From: T T <tath76@yahoo.com>
To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/10] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()
Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 12:36:28 +0000 (UTC) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1464025410.301444.1522154188153@mail.yahoo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180327120153.31612-10-mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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unscribed me
On Tuesday, March 27, 2018 05:31:31 AM PDT, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> wrote:
Add a definition for cpu_show_spectre_v2() to override the generic
version. This has several permuations, though in practice some may not
occur we cater for any combination.
The most verbose is:
Mitigation: Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only), Indirect
branch cache disabled, ori31 speculation barrier enabled
We don't treat the ori31 speculation barrier as a mitigation on its
own, because it has to be *used* by code in order to be a mitigation
and we don't know if userspace is doing that. So if that's all we see
we say:
Vulnerable, ori31 speculation barrier enabled
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
index 0eace3cac818..2cee3dcd231b 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
@@ -58,3 +58,36 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, c
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ bool bcs, ccd, ori;
+ struct seq_buf s;
+
+ seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+
+ bcs = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED);
+ ccd = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED);
+ ori = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31);
+
+ if (bcs || ccd) {
+ seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: ");
+
+ if (bcs)
+ seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)");
+
+ if (bcs && ccd)
+ seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ");
+
+ if (ccd)
+ seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled");
+ } else
+ seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable");
+
+ if (ori)
+ seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ori31 speculation barrier enabled");
+
+ seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
+
+ return s.len;
+}
--
2.14.1
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-27 12:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-27 12:01 [PATCH v2 01/10] powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown Michael Ellerman
2018-03-27 12:01 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags Michael Ellerman
2018-03-27 12:01 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags Michael Ellerman
2018-03-29 18:35 ` Mauricio Faria de Oliveira
2018-03-27 12:01 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] powerpc/powernv: " Michael Ellerman
2018-03-27 12:01 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] powerpc/64s: Move cpu_show_meltdown() Michael Ellerman
2018-03-27 12:01 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_meltdown() Michael Ellerman
2018-03-27 12:01 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush() Michael Ellerman
2018-03-27 12:01 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush() Michael Ellerman
2018-03-27 12:01 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v1() Michael Ellerman
2018-03-27 12:01 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2() Michael Ellerman
2018-03-27 12:36 ` T T [this message]
2018-03-28 9:15 ` Diana Madalina Craciun
2018-03-27 13:42 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown Gabriel Paubert
2018-03-28 14:13 ` [v2, " Michael Ellerman
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