* [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe @ 2026-08-21 7:41 syzbot 2026-08-25 3:43 ` syzbot 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: syzbot @ 2026-08-21 7:41 UTC (permalink / raw) To: gregkh, heikki.krogerus, linux-kernel, linux-usb, syzkaller-bugs Hello, syzbot found the following issue on: HEAD commit: 8d3ae59288f1 Linux 7.2 git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=14ea0679580000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=a0fdc3b566746377 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1a01783ea233350598b5 compiler: gcc (Debian 14.2.0-19) 14.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.44 Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet. Downloadable assets: disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/571b2fa98290/disk-8d3ae592.raw.xz vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5758aecc42aa/vmlinux-8d3ae592.xz kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/f9306cccc3b8/bzImage-8d3ae592.xz IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: syzbot+1a01783ea233350598b5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6187 Comm: syz.5.107 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/16/2026 RIP: 0010:wcove_typec_probe+0xdb/0x780 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/wcove.c:621 Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 4d 89 af 88 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 7f 05 00 00 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 8b 6d 08 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000594fb18 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88801e371000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff888035b4d483 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff90281e28 R13: ffff88801e371010 R14: ffff888035b4d4c0 R15: ffff888035b4d438 FS: 00007f3b03bde6c0(0000) GS:ffff888123de1000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000110c3be387 CR3: 0000000013036000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> platform_probe+0x106/0x1d0 drivers/base/platform.c:1439 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:628 [inline] really_probe+0x241/0xa60 drivers/base/dd.c:706 __driver_probe_device+0x20e/0x450 drivers/base/dd.c:868 device_driver_attach+0xd1/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:1203 bind_store+0xf4/0x190 drivers/base/bus.c:267 drv_attr_store+0x74/0xb0 drivers/base/bus.c:125 sysfs_kf_write+0xf2/0x150 fs/sysfs/file.c:145 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3e0/0x5f0 fs/kernfs/file.c:345 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline] vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687 ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f3b02d9e0d9 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f3b03bde028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3b03025fa0 RCX: 00007f3b02d9e0d9 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000200000000200 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f3b02e35024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f3b03026038 R14: 00007f3b03025fa0 R15: 00007ffd49d97768 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:wcove_typec_probe+0xdb/0x780 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/wcove.c:621 Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 4d 89 af 88 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 7f 05 00 00 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 8b 6d 08 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000594fb18 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88801e371000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff888035b4d483 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff90281e28 R13: ffff88801e371010 R14: ffff888035b4d4c0 R15: ffff888035b4d438 FS: 00007f3b03bde6c0(0000) GS:ffff888123ee1000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000562bed817760 CR3: 0000000013036000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 ---------------- Code disassembly (best guess): 0: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx 4: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) 8: 0f 85 af 05 00 00 jne 0x5bd e: 48 8d 7d 08 lea 0x8(%rbp),%rdi 12: 4d 89 af 88 00 00 00 mov %r13,0x88(%r15) 19: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax 20: fc ff df 23: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx 26: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx * 2a: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) <-- trapping instruction 2e: 0f 85 7f 05 00 00 jne 0x5b3 34: 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 lea 0x90(%r15),%rdi 3b: 48 8b 6d 08 mov 0x8(%rbp),%rbp 3f: 48 rex.W --- This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com. syzbot will keep track of this issue. See: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot. If the report is already addressed, let syzbot know by replying with: #syz fix: exact-commit-title If you want to overwrite report's subsystems, reply with: #syz set subsystems: new-subsystem (See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard) If the report is a duplicate of another one, reply with: #syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report If you want to undo deduplication, reply with: #syz undup ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe 2026-08-21 7:41 [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe syzbot @ 2026-08-25 3:43 ` syzbot 2026-08-25 5:11 ` Greg KH 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: syzbot @ 2026-08-25 3:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: gregkh, heikki.krogerus, jeffinphilip14, linux-kernel, linux-usb, mika.westerberg, stable, syzkaller-bugs syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: HEAD commit: 66498c75b4f8 Merge tag 'dmaengine-7.3-rc1' of git://git.ke.. git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1253719e580000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=3e64b1bf01d830ed dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1a01783ea233350598b5 compiler: gcc (Debian 14.2.0-19) 14.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.44 userspace arch: i386 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=17491979580000 Downloadable assets: disk image (non-bootable): https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/d900f083ada3/non_bootable_disk-66498c75.raw.xz vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5ce4685e13ba/vmlinux-66498c75.xz kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/6a32d8e997a7/bzImage-66498c75.xz IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: syzbot+1a01783ea233350598b5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5912 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:wcove_typec_probe+0xdb/0x780 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/wcove.c:621 Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 4d 89 af 88 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 7f 05 00 00 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 8b 6d 08 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc90002f6faf8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880226c1000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff888014243883 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffffffff904a7ea8 R13: ffff8880226c1010 R14: ffff8880142438c0 R15: ffff888014243838 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888096982000(0063) knlGS:00000000f67e5b40 CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000032e24008 CR3: 000000004e2f1000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> platform_probe+0x106/0x1d0 drivers/base/platform.c:1507 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:628 [inline] really_probe+0x241/0xa60 drivers/base/dd.c:706 __driver_probe_device+0x210/0x460 drivers/base/dd.c:868 device_driver_attach+0xd1/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:1203 bind_store+0xf4/0x190 drivers/base/bus.c:267 drv_attr_store+0x74/0xb0 drivers/base/bus.c:125 sysfs_kf_write+0xf2/0x150 fs/sysfs/file.c:145 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3e0/0x5f0 fs/kernfs/file.c:345 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline] vfs_write+0x6af/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687 ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:79 [inline] __do_fast_syscall_32+0x13a/0x8b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:291 do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x70 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:316 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e RIP: 0023:0xf6feefec Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xf6feefc2. RSP: 002b:00000000f67e550c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000004 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000080000400 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:wcove_typec_probe+0xdb/0x780 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/wcove.c:621 Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 4d 89 af 88 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 7f 05 00 00 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 8b 6d 08 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc90002f6faf8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880226c1000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff888014243883 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffffffff904a7ea8 R13: ffff8880226c1010 R14: ffff8880142438c0 R15: ffff888014243838 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888096a82000(0063) knlGS:00000000f67e5b40 CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f45dd833708 CR3: 000000004e2f1000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 ---------------- Code disassembly (best guess): 0: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx 4: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) 8: 0f 85 af 05 00 00 jne 0x5bd e: 48 8d 7d 08 lea 0x8(%rbp),%rdi 12: 4d 89 af 88 00 00 00 mov %r13,0x88(%r15) 19: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax 20: fc ff df 23: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx 26: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx * 2a: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) <-- trapping instruction 2e: 0f 85 7f 05 00 00 jne 0x5b3 34: 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 lea 0x90(%r15),%rdi 3b: 48 8b 6d 08 mov 0x8(%rbp),%rbp 3f: 48 rex.W --- If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with: #syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe 2026-08-25 3:43 ` syzbot @ 2026-08-25 5:11 ` Greg KH 2026-08-25 5:20 ` Jeffin Philip 2026-08-25 9:04 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 0 siblings, 2 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Greg KH @ 2026-08-25 5:11 UTC (permalink / raw) To: syzbot Cc: heikki.krogerus, jeffinphilip14, linux-kernel, linux-usb, mika.westerberg, stable, syzkaller-bugs On Mon, Aug 24, 2026 at 08:43:40PM -0700, syzbot wrote: > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: > > HEAD commit: 66498c75b4f8 Merge tag 'dmaengine-7.3-rc1' of git://git.ke.. > git tree: upstream > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1253719e580000 > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=3e64b1bf01d830ed > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1a01783ea233350598b5 > compiler: gcc (Debian 14.2.0-19) 14.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.44 > userspace arch: i386 > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=17491979580000 > > Downloadable assets: > disk image (non-bootable): https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/d900f083ada3/non_bootable_disk-66498c75.raw.xz > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5ce4685e13ba/vmlinux-66498c75.xz > kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/6a32d8e997a7/bzImage-66498c75.xz > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > Reported-by: syzbot+1a01783ea233350598b5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] > CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5912 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 > RIP: 0010:wcove_typec_probe+0xdb/0x780 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/wcove.c:621 > Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 4d 89 af 88 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 7f 05 00 00 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 8b 6d 08 48 > RSP: 0018:ffffc90002f6faf8 EFLAGS: 00010202 > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880226c1000 RCX: 0000000000000000 > RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000008 > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: ffff888014243883 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffffffff904a7ea8 > R13: ffff8880226c1010 R14: ffff8880142438c0 R15: ffff888014243838 > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888096982000(0063) knlGS:00000000f67e5b40 > CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 0000000032e24008 CR3: 000000004e2f1000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > platform_probe+0x106/0x1d0 drivers/base/platform.c:1507 > call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:628 [inline] > really_probe+0x241/0xa60 drivers/base/dd.c:706 > __driver_probe_device+0x210/0x460 drivers/base/dd.c:868 > device_driver_attach+0xd1/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:1203 > bind_store+0xf4/0x190 drivers/base/bus.c:267 Please do not think that this is a valid path for syzbot to be fuzzing... ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe 2026-08-25 5:11 ` Greg KH @ 2026-08-25 5:20 ` Jeffin Philip 2026-08-25 9:04 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 1 sibling, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Jeffin Philip @ 2026-08-25 5:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: gregkh Cc: heikki.krogerus, jeffinphilip14, linux-kernel, linux-usb, mika.westerberg, stable, syzbot+1a01783ea233350598b5, syzkaller-bugs [-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --] [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain; charset=y, Size: 155 bytes --] On Tue, Aug 25, 2026, 10:42 AM, Greg KH wrote: >Please do not think that this is a valid path for syzbot to be >fuzzing... Understood Thanks, Jeffin. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe 2026-08-25 5:11 ` Greg KH 2026-08-25 5:20 ` Jeffin Philip @ 2026-08-25 9:04 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 2026-08-25 9:07 ` Greg KH 1 sibling, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Aleksandr Nogikh @ 2026-08-25 9:04 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Greg KH Cc: syzbot, heikki.krogerus, jeffinphilip14, linux-kernel, linux-usb, mika.westerberg, stable, syzkaller-bugs, syzkaller Hi Greg, On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 7:12 AM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > On Mon, Aug 24, 2026 at 08:43:40PM -0700, syzbot wrote: > > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: > > > > HEAD commit: 66498c75b4f8 Merge tag 'dmaengine-7.3-rc1' of git://git.ke.. > > git tree: upstream > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1253719e580000 > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=3e64b1bf01d830ed > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1a01783ea233350598b5 > > compiler: gcc (Debian 14.2.0-19) 14.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.44 > > userspace arch: i386 > > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=17491979580000 > > > > Downloadable assets: > > disk image (non-bootable): https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/d900f083ada3/non_bootable_disk-66498c75.raw.xz > > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5ce4685e13ba/vmlinux-66498c75.xz > > kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/6a32d8e997a7/bzImage-66498c75.xz > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > > Reported-by: syzbot+1a01783ea233350598b5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > > > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI > > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] > > CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5912 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) > > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 > > RIP: 0010:wcove_typec_probe+0xdb/0x780 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/wcove.c:621 > > Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 4d 89 af 88 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 7f 05 00 00 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 8b 6d 08 48 > > RSP: 0018:ffffc90002f6faf8 EFLAGS: 00010202 > > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880226c1000 RCX: 0000000000000000 > > RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000008 > > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 > > R10: ffff888014243883 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffffffff904a7ea8 > > R13: ffff8880226c1010 R14: ffff8880142438c0 R15: ffff888014243838 > > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888096982000(0063) knlGS:00000000f67e5b40 > > CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 > > CR2: 0000000032e24008 CR3: 000000004e2f1000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 > > Call Trace: > > <TASK> > > platform_probe+0x106/0x1d0 drivers/base/platform.c:1507 > > call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:628 [inline] > > really_probe+0x241/0xa60 drivers/base/dd.c:706 > > __driver_probe_device+0x210/0x460 drivers/base/dd.c:868 > > device_driver_attach+0xd1/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:1203 > > bind_store+0xf4/0x190 drivers/base/bus.c:267 > > Please do not think that this is a valid path for syzbot to be > fuzzing... > Can you please elaborate on this? Do you mean driver binding sysfs interface in general or something more specific? -- Aleksandr ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe 2026-08-25 9:04 ` Aleksandr Nogikh @ 2026-08-25 9:07 ` Greg KH 2026-08-26 13:26 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Greg KH @ 2026-08-25 9:07 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Aleksandr Nogikh Cc: syzbot, heikki.krogerus, jeffinphilip14, linux-kernel, linux-usb, mika.westerberg, stable, syzkaller-bugs, syzkaller On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 11:04:54AM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: > Hi Greg, > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 7:12 AM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Aug 24, 2026 at 08:43:40PM -0700, syzbot wrote: > > > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: > > > > > > HEAD commit: 66498c75b4f8 Merge tag 'dmaengine-7.3-rc1' of git://git.ke.. > > > git tree: upstream > > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1253719e580000 > > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=3e64b1bf01d830ed > > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1a01783ea233350598b5 > > > compiler: gcc (Debian 14.2.0-19) 14.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.44 > > > userspace arch: i386 > > > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=17491979580000 > > > > > > Downloadable assets: > > > disk image (non-bootable): https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/d900f083ada3/non_bootable_disk-66498c75.raw.xz > > > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5ce4685e13ba/vmlinux-66498c75.xz > > > kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/6a32d8e997a7/bzImage-66498c75.xz > > > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > > > Reported-by: syzbot+1a01783ea233350598b5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > > > > > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI > > > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] > > > CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5912 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) > > > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 > > > RIP: 0010:wcove_typec_probe+0xdb/0x780 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/wcove.c:621 > > > Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 4d 89 af 88 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 7f 05 00 00 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 8b 6d 08 48 > > > RSP: 0018:ffffc90002f6faf8 EFLAGS: 00010202 > > > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880226c1000 RCX: 0000000000000000 > > > RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000008 > > > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 > > > R10: ffff888014243883 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffffffff904a7ea8 > > > R13: ffff8880226c1010 R14: ffff8880142438c0 R15: ffff888014243838 > > > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888096982000(0063) knlGS:00000000f67e5b40 > > > CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 > > > CR2: 0000000032e24008 CR3: 000000004e2f1000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 > > > Call Trace: > > > <TASK> > > > platform_probe+0x106/0x1d0 drivers/base/platform.c:1507 > > > call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:628 [inline] > > > really_probe+0x241/0xa60 drivers/base/dd.c:706 > > > __driver_probe_device+0x210/0x460 drivers/base/dd.c:868 > > > device_driver_attach+0xd1/0x220 drivers/base/dd.c:1203 > > > bind_store+0xf4/0x190 drivers/base/bus.c:267 > > > > Please do not think that this is a valid path for syzbot to be > > fuzzing... > > > > Can you please elaborate on this? > Do you mean driver binding sysfs interface in general or something > more specific? That is the specific thing, don't have syzbot do random bind/unbind calls, having it attempt to bind any random driver to any random hardware device. That's not how bind/unbind is supposed to work at all, it's for developers who "know what they are doing" and you get to keep the broken system if you mess it up. Same for unbind. This is a root-only api for that reason. thanks, greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe 2026-08-25 9:07 ` Greg KH @ 2026-08-26 13:26 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 2026-08-26 14:11 ` Greg KH 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Aleksandr Nogikh @ 2026-08-26 13:26 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Greg KH Cc: syzbot, heikki.krogerus, jeffinphilip14, linux-kernel, linux-usb, mika.westerberg, stable, syzkaller-bugs, syzkaller On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 11:07 AM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 11:04:54AM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: > > Hi Greg, > > > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 7:12 AM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > < .. > > > > > > > Please do not think that this is a valid path for syzbot to be > > > fuzzing... > > > > > > > Can you please elaborate on this? > > Do you mean driver binding sysfs interface in general or something > > more specific? > > That is the specific thing, don't have syzbot do random bind/unbind > calls, having it attempt to bind any random driver to any random > hardware device. That's not how bind/unbind is supposed to work at all, > it's for developers who "know what they are doing" and you get to keep > the broken system if you mess it up. > > Same for unbind. > > This is a root-only api for that reason. Thanks for clarifying! Some context from the syzkaller side: Restricting the fuzzer is always tricky, especially when the problematic operation is just opening a file and writing to it. We normally constrain openat to: 1) An allowlist of safe absolute paths (so it won't open /dev/mem, etc.), blocking any other path starting with '/'. 2) Relative paths under CWD (so we can still fuzz normal file operations). Here the problem is that one can mount sysfs under CWD, which leaves syzkaller full access to everything inside it. Tightening the access to /bind, /unbind, /driver_override sounds reasonable, but trying to catch all workarounds purely in userspace (e.g., creating symlinks to these paths before opening them) will easily turn into a whack-a-mole. Would you be open to adding some kernel config option or a boot parameter to disable manual sysfs driver bind/unbind and driver_override? We had a similar problem with writing to a block device while a filesystem was being mounted, which was perfectly solved by CONFIG_BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED. Best regards, Aleksandr > > thanks, > > greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe 2026-08-26 13:26 ` Aleksandr Nogikh @ 2026-08-26 14:11 ` Greg KH 2026-08-26 14:32 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Greg KH @ 2026-08-26 14:11 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Aleksandr Nogikh Cc: syzbot, heikki.krogerus, jeffinphilip14, linux-kernel, linux-usb, mika.westerberg, stable, syzkaller-bugs, syzkaller On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 03:26:23PM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 11:07 AM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 11:04:54AM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: > > > Hi Greg, > > > > > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 7:12 AM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > > < .. > > > > > > > > > Please do not think that this is a valid path for syzbot to be > > > > fuzzing... > > > > > > > > > > Can you please elaborate on this? > > > Do you mean driver binding sysfs interface in general or something > > > more specific? > > > > That is the specific thing, don't have syzbot do random bind/unbind > > calls, having it attempt to bind any random driver to any random > > hardware device. That's not how bind/unbind is supposed to work at all, > > it's for developers who "know what they are doing" and you get to keep > > the broken system if you mess it up. > > > > Same for unbind. > > > > This is a root-only api for that reason. > > Thanks for clarifying! > > Some context from the syzkaller side: > Restricting the fuzzer is always tricky, especially when the > problematic operation is just opening a file and writing to it. > > We normally constrain openat to: > 1) An allowlist of safe absolute paths (so it won't open /dev/mem, > etc.), blocking any other path starting with '/'. > 2) Relative paths under CWD (so we can still fuzz normal file operations). > > Here the problem is that one can mount sysfs under CWD, which leaves > syzkaller full access to everything inside it. > > Tightening the access to /bind, /unbind, /driver_override sounds > reasonable, but trying to catch all workarounds purely in userspace > (e.g., creating symlinks to these paths before opening them) will > easily turn into a whack-a-mole. > > Would you be open to adding some kernel config option or a boot > parameter to disable manual sysfs driver bind/unbind and > driver_override? We had a similar problem with writing to a block > device while a filesystem was being mounted, which was perfectly > solved by CONFIG_BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED. I've submitted a patch to taint the kernel if these files are written to, so that should "catch" syzbot and let you know to ignore these reports if it runs into them: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260826-bind_taint-v1-0-52b05f4a965c@linuxfoundation.org Is that sufficient? If not, no, I really don't want to make a kernel config option just for this type of thing. thanks, greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe 2026-08-26 14:11 ` Greg KH @ 2026-08-26 14:32 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 2026-08-26 15:23 ` Greg KH 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Aleksandr Nogikh @ 2026-08-26 14:32 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Greg KH Cc: syzbot, heikki.krogerus, jeffinphilip14, linux-kernel, linux-usb, mika.westerberg, stable, syzkaller-bugs, syzkaller On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 4:11 PM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 03:26:23PM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 11:07 AM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 11:04:54AM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: > > > > Hi Greg, > > > > > > > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 7:12 AM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > > > > < .. > > > > > > > > > > > Please do not think that this is a valid path for syzbot to be > > > > > fuzzing... > > > > > > > > > > > > > Can you please elaborate on this? > > > > Do you mean driver binding sysfs interface in general or something > > > > more specific? > > > > > > That is the specific thing, don't have syzbot do random bind/unbind > > > calls, having it attempt to bind any random driver to any random > > > hardware device. That's not how bind/unbind is supposed to work at all, > > > it's for developers who "know what they are doing" and you get to keep > > > the broken system if you mess it up. > > > > > > Same for unbind. > > > > > > This is a root-only api for that reason. > > > > Thanks for clarifying! > > > > Some context from the syzkaller side: > > Restricting the fuzzer is always tricky, especially when the > > problematic operation is just opening a file and writing to it. > > > > We normally constrain openat to: > > 1) An allowlist of safe absolute paths (so it won't open /dev/mem, > > etc.), blocking any other path starting with '/'. > > 2) Relative paths under CWD (so we can still fuzz normal file operations). > > > > Here the problem is that one can mount sysfs under CWD, which leaves > > syzkaller full access to everything inside it. > > > > Tightening the access to /bind, /unbind, /driver_override sounds > > reasonable, but trying to catch all workarounds purely in userspace > > (e.g., creating symlinks to these paths before opening them) will > > easily turn into a whack-a-mole. > > > > Would you be open to adding some kernel config option or a boot > > parameter to disable manual sysfs driver bind/unbind and > > driver_override? We had a similar problem with writing to a block > > device while a filesystem was being mounted, which was perfectly > > solved by CONFIG_BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED. > > I've submitted a patch to taint the kernel if these files are written > to, so that should "catch" syzbot and let you know to ignore these > reports if it runs into them: > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260826-bind_taint-v1-0-52b05f4a965c@linuxfoundation.org > > Is that sufficient? Hmm, if we set `panic_on_taint=` with TAINT_FORCED_BIND and ignore such crashes, I think it could work, yes. > > If not, no, I really don't want to make a kernel config option just for > this type of thing. > > thanks, > > greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe 2026-08-26 14:32 ` Aleksandr Nogikh @ 2026-08-26 15:23 ` Greg KH 2026-08-27 9:08 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Greg KH @ 2026-08-26 15:23 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Aleksandr Nogikh Cc: syzbot, heikki.krogerus, jeffinphilip14, linux-kernel, linux-usb, mika.westerberg, stable, syzkaller-bugs, syzkaller On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 04:32:28PM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: > On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 4:11 PM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 03:26:23PM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: > > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 11:07 AM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 11:04:54AM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: > > > > > Hi Greg, > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Aug 25, 2026 at 7:12 AM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > > > > > > < .. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Please do not think that this is a valid path for syzbot to be > > > > > > fuzzing... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Can you please elaborate on this? > > > > > Do you mean driver binding sysfs interface in general or something > > > > > more specific? > > > > > > > > That is the specific thing, don't have syzbot do random bind/unbind > > > > calls, having it attempt to bind any random driver to any random > > > > hardware device. That's not how bind/unbind is supposed to work at all, > > > > it's for developers who "know what they are doing" and you get to keep > > > > the broken system if you mess it up. > > > > > > > > Same for unbind. > > > > > > > > This is a root-only api for that reason. > > > > > > Thanks for clarifying! > > > > > > Some context from the syzkaller side: > > > Restricting the fuzzer is always tricky, especially when the > > > problematic operation is just opening a file and writing to it. > > > > > > We normally constrain openat to: > > > 1) An allowlist of safe absolute paths (so it won't open /dev/mem, > > > etc.), blocking any other path starting with '/'. > > > 2) Relative paths under CWD (so we can still fuzz normal file operations). > > > > > > Here the problem is that one can mount sysfs under CWD, which leaves > > > syzkaller full access to everything inside it. > > > > > > Tightening the access to /bind, /unbind, /driver_override sounds > > > reasonable, but trying to catch all workarounds purely in userspace > > > (e.g., creating symlinks to these paths before opening them) will > > > easily turn into a whack-a-mole. > > > > > > Would you be open to adding some kernel config option or a boot > > > parameter to disable manual sysfs driver bind/unbind and > > > driver_override? We had a similar problem with writing to a block > > > device while a filesystem was being mounted, which was perfectly > > > solved by CONFIG_BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED. > > > > I've submitted a patch to taint the kernel if these files are written > > to, so that should "catch" syzbot and let you know to ignore these > > reports if it runs into them: > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260826-bind_taint-v1-0-52b05f4a965c@linuxfoundation.org > > > > Is that sufficient? > > Hmm, if we set `panic_on_taint=` with TAINT_FORCED_BIND and ignore > such crashes, I think it could work, yes. Great, thanks for confirming. I'll add that to the changelog just to highlight how this can be used. greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe 2026-08-26 15:23 ` Greg KH @ 2026-08-27 9:08 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Aleksandr Nogikh @ 2026-08-27 9:08 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Greg KH Cc: syzbot, heikki.krogerus, jeffinphilip14, linux-kernel, linux-usb, mika.westerberg, stable, syzkaller-bugs, syzkaller On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 5:23 PM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 04:32:28PM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 4:11 PM Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 03:26:23PM +0200, Aleksandr Nogikh wrote: < ... > > > > > > > > > Thanks for clarifying! > > > > > > > > Some context from the syzkaller side: > > > > Restricting the fuzzer is always tricky, especially when the > > > > problematic operation is just opening a file and writing to it. > > > > > > > > We normally constrain openat to: > > > > 1) An allowlist of safe absolute paths (so it won't open /dev/mem, > > > > etc.), blocking any other path starting with '/'. > > > > 2) Relative paths under CWD (so we can still fuzz normal file operations). > > > > > > > > Here the problem is that one can mount sysfs under CWD, which leaves > > > > syzkaller full access to everything inside it. > > > > > > > > Tightening the access to /bind, /unbind, /driver_override sounds > > > > reasonable, but trying to catch all workarounds purely in userspace > > > > (e.g., creating symlinks to these paths before opening them) will > > > > easily turn into a whack-a-mole. > > > > > > > > Would you be open to adding some kernel config option or a boot > > > > parameter to disable manual sysfs driver bind/unbind and > > > > driver_override? We had a similar problem with writing to a block > > > > device while a filesystem was being mounted, which was perfectly > > > > solved by CONFIG_BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED. > > > > > > I've submitted a patch to taint the kernel if these files are written > > > to, so that should "catch" syzbot and let you know to ignore these > > > reports if it runs into them: > > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260826-bind_taint-v1-0-52b05f4a965c@linuxfoundation.org > > > > > > Is that sufficient? > > > > Hmm, if we set `panic_on_taint=` with TAINT_FORCED_BIND and ignore > > such crashes, I think it could work, yes. > > Great, thanks for confirming. I'll add that to the changelog just to > highlight how this can be used. Thanks! FYI, I've just merged a mitigation into syzkaller: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/commit/c53a1b9ca227. It should prevent syzkaller from touching /bind, /unbind, etc., at least until it finds a workaround. Some more such bug reports are already in the reporting pipeline and may still reach LKML, but new ones should stop appearing. -- Aleksandr > > greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-08-27 9:09 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 11+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2026-08-21 7:41 [syzbot] [usb?] general protection fault in wcove_typec_probe syzbot 2026-08-25 3:43 ` syzbot 2026-08-25 5:11 ` Greg KH 2026-08-25 5:20 ` Jeffin Philip 2026-08-25 9:04 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 2026-08-25 9:07 ` Greg KH 2026-08-26 13:26 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 2026-08-26 14:11 ` Greg KH 2026-08-26 14:32 ` Aleksandr Nogikh 2026-08-26 15:23 ` Greg KH 2026-08-27 9:08 ` Aleksandr Nogikh
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