,14 +1777,14 @@ static int hook_inode_set_acl(const struct path *const path,
 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA);
 }
 
-static int hook_inode_get_acl(const struct path *const path,
+static int hook_path_get_acl(const struct path *const path,
 			      const char *const acl_name)
 {
 	return current_check_access_path(path,
 					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA);
 }
 
-static int hook_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *const path,
+static int hook_path_remove_acl(const struct path *const path,
 				 const char *const acl_name)
 {
 	return current_check_access_path(path,
@@ -2223,9 +2223,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_getxattr, hook_path_getxattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_listxattr, hook_path_listxattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_removexattr, hook_path_removexattr),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, hook_inode_set_acl),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, hook_inode_get_acl),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, hook_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_set_acl, hook_path_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_get_acl, hook_path_get_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_remove_acl, hook_path_remove_acl),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_find, hook_unix_find),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, hook_file_alloc_security),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 98930f0b3b60..0a8ffc97d679 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ int security_path_setxattr(const struct path *path,
 }
 
 /**
- * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed
+ * security_path_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed
  * @path: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  * @kacl: acl struct
@@ -1996,12 +1996,12 @@ int security_path_setxattr(const struct path *path,
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+int security_path_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 			   const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, path, acl_name, kacl);
+	return call_int_hook(path_set_acl, path, acl_name, kacl);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2022,7 +2022,7 @@ void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
 }
 
 /**
- * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
+ * security_path_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
  * @path: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  *
@@ -2031,15 +2031,15 @@ void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
+int security_path_get_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, path, acl_name);
+	return call_int_hook(path_get_acl, path, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed
+ * security_path_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed
  * @path: file
  * @acl_name: acl name
  *
@@ -2048,11 +2048,11 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
+int security_path_remove_acl(const struct path *path, const char *acl_name)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, path, acl_name);
+	return call_int_hook(path_remove_acl, path, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9b2e0f38bf2c..e1d3dc4f063f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3505,19 +3505,19 @@ static int selinux_path_setxattr(const struct path *path,
 			    &ad);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+static int selinux_path_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 				 const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path,
+static int selinux_path_get_acl(const struct path *path,
 				 const char *acl_name)
 {
 	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
+static int selinux_path_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
 				    const char *acl_name)
 {
 	return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
@@ -7765,9 +7765,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_removexattr, selinux_path_removexattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_file_getattr, selinux_inode_file_getattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_file_setattr, selinux_inode_file_setattr),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_set_acl, selinux_path_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_get_acl, selinux_path_get_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_remove_acl, selinux_path_remove_acl),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 95799afbb5c9..1a1e9f11939e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ static int smack_path_removexattr(const struct path *path,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_inode_set_acl - Smack check for setting posix acls
+ * smack_path_set_acl - Smack check for setting posix acls
  * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
  * @dentry: the object
  * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ static int smack_path_removexattr(const struct path *path,
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
+static int smack_path_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 			       const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -1563,13 +1563,13 @@ static int smack_inode_set_acl(const struct path *path,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_inode_get_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
+ * smack_path_get_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
  * @path: the object
  * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path,
+static int smack_path_get_acl(const struct path *path,
 			       const char *acl_name)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -1584,13 +1584,13 @@ static int smack_inode_get_acl(const struct path *path,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_inode_remove_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
+ * smack_path_remove_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
  * @path: the object
  * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
+static int smack_path_remove_acl(const struct path *path,
 				  const char *acl_name)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -5185,9 +5185,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_getxattr, smack_path_getxattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_removexattr, smack_path_removexattr),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, smack_inode_set_acl),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, smack_inode_get_acl),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, smack_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_set_acl, smack_path_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_get_acl, smack_path_get_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_remove_acl, smack_path_remove_acl),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
-- 
2.18.0.huawei.25


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-15 12:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-15 12:54 [PATCH v2 -next 00/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 01/18] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 02/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 03/18] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 04/18] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 05/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setattr hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:32   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 06/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 07/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 08/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode fileattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 09/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 10/18] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:32   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 11/18] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 12/18] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` Cai Xinchen [this message]
2026-10-15 12:39   ` [PATCH v2 -next 13/18] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 14/18] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 15/18] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 16/18] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:46   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 17/18] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v2 -next 18/18] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-15 12:39   ` sashiko-bot

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