From: Gabriele Monaco <gmonaco@redhat.com>
To: wen.yang@linux.dev
Cc: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 9/9] selftests/ftrace: Walk up to find test.d/functions when a subdirectory is passed
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2026 12:08:25 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f70d634ff65d6b1bd61c4ae517cf522881a23c61.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260820165819.5CCC71F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org>
On Thu, 2026-08-20 at 16:58 +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> > + if [ -n "$OPT_TEST_DIR" ]; then
> > + # Walk up from OPT_TEST_DIR to find the nearest ancestor that contains
> > + # test.d/functions. This allows a monitor subdirectory (e.g.
> > + # verification/test.d/tlob/) to be passed directly without placing a
> > + # dummy functions shim in each new subdirectory.
> > + # Security: only walk within directories owned by root or the current
> > user
> > + # to prevent sourcing a functions file planted in a world-writable
> > ancestor.
> > + dir=$(realpath "$OPT_TEST_DIR" 2>/dev/null || echo "$OPT_TEST_DIR")
> > + while [ "$dir" != "/" ] && [ "$dir" != "//" ]; do
> > + if [ -f "$dir/test.d/functions" ]; then
> > + # Verify the directory is not world-writable to prevent LPE.
> > + dirperms=$(stat -c "%a" "$dir" 2>/dev/null || stat -f "%Lp" "$dir"
> > 2>/dev/null)
> > + case "$dirperms" in
> > + *2|*3|*6|*7) ;; # world-writable: skip this candidate
> > + *)
> > + TOP_DIR=$dir
>
> [Severity: High]
> Does this logic actually check directory ownership as mentioned in the
> comments?
>
> It appears the code only checks if the directory is world-writable, but omits
> validating that it is owned by root or the current user. An attacker could
> potentially create a directory with standard 0755 permissions, plant a
> malicious test.d/functions script, and if a privileged user or automated test
> harness runs ftracetest against a subdirectory, the script would traverse up
> and source the payload.
I'm wondering if this is a broad example of root can shoot themselves in the
foot.
This is a selftest run by a root user, I believe they are responsible to
validate what's running isn't malicious.
I cannot picture a case where a path is commonly world writable here. I would
keep things simple and perhaps walk up at a maximum of 4-5 levels
(tools/testing/selftests/verification/test.d), to kinda make sure we never go
out of the repository.
You cannot really rely on git (may run from a tarball) or other static methods,
but I believe 4-5 levels up will cover us just fine.
In my opinion all this stat/dirperms thing is rarely useful, you could just
write the concern in a *brief* comment, saying we trust 4-5 level ups are still
in the repo and we trust the repo, just to make AIs happy.
What do you think?
Gabriele
> Additionally, if the stat command fails for any reason, dirperms will be
> empty.
> Would an empty string match the *) fallback case and cause the script to
> silently
> fail open, accepting even a world-writable directory?
>
> > + TEST_DIR=$TOP_DIR/test.d
> > + break
> > + ;;
> > + esac
> > + fi
> > + dir=$(dirname "$dir")
> > + done
> > fi
> > }
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-24 10:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-20 16:45 [PATCH v6 0/9] rv: Add task latency over budget RV monitor wen.yang
2026-08-20 16:45 ` [PATCH v6 1/9] rv: Introduce DA_MON_ALLOCATION_STRATEGY wen.yang
2026-08-20 16:45 ` [PATCH v6 2/9] rv: Add generic uprobe infrastructure for RV monitors wen.yang
2026-08-20 16:59 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 16:45 ` [PATCH v6 3/9] rv: Add tlob model DOT file wen.yang
2026-08-20 16:53 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 16:45 ` [PATCH v6 4/9] rv: Fix ha_invariant_passed_ns silent bypass of invariant check wen.yang
2026-08-20 16:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 16:45 ` [PATCH v6 5/9] rv: Make da_monitor_reset_hook and EVENT_NONE_LBL overridable wen.yang
2026-08-20 16:59 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 16:45 ` [PATCH v6 6/9] rv: Add tlob hybrid automaton monitor wen.yang
2026-08-20 17:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 16:45 ` [PATCH v6 7/9] rv: Add KUnit tests for the tlob monitor wen.yang
2026-08-20 16:45 ` [PATCH v6 8/9] selftests/verification: Add tlob selftests wen.yang
2026-08-20 16:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-20 16:45 ` [PATCH v6 9/9] selftests/ftrace: Walk up to find test.d/functions when a subdirectory is passed wen.yang
2026-08-20 16:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-24 10:08 ` Gabriele Monaco [this message]
2026-08-24 19:35 ` Steven Rostedt
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