From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
To: "Thiébaud Weksteen" <tweek@google.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>,
Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] selinux: add tracepoint on audited events
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 10:31:11 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <08b8b541-d558-d290-9593-a8cf18a40c1e@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200817170729.2605279-2-tweek@google.com>
On 8/17/20 1:07 PM, Thiébaud Weksteen wrote:
> The audit data currently captures which process and which target
> is responsible for a denial. There is no data on where exactly in the
> process that call occurred. Debugging can be made easier by being able to
> reconstruct the unified kernel and userland stack traces [1]. Add a
> tracepoint on the SELinux denials which can then be used by userland
> (i.e. perf).
>
> Although this patch could manually be added by each OS developer to
> trouble shoot a denial, adding it to the kernel streamlines the
> developers workflow.
>
> It is possible to use perf for monitoring the event:
> # perf record -e avc:selinux_audited -g -a
> ^C
> # perf report -g
> [...]
> 6.40% 6.40% audited=800000 tclass=4
> |
> __libc_start_main
> |
> |--4.60%--__GI___ioctl
> | entry_SYSCALL_64
> | do_syscall_64
> | __x64_sys_ioctl
> | ksys_ioctl
> | binder_ioctl
> | binder_set_nice
> | can_nice
> | capable
> | security_capable
> | cred_has_capability.isra.0
> | slow_avc_audit
> | common_lsm_audit
> | avc_audit_post_callback
> | avc_audit_post_callback
> |
>
> It is also possible to use the ftrace interface:
> # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/avc/selinux_audited/enable
> # cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
> tracer: nop
> entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 1/1 #P:8
> [...]
> dmesg-3624 [001] 13072.325358: selinux_denied: audited=800000 tclass=4
>
> The tclass value can be mapped to a class by searching
> security/selinux/flask.h. The audited value is a bit field of the
> permissions described in security/selinux/av_permissions.h for the
> corresponding class.
>
> [1] https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/native_stack_dump
>
> Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> Suggested-by: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-18 14:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-17 17:07 [PATCH v3 0/3] selinux: add detailed tracepoint on audited events Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-17 17:07 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] selinux: add " Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-18 14:31 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2020-08-17 17:07 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-18 14:36 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-17 17:07 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] selinux: add permission names to trace event Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-17 20:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-17 20:29 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-18 16:09 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-19 13:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21 2:31 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-21 12:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21 13:19 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-21 13:39 ` peter enderborg
[not found] ` <CA+zpnLfNjDwxgoG2p3W8YfXxYVQDum4Eh_MJQvKP4rGLqsqACA@mail.gmail.com>
2020-08-21 13:46 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-17 20:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-18 8:11 ` peter enderborg
2020-08-18 12:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21 2:22 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-21 5:53 ` peter enderborg
2020-08-21 12:14 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21 13:10 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20200824132252.31261-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com>
2020-08-24 13:22 ` [RFC PATCH] selinux: Add denied trace with permssion filter Peter Enderborg
2020-08-26 13:42 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-26 14:34 ` peter enderborg
2020-08-26 14:45 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-26 15:06 ` peter enderborg
2020-08-27 13:30 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-27 14:04 ` peter enderborg
2020-08-31 14:16 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-31 14:19 ` Robert Judy
2020-08-31 14:24 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-31 15:34 ` peter enderborg
2020-09-01 15:31 ` Paul Moore
2020-09-01 17:18 ` peter enderborg
2020-09-18 1:47 ` Steven Rostedt
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