Re: [PATCH] wifi: mwifiex: validate HT/VHT capability and operation IE lengths

[Francesco Dolcini <francesco@dolcini.it>]

On Thu, Jul 09, 2026 at 12:08:00PM +0200, Doruk Tan Ozturk wrote:
> mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie() records raw pointers to the HT
> Capabilities, HT Operation, VHT Capabilities, VHT Operation, 20/40 BSS
> Coexistence and Operating Mode Notification elements taken straight out
> of a beacon/probe-response buffer, without checking that each element is
> long enough for the fixed-size structure that later consumers read. The
> buffer is a tight kmemdup() of the on-air IEs (beacon_buf_size ==
> ies->len), so a truncated element placed last leaves the stored pointer
> one past the end of the allocation.
> 
> At association time these pointers are dereferenced at fixed offsets
> regardless of the on-air length: mwifiex_cmd_append_11n_tlv() memcpy()s
> sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap) (26 bytes) from bcn_ht_cap and reads
> bcn_ht_oper->ht_param, and mwifiex_cmd_append_11ac_tlv() memcpy()s
> sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap) (12 bytes) from bcn_vht_cap and reads
> bcn_vht_oper->chan_width. A nearby AP (rogue / evil-twin; an open SSID
> needs no credentials) advertising a BSS with a truncated HT/VHT cap
> element therefore triggers a slab out-of-bounds read on the victim's
> association attempt. This out-of-bounds read is the primary issue.
> 
> For the HT-Cap copy the over-read bytes are additionally placed into the
> outgoing association request, so a limited amount of adjacent heap memory
> can leak over the air. In station mode this is small (single-digit
> bytes), because mwifiex_fill_cap_info() rewrites most of the copied
> HT-Cap before transmission; the leak is a secondary effect.
> 
> mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() has the same missing-length pattern: in uAP mode
> it reads two bytes of ieee80211_ht_cap.cap_info from a
> cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY) result in a client association
> request without checking the element length, a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds
> read (used only to select an A-MSDU size, not leaked).
> 
> Reject (skip) any of these elements whose payload is shorter than the
> structure the driver later reads, matching the length validation the
> FH/DS/CF/IBSS parameter-set cases in the same beacon parser already
> perform.
> 
> No dynamic reproducer: mwifiex is a fullmac driver for Marvell hardware
> with no mac80211_hwsim equivalent, so this was confirmed by source and
> structure-offset analysis only.

Were you able to test that this is not breaking the driver functionality?

> 
> Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
> 
> Fixes: 5e6e3a92b9a4 ("wireless: mwifiex: initial commit for Marvell mwifiex driver")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Assisted-by: 0sec:claude-opus-4-8
> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
> ---
>  drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 12 ++++++++++++
>  drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c |  2 +-
>  2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
> index 97c0ec3b822e..997e7e19525b 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
> @@ -1384,6 +1384,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter,
>  							bss_entry->beacon_buf);
>  			break;
>  		case WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY:
> +			if (element_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap))
> +				break;

why break and not return -EINVAL? (this in general, not only on this
specific one).